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 Abstract 
 
  
 
A tension exists between the interests of states in protecting national 
security through border controls and those of communities in cross-
border regions, to whom frequent border crossing is part of daily life – a 
necessary part of achieving their own wellbeing. The interplay between 
these two sets of interests has shaped particular ‘border regimes’ with 
varying degrees of selectivity in measures of the control of movements of 
people. In Mozambique, the securing of borders since the early 1990s in 
order to tackle unauthorised migration and organised crime has revealed a 
tension with border communities – the manifestation of which is 
regionally specific elements related to commuters (those crossing the 
border for shopping, schooling or medical care). This thesis applies 
qualitative research methods to a study of this multilevel (social, economic, 
cultural, security and political) problem of border governance in 
Mozambique. Empirical data, drawing on the interpretations and 
meanings of those who live in cross-border areas, as well as of government 
officials, are drawn on to reach a deeper understanding of the types of 
cross-border interactions and challenges that exist. Opportunities and 
constraints emanating from the demands of regional integration and 
international models of border governance are also analysed, in terms of 
their implications for those responsible for border control. By contrasting 
the national security orientation of border control and examining some of 
the localised cross-border consequences of its practices on communities 
living in cross-border regions, the study aims to contribute to a growing 
body of knowledge on the impact of border control practices on 
 Samenvatting xvii 
 
communities in cross-border regions. In order to achieve this, three 
regions were selected as cases studies, each representing a regional case: 
the Mozambique-Malawi border (Mandimba); the Mozambique-
Zimbabwe border (Machipanda); and the Mozambique-South Africa 
border (Ressano Garcia). Key findings indicate that, despite some 
similarities (ethnic, language, religious), each border region is unique in the 
way that it contains specific aspects of crossing which demand a 
contextualised approach to border and security. These specific elements 
include the use of transboundary resources and access to socio-economic 
facilities (schools, hospitals, mills, markets, jobs). These elements have 
persisted since colonial times to post-independence and post-war 
Mozambique. They neither fit into a truncated view of constructivism on 
security and borders nor into a sovereign-oriented border governance. 
Drawing on these findings, the study concludes by proposing a human 
development (or human security) approach to border controls, giving due 
attention to people’s experiences and needs in daily life. 
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Grensbewaking in Mozambique: Het snijvlak van internationale 
grenscontroles, regionale integratie en de grensregio’s 
 Samenvatting 
 
 
 
Er bestaat een spanningsveld tussen enerzijds de belangen van staten om 
de nationale veiligheid te beschermen door middel van grenscontroles, en 
anderzijds de belangen van bewoners van grensregio’s die in het dagelijks 
leven geregeld de grens oversteken – wat onlosmakelijk verbonden is met 
hun welbevinden. De wisselwerking tussen deze verschillende belangen 
heeft geleid tot bepaalde ‘grensregimes’ die verschillen in de mate waarin 
de bewegingen van mensen worden gecontroleerd. In Mozambique 
worden de grenzen sinds begin jaren 90 bewaakt om ongeoorloofde 
migratie en georganiseerde misdaad tegen te gaan. Dit heeft nadelen voor 
bewoners van de grensregio’s, die tot uitdrukking komen in 
regiospecifieke aspecten van het forenzen (de grens oversteken om 
inkopen te doen, onderwijs te genieten of medische zorg te ontvangen).    
 
In dit onderzoek wordt het meerlagige (sociale, economische, culturele, 
veiligheids- en politieke) probleem van grensbewaking in Mozambique 
met kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethoden bestudeerd. Om de verschillende 
soorten grensoverschrijdende interacties en uitdagingen beter te kunnen 
begrijpen, zijn empirische data verzameld met betrekking tot de 
interpretaties en belangen van zowel degenen die in de grensregio’s wonen 
als overheidsfunctionarissen. Ook zijn de mogelijkheden en beperkingen 
die voorvloeien uit de eisen die regionale integratie stelt en uit 
internationale modellen van grensbewaking geanalyseerd om de 
implicaties voor degenen die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de grenscontroles 
vast te stellen.  
 Samenvatting xix 
 
 
In het onderzoek wordt de op de nationale veiligheid gerichte 
grensbewaking gecontrasteerd en wordt gekeken naar een aantal lokale 
grensoverschrijdende gevolgen van de manier waarop grenscontroles in 
de praktijk worden uitgevoerd voor bewoners van de grensregio’s. Het 
doel hiervan is om een bijdrage te leveren aan de groeiende hoeveelheid 
kennis over wat de praktijk van grenscontroles betekent voor bewoners 
van de grensregio’s. Voor het onderzoek zijn drie verschillende regio’s 
geselecteerd als casestudy’s: de grens tussen Mozambique en Malawi 
(Mandimba); de grens tussen Mozambique en Zimbabwe (Machipanda) 
en de grens tussen Mozambique en Zuid-Afrika (Ressano Garcia).  
 
Uit de resultaten blijkt dat er weliswaar overeenkomsten zijn (in etniciteit, 
taal, religie), maar dat iedere grensregio uniek is wat betreft de specifieke 
aspecten van het passeren van de grens. Dit vereist een 
gecontextualiseerde benadering van grenzen en veiligheid. Deze specifieke 
aspecten zijn onder meer het gebruik 
van grensoverschrijdende hulpbronnen en toegang tot socio-economische 
faciliteiten (scholen, ziekenhuizen, fabrieken, markten, banen). Deze 
elementen waren altijd al aanwezig in Mozambique, van de koloniale tijd 
tot na de onafhankelijkheid en na de oorlog. Ze passen niet in een puur 
constructivistische kijk op veiligheid en grenzen, noch in een op 
soevereiniteit georiënteerde grensbewaking. Op grond van deze resultaten 
wordt een op menselijke ontwikkeling (of menselijke veiligheid) gerichte 
benadering van grenscontroles voorgesteld, waarin voldoende aandacht is 
voor wat mensen in het dagelijks leven ervaren en waaraan ze behoefte 
hebben. 
 
 
. 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
1.1 The research problem  
As a country that has emerged from a protracted and violent anti-colonial 
struggle, post-colonial Mozambique’s borders have been plagued by 
tension between the Mozambican border authorities and local 
communities, particularly those in the cross-border regions1. Since the 
early 1990s, the Mozambican government has been more concerned with 
a regime border controls focused on national security and aimed at 
preserving territorial sovereignty. This has seen an increase in training and 
deployment of patrol units on the border. In part, these arrangements have 
been implemented in response to high immigration flows from Sub-
Saharan Africa and beyond following the end of the war in 1992. More 
precisely, these arrangements have been implemented as a result of the 
association of the country’s extensive, porous and weakly patrolled 
borders with transnational crime in the Southern Africa region (Gastrow 
and Mosse 2011; Alar, 2010;  Raimundo, 2009; Lalá, 2003; Gastrow and 
Mosse, 2002; Gastrow, 2001). An overemphasis on the control of 
immigration flows has overlooked local patterns of cross-border 
movement among local communities living along the border, to whom 
daily border crossing is vital to their access to markets, health treatment, 
work on cultivated land, the gathering of firewood and other resources 
essential to their livelihoods.  
 Mozambique’s approach to security, built on the Westphalian model of 
state sovereignty, tends to see borders primarily as spaces for criminality 
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and its practices of control have had dire consequences for the 
establishment of border control strategies that could meet the needs of 
post-colonial countries in the Southern African region. Currently, each 
state in this region is concerned with making borders more patrolled rather 
than turning them into spaces complementary to rapid integration and 
economic development (Lunegelo and Mbilinyi, 2009).  
 While the different national regimes of border control in this region 
have been strengthened, there is no forum to negotiate the human aspects 
of security in border areas. Communities and their needs in these areas are 
characterised by historically rooted social ties that defy the Westphalian 
notion of territorial sovereignty. As far as the literature on border studies 
is concerned, at the local, regional, or international levels, borders are 
characterized by conflicts and opportunities that are exploited differently 
by different actors, collective and individuals alike (Rodrigues and Tomás, 
2012). Therefore, in order to protect the human security needs of these 
border communities, new complementary spaces are needed to ensure that 
practices of border control do not threaten the human security of border 
communities in the name of national security.  
 One way to overcome the current tension would be to create a forum 
through which local communities can discuss ‘security’ issues with state 
officials. This would help to shift the key concerns from a state-centred 
regime of security to a human-centred regime that recognises the actual 
meanings of ‘security’ and ‘border’ in the day-to-day lives of communities 
in the cross-border regions of Mozambique. An interaction between states 
and local communities on the meaning of borders could challenge the 
dominant trends in practices of the securitisation of borders. 
 To be more specific, this thesis is built on the assumption that a focus 
on sovereignty-oriented border control has led to a fragmentation of 
migration research and a failure to produce a fundamental body of know-
ledge in the field of border control (Castles, 2015; 2002). In this sense, the 
thesis could be regarded as an invitation to the Mozambican state, its 
border divisions and the general stakeholders to revisit and reflect once 
more on current practices of border control and their import in relation 
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to the concept of national security and the security community. They may 
need to engage in such reflection, taking into consideration both the wider 
context of regional integration in the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) and the global model of border governance.  
1.2 Contextualising border and its meanings in Mozambique 
Given the growing perception of the different roles and meanings of 
borders (Guillaume and Huysmans, 2013; Balzacq, 2010; Houtum, 2005), 
I define border as a power-relation reality in which national, regional, and 
international interests are encountered. While in the international and 
regional domains the meaning of border tends to be the result of 
articulation between international actors such as states and international 
institutions through conventions, agreements, and other international 
legal instruments, in the national dimension, border represents the 
aspirations and views of state authorities rather than those of local 
communities. This understanding is recognised in the literature: “models 
of analysis of migration have tended to favour the interests of states over 
people” (Truong, Gasper and Handmaker, 2014:5). Not only have these 
models been detrimental to people on the move, they have also had a 
negative impact on people living in the cross-border regions, whose day-
to-day life depends on crossing ‘securitised borders’.    
 In the context of Mozambique, the meanings and roles of borders in 
the post-colonial and post-conflict period are extremely fragmented, an 
issue that is returned to in Chapter 3.  
 From the geographical standpoint, Mozambique has a coastline of 4330 
km and land border of 2515 km, making their protection a challenging if 
not impossible task, given the current lack of human and technological 
capacity to protect these borders physically (Mosse, 2011; Alar, 2010; 
Gastrow, 2002). Historically, these borders, inherited from colonial rule, 
became a concern following independence, the legacy of a post-
independence war with Renamo, supported by the then-apartheid regime 
in South Africa. In the face of threats posed by penetration by apartheid-
supported guerrilla fighters, various contemporary border control 
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practices were developed during the civil war period, including back 
checks, arrests and detention of (especially armed) illegal immigrants 
suspected of having sympathies with Renamo (Emerson, 2014; Davies, 
1987);  
 In the case of post-apartheid South Africa, earlier internal segregation 
policies in relation to migration have been replaced by control strategies 
at the external border crossings into South Africa. This has happened 
simultaneously with the reconnection of South Africa to global chains of 
investment, and capital and trade transactions, resulting in migration 
reforms at national level that have penalised less skilled labour immigrants 
from neighbouring states (Crush and Dodson, 2007). 
 More recently, the meanings and roles of borders have also shifted 
from a physical representation to political and virtual interpretations, 
especially in the case of transnational migration and organised crime 
(Cerny, 2009; Rumford, 2006). For example, the Mozambican media has 
several times reported cases of unauthorised immigrants found in 
containers on long-distance transport vehicles, the intention of whom it is 
to enter South Africa. In most cases, these unauthorised immigrants are 
Ethiopians, Pakistanis, Bengalis, Indians, Nigerians or Chinese 
(Raimundo, 2009). As a result, neighbouring states, particularly South 
Africa, Namibia and Botswana, have considered Mozambique a transit 
corridor for unauthorised immigrants, which has profoundly altered the 
foundation and implementation of the Protocol on free movement of 
persons within SADC, leading to the consolidation of different regimes of 
border control in the region (Oucho, 2014; Oucho and Crush, 2001). 
 The Mozambican government has responded to cross-border related 
crime by focusing on the training and deployment of greater numbers of 
patrol forces at the border, legal reforms aimed at allowing better control 
of entry, stay and departure of immigrants, as well as reforms such as the 
reaffirmation and delimitation of borders. In conjunction with these 
initiatives, Mozambique has established the National Institute of the Sea 
and Borders (IMAF2), which is the state’s coordinating body responsible 
for implementing technical and methodological activities in the 
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reaffirmation and delimitation of national borders. Through IMAF, 
Mozambique has finalised the delimitation of its borders with Tanzania, 
Comoros, Malawi and Mauritius. In addition, the Mozambican 
government has established an Inter-ministerial Commission for the Sea 
and Borders (COMAF3) – a multi-sector institution responsible for 
coordinating all border-related activities (national defence, health, police, 
customs, immigration, mining, agriculture and other relevant sectors). In 
relation to this multi-sector border network, the president of IMAF4 has 
observed that “border management is a multilateral task which demands a 
permanent coordination and sharing of fundamental information between 
different sectors”. He considers that such multi-sector institutions can 
better coordinate their activities for better control of unauthorised 
migration, trafficking, smuggling and other transnational criminal activities 
threatening ‘global’ stability.  
Besides internal institutions’ arrangements for better management of 
border-related issues, the Mozambican government has passed and 
ratified several legal instruments aimed at reinforcing the security and 
safety of travellers crossing the country’s borders. These instruments 
range from the Decree 55/2003 of 28 December on facilitation and 
security of passengers travelling on aeroplanes; Decree 13/2008 on 
biometric passports; Resolution 21/2001 on visa abolition on passports 
among the community of Portuguese language countries (CPLP); the 
Southern African Community for Development (SADC) Protocol on 
facilitation of movement of people approved by heads of states of the 
region on 13/07/2005; Resolution 25/2004, of 14 July on the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS); 
Resolution 26/2004, which adopts the International Code for Security of 
Ships and of Port Facilities; the Protocol of the Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime, which came into force on 20 September 
2006; Decree 10/2006 of 5 April, which adopted electronic checks on 
luggage and passengers; Law 21/2009 of 28 September, which defines the 
general principles for civil aviation for safe and efficient air transportation 
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operations; Annex to the Decree 34/2009, which defines a list of goods 
prohibited for import and export.   
 While these legal instruments have made Mozambique a receiver of an 
international model of border governance, they have also reinforced 
internal security through security practices at the border, which has in turn 
consolidated the conflicting role of the border for the state and for 
communities in cross-border regions. Based on this persistent 
contradiction, particularly a lack of analysis of the impact of state-centred 
border controls on communities in cross-border regions, this study set out 
to bring an alternative approach to border controls that might minimise 
the tensions between state models and those of border dwellers on the 
issues of border security and the function of borders. What remains as yet 
unanswered is the question of how security resulting from international 
border governance intersects with regional regimes of border control, 
national interests and local cross-border communities.  
1.3 Border governance in a dynamic context 
Border governance is a practice on the one hand, and a concept on the 
other. As a practice, border governance involves the ability of government 
officials to enforce rules and to deliver services such as national defence 
and public security (Fukuyama, 2013). It involves the protection of state 
sovereignty against both external and internal security threats posed by 
vulnerability or an inability to defend the border. As a concept, border 
governance entails both ‘border’ and ‘governance’. In the field of border 
and migration studies, governance involves other actors aside from 
government such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the World Customs Organisation (WCO) 
and other international security agencies that are involved in regulating the 
movement of persons and trade across international borders. Border 
governance is thus a process that involves several actors as a result of 
various security interests over time. For example, the end of the Cold War 
has led to an intersection of different actors in the national, regional and 
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international domains. Regional and international dimensions of border 
governance will be discussed at a later point in this chapter.  
 From the perspective of national interests, borders are simply 
defined as fixed lines in a given territorial space dividing sovereign states 
(Mbembé and Rendall, 2000). Thus, the Chicago Convention (1944) 
defines a border as the limit of a state’s power; a line on the terrestrial and 
aquatic surfaces as well as on their vertical planes which determines the air 
boundary and the subsoil. The IOM defines a border as the line separating 
the land territory or maritime zones of one state from those of another. 
Among geographers, however, borders can be defined as more than the 
physical lines separating states in the international system; they can be 
defined more broadly as zones of transition between different societies 
and centres of power (Medeiros, 2015; Bartlett and Mackay, cited in 
Anderson and O’ Dowd, 1999; Newman, 2006a).  
From the Westphalian perspective of territorial sovereignty, borders 
are understood as strategic lines where the presence of military apparatus 
is used to protect the state against external military threats (Adamson, 
2008; Adamson, 2006; Andreas, 2003a). In the following subsection, the 
Westphalian regime is discussed in the context of border governance.  
1.3.1 Border governance under the Westphalian regime of 
sovereignty   
The Westphalian system is founded on two key principles, (1) the 
government of each country is sovereign within its territorial jurisdiction, 
and (2) no country shall interfere in another’s domestic affairs (Osiander, 
2001: 261). These principles legitimise the national security logic of border 
control and qualify the state as an ‘autonomous’ and ‘independent’ entity 
with the right and ‘capacity’ to impose authority within its territorial 
boundaries (Chung, 2014; Krasner, 2001; de Benoist, 1999; Doty, 1998; 
Krasner, 1995). Autonomy and independence are grounded in the idea 
that a state is a single super power authority with legitimacy to maintain 
domestic affairs and justice within its territorial boundaries (Krasner, 
2001). 
 Introduction 8 
  Building on the realist’s assumption that the international system is 
characterised by anarchy with a permanent environment of war in the 
background (Newman, 2009; Mearsheimer, 1995), states under the gaze 
of a Westphalian regime have focused on the military apparatus aimed at 
protecting territorial integrity.  
However, the growing interest in global networks of transactions (since 
the early 1990s) has given rise to tensions in the maximisation of domestic 
sovereignty of states under the Westphalian system (Anderson, 2013; 
Rudolph, 2005). Essentially, the Westphalian model of sovereignty has 
been compromised by four categories of interference (conventions, 
contracts, coercion and imposition) through which hegemonic states have 
been able to influence a third state’s domestic affairs (Finnemore and 
Goldstein, 2013; Anderson, 2013; Krasner, 1995). Some of these 
conventions range from a) the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 1997; b) the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1998; c) the International Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999; and d) the Convention against 
Organised Transnational Crime of 2004. As far as imposition is 
concerned, this is a situation in which the referent states are so weak that 
they have no choice other than to accept the policies of their rulers 
(Finnemore and Goldstein, 2013; Krasner, 1995). An example of 
imposition is the 2011 banning by the ICAO of several airline companies 
from flying into the EU, including Mozambique Air Lines.  
Another sort of interference that has challenged the traditional essence 
of the Westphalian regime is the concept of ‘contingent sovereignty’ – the 
entitlement of concerned states to enter a third state’s domestic nation to 
take actions of self-defence, particularly around issues of production of 
weapons of mass destruction (Donnelly, 2014; Elden, 2006). Since then, 
Westphalian borders have become eroded and people’s movements have 
been severely restricted. This is the complex reality in which border 
controls operate in the contemporary global system, and this presents an 
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interesting paradox in this study, one which is investigated in more depth 
in Chapter 2.  
1.3.2 Globalisation and the crisis of Westphalian borders     
While the previous section focused on the concept of border from the 
perspective of national security, the present subsection analyses border in 
regional and international contexts. In the case of the SADC region, the 
Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (PFMP) defines 
border as a common land space between any two member states, or any 
airport used for flights within the region, or seaport used for transhipment 
connections exclusively within the region. With the intersection between 
national interests and the international model of border governance, and 
the liberalisation of global markets in trade and capital, borders have 
shifted from fortified military lines to open spaces for commercial 
transactions (Andreas, 2003a). 
 As this intersection has created different interests among role-players 
(international agents, states, private companies such as technology 
providers), migration has come to be regarded as a security problem and 
borders have thus become bastions for the deterrence of unwanted 
immigrants (Donzelli, 2013; Huysmans and Squire, 2009; Dauvergne, 
2008; Munck, 2008). In other words, the opening of international frontiers 
in order to ease global trade and capital has led to a new political approach 
to border governance, one which proclaims the movements of people as 
a major security threat to a borderless world (Fassin, 2011; Huysmans and 
Squire, 2009; Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Adamson, 2006; Andreas, 2003a; 
Walters, 2002). This has shifted the perspective of protection of borders 
against external invasion to one of the protection of borders against 
infiltration by suspected persons (Léonard, 2010; Shamir, 2005; Flynn, 
2000). In retrospect, the majority of states have become more concerned 
with the movement of so-called disparate immigrants, which has led to 
restrictive border control responses (Castles, 2015; 2002). From the 
perspective of those responsible for border controls, globalisation has led 
to the establishment of a global human migration regime – one that 
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segregates and excludes people on the move on the basis of profiling 
categories ranging from race, nationality to country/region, which in turn 
has deepened the divide between countries and regions of the world 
(Shamir, 2005).   
 Concomitantly, the migration-security nexus in the global era has 
become the preferred risk-management system of border governance, 
with different regimes of control ranging from (1) labour migration 
regimes distinguishing qualified/skilled immigrants from asylum seekers 
and refugees; (2) distinctions between legal and high risk nationalities or 
sub-groups of migrants; (3) militarisation of borders and the establishment 
of detention centres; (4) externalisation of border control and the 
establishment of buffer zones; and e) the establishment of transnational 
visa regimes and biometric border control technology on a global scale 
(Weber and Grewcock, 2011; Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Shamir, 2005). 
These regimes make it evident that  
there is a clear choice to characterise immigrants as threatening, one that is 
often communicated by political leaders to domestic constituents and one 
that seems to justify emergency measures and the suspension of the normal 
rules of the game (McDonald, 2008:8). 
The choice that characterises ‘migrants’ as primary security threats has 
become the dominant approach to border control since the end of the 
Cold War. It is worth mentioning that as a result of the increasing 
association of migrants with security, migration management can better be 
understood from two typologies of regime: admission and integration 
(Boucher and Gest, 2014). In the next subsection an analysis is provided 
of both regimes from the perspective of securitisation theory, which has 
posed tremendous challenges to Westphalian sovereignty in relation to 
border control as an international concern.  
1.3.3 Securitisation and the crisis of people’s movement across 
borders   
Securitisation theory emerged during the 1990s. Barry Buzan and Ole 
Waever at the Copenhagen School of Security made the theory famous by 
 Introduction 11 
arguing that security is a social construction and not something that is 
given or obvious (McDonald, 2008). By counteracting the traditional 
definition of security (objectively defined), securitisation is grounded in an 
“intersubjective and social construct process by which a threat to a 
particular referent object is acknowledged and deemed worth protecting’’ 
(Charrett, 2009:13). It occurs when a particular issue (which has 
traditionally never been treated as such) is transformed into a security 
threat through a linguistic representation/speech act (McDonald, 2008).  
 Securitisation involves its speech act (communication tool) and its 
associated practices. Through a speech act, political leaders persuade the 
audience/constituency to agree on the existence of a survival threat that 
needs states’ interventions (including military power) in dealing with it 
(McDonald, 2008). In so doing, “an issue becomes a security issue not 
because something constitutes an objective threat to the state […], but 
rather because an actor has defined something as [an] existential threat to 
some object’s survival” (Diskaya, 2013:1). Securitisation occurs when: (1) 
it is claimed that there is an objective existential threat; (2) the referent 
object of security is seen as morally legitimate or vulnerable; and (3) the 
security response is viewed as appropriate to the capabilities of the threat 
concerned (Latawski, 2014; Floyd, 2011; Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, 1998).  
The power of speech acts (used to construct security threats) can be 
illustrated through elite and public discourses that associate asylum seekers 
and refugees, for example, with crime, drugs and terrorism rather than 
focusing on the lack of human security that underpins or explains their 
movements (Walters, 2002). As Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001:613) point 
out, “the official position of most advanced countries is that controlling 
national borders against illegal entry is a central goal of immigration 
policy”. However, securitisation has resulted in rhetoric and anti-
immigration policies that are dissonant with the real security threats 
endured by people on the move, displaced by wars, and lacking 
livelihoods. Put differently, generalised securitisation has resulted in the 
reclosing of states’ borders because of the general construction of fear 
imparted by political leaders. Political leaders instil in the public the belief 
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that crime and unauthorised immigration are inextricably linked to the 
abolition of international frontiers and that stronger control of these 
borders is an imperative (Guillaume and Huysmans, 2013: 4–5; Huysmans, 
2002). 
Apart from political leaders, other sources of securitisation include 
media displays (of images representing security threats such as bombings 
by terrorists groups); visual representations of security threats (through 
canvas, symbols, and artefacts); categorisation of travellers by citizenship 
for passport checks; and standardisation of (in)secure responses through 
mandatory recommended security measures.  
As far as securitising practices are concerned, states have been trying 
to match discourse with actions ranging from increased budgets for new 
admissions and training of staff, research and investment in high 
technology for border surveillance, increased numbers of detention 
centres, and militarisation of borders (Nessel, 2008; Munck, 2008; 
Bosworth and Guild, 2008). As Léonard (2010) argues, the deployment of 
troops and military equipment to prevent the entry of asylum seekers and 
refugees through the EU border is a socially constructed practice that 
criminalises these categories of immigrants. At the training level, 
securitisation has become a dominant strategy of border control, through 
which border authorities and networks of other professionals are trained 
and indoctrinated in institutional values that have blurred the distinction 
between the military and the police role at the border (Guillaume and 
Huysmans, 2013; Munck, 2008; Huysmans and Squire, 2009). 
Indoctrination in the belief of socially constructed threats creates a 
structure determining how border patrols should secure the border, and 
what they have to see and not see at the border (Gubrium and Koro-
Ljungberg, 2005).  
1.3.3.1 Critiques of securitisation  
Based on securitising practices, the concept of securitisation has been 
extensively criticised. From the perspective of border governance, it has 
been recognised by several scholars that the linking of immigrants with 
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crime has resulted in negative securitisation. In this context, negative 
securitisation has led to the removal of human security needs from 
national security agendas (McDonald, 2008; Munck, 2008).   
In terms of language and speech acts, securitisation has been criticised 
for prioritising powerful and influential voices (of political leaders, the 
media, and artists), who are able to achieve a wide audience while 
neglecting the less influential and thereby deflecting focus from security 
(McDonald, 2008). Language has turned migration into a security problem 
through the social mobilisation of the general society and government 
institutions (police, customs, the army, and other sectors) regarding the 
advantages and dangers from contacts with different social groups 
(Huysmans, 2002; Munck, 2008). For example, global policing has 
embodied a transformation in such a way that the training of police 
officers to fight trafficking, terrorism and other organised crime has to 
follow standardised practices of communication, particularly in the use of 
specific language and telecommunications (Bowling, 2009). Critiques of 
securitising practice make it evident that the articulation of discourse 
about security threats and the training of professionals, as well as the 
technology adopted, is detrimental to the human security aspects of 
border control (Huysmans and Squire, 2009). 
 Therefore, securitisation and its results in the (re)militarisation of 
borders has not yet become a sustainable solution for migration 
management; surveillance operations do not provide a response to the 
safety and well-being of people who move and the leading forces for their 
relocation (Axworthy, 2001).  
 Whilst there are many studies that consider the negative impact of 
border securitisation on people on the move, this study considers how 
‘hard’ border regimes can affect local settled communities living in cross-
border areas. As Table 1.1 in the next section shows, a less securitised or 
more ‘simplified’ set of border controls is applied by the Mozambican 
government in areas where local cross-border movements are considered 
‘normal’ and non-threatening to national sovereignty. Simplified border 
arrangements can also be introduced in emergencies, for instance when 
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natural disasters, droughts or floods necessitate the rapid movement of 
people across borders. By the same token, simplified border regimes are 
reversible, as when neighbouring countries decide to close border 
crossings and construct fences, as has been the case between Mozambique 
and South Africa. In such cases, a single border crossing point may 
become official, or may even be closed in some instances, for temporary 
security reasons. In such cases, the key challenge for states, and for the 
Mozambican government in particular in its migration governance, is to 
(re)configure a security model that combines defence of the state with that 
of individuals, recognising that a state cannot be secure while it has 
insecure people – citizens and others – living within (and moving across) 
its borders (Oberleitner, 2002: 10). The three local cross-border case study 
areas selected for special focus in this study are briefly introduced in the 
following section.  
1.4 Selection of research sites: different modes of border 
governance  
This study includes three cross-border research areas in Mozambique 
where regional and local, rather than international migration governance 
regimes apply. These are Ressano Garcia (Chapter 4), Machipanda 
(Chapter 5) and Mandimba (Chapter 6). All three cross-border regions are 
neighbours to different countries5 in the Southern Africa region. The first 
case, the Ressano Garcia border in Maputo Province in South 
Mozambique has rapidly become the busiest crossing point of the 
Mozambique-South Africa border. The second research area, Machipanda 
border region in Manica Province in Central Mozambique, borders on 
Zimbabwe. The third research area, Mandimba border, in Niassa Province 
in northern Mozambique, borders on Malawi.   
 In the case of Ressano Garcia, border controls are confined to the 
official crossing point itself, which is characterised by a strong military 
presence and can be defined as ‘securitised’. The land border is not porous, 
as is the case in some regions, but is fully fenced and patrolled so that the 
border can be crossed only at a single official crossing point. The second 
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case study area, Machipanda, is located on the busy Beira corridor and 
forms the crossing point in an economic zone that involves trade between 
Zimbabwe and the hinterland and the port of Beira on the Indian Ocean. 
As well as being an informal economic trading area, Machipanda is the 
crossing in an important economic zone. On the road itself, official 
controls apply, and can be classified as strong. However, around 
Machipanda in the outlying areas the border is more porous and is 
considered a simplified’ border with a special regime specified by the 
national Mozambican Border Police. Map 1.1 and Table 1.1 show both 
the locations of the cross-border case studies and some basic 
characteristics of migration governance in the three cases. 
 Map 1.1 
 The selected border regions for data collection  
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       Legend: 
- Mandimba border 
- Machipanda border 
- Ressano Garcia border  
 
Source: http://www.southafrica.to/transport/Airlines/cheap-flights-from-South-Africa/cheap-flights-
from-Johannesburg/Johannesburg-Mozambique.php; retrieved on 5 October 2014 
 
 
In the case of Ressano Garcia, researchers have argued that, for 
Mozambican migrant workers (and also those from Swaziland and 
Lesotho), being able to pass through the border crossing to South Africa 
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is vital for their livelihood strategies. However, the diminishing interest in 
mine workers’ welfare, which has been perceived as related to irregular 
forms of border crossing, has in turn led states to increase border 
surveillance (Melde, Anich, Crush et al.¸ 2014; Vigneswaran, 2013; 
Adepoju, 2006; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002). In this scenario, the Ressano 
Garcia border has become contentious as local communities face 
restrictions when crossing the border as both the Mozambican and the 
South African authorities have increased border control levels in disregard 
of human security concerns among the local populace. 
 The second case, Machipanda, has been characterised over the last 
three decades by reversal patterns of migration intertwined with political 
and economic dynamics in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Given these 
dynamics, this research study was concerned with understanding 
government approaches to border control and migration management in 
response to the change in migration patterns across the Mozambique-
Zimbabwe border.    
The third case, Mandimba, is characterised by land disputes between 
local communities and Malawian citizens on the Mozambican side of the 
border. In this particular context, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish 
people by their identity, as both Malawian and Mozambican citizens 
struggle to find land, firewood and timber for construction (Raimundo, 
2009). This suggests that populations from border regions are concerned 
with food security and other socio-economic matters regardless of legal 
lines establishing the limit of state sovereignty. Moreover, the 
Mozambique-Malawi border has been affected by the return of 
Mozambican citizens since the war, which has given rise to a different 
scenario of human migration across the border, particularly in cases of 
‘one household on two sides of the border’. 
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 Table 1.1 
Summary of convergent factors in the three border regions    
 Similarities Differences 
Ethnicity and 
language  
Socio-
economic 
needs 
Goods and 
services 
Cross-
border 
interaction 
Influential 
factors 
Ressano 
Garcia 
Tsonga; Changana; 
Zulus  
Apartheid regime 
Access to 
supermarkets; 
informal 
trading; job 
opportunities 
Manufactured 
goods; 
mining; 
construction 
Limited  Smuggling; 
trafficking, 
illegal 
migration; 
highly 
patrolled 
border 
Machipanda Shona; Manhyka  
cross-border identity  
Informal 
trading;  
access to 
basic 
consumer 
goods; 
job 
opportunities 
Groceries; 
clothing; 
plumbing; 
house 
building; 
wood workers 
Moderate Political 
and 
economic 
dynamics; 
smuggling; 
trafficking 
Mandimba Emacua; Cyao; 
Chichewa; cross-
border identity  
Informal 
trading; 
casual jobs  
Agricultural 
surplus; 
access to 
land; family 
visits; 
medical 
treatment;  
farming jobs 
Permanent Legacies of 
the war 
(refugees); 
porosity; 
limited 
control; 
cross-
border 
households; 
cross-
border 
leadership 
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 This table reflects similarities and differences in the three cross-border 
case studies. Language and cultural proximity is a common factor in all 
three border regions, as shown in the second column of the table. 
Similarly, in all three border regions, there are strong cross-border 
interactions in terms of socio-economic factors. What differs are the 
specific goods and services being traded and taken across the border. In 
Ressano Garcia most cross-border movement involves trade in consumer 
goods or labour movement towards South Africa, mainly in mining and 
construction. In Machipanda, most economic activities centre on 
construction, food items and clothing, whilst in Mandimba most of the 
cross-border migration relates to land use and agricultural goods. 
However, for the government, the dominant discourse is one of ‘security’, 
and a concern under this umbrella with protecting national resources, 
raising revenues, fighting crime and other transnational threats, and 
ultimately securing sovereignty. There are, however, as the table shows, 
moderate forms of security that are practised at borders that are not 
considered to be under pressure from transnational threats.  
 The fourth and fifth cases examined in this study are the international 
crossing points into Mozambique, specifically the airport of Mavalane in 
Maputo and the port of Maputo, where an international model of border 
control and migration governance applies. In the main airport and port of 
Mozambique, for instance, electronic checks are routine for persons and 
for luggage. High-tech instruments are used for collecting data, many 
provided by private companies. At the airport, controls are carried out by 
immigration police and customs officials, whilst a private company secures 
the airport building. In the port, government officials also work with 
private security companies.   
 As this range of cases shows, within Mozambican domestic migration 
governance, there are some differences in how border controls are applied; 
the kind of technology and procedures used at the airport and seaport are 
not used at every border crossing with neighbouring countries. What the 
three local cross-border cases illustrate is the diversity of migration 
governance systems in the country. Chapter 7 explores this problem at 
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international level. In Chapter 8, the problem of the lack of agreement on 
how border regimes are decided is illustrated in the context of SADC. If 
stronger countries within SADC can unilaterally take action to close 
borders and to tighten controls, what are the implications for cooperation 
within SADC. Chapter 8 also considers how SADC might improve 
communications about such decision-making, leading to conflict 
avoidance and improved coordination of border governance within the 
Southern African region.  
 Each of these cases was selected in order to provide a comparative 
picture of cross-border interaction and migration patterns in these three 
regions of the country.  
1.5 Research objectives and questions 
1.5.1 Objectives 
By examining the conflict between national security-driven border 
controls and local needs regarding border crossing, this thesis pursues four 
objectives. First, it seeks to explore the existing academic literature on the 
concept of security, its transformation, and its impact on border controls. 
The thesis does this by focusing on security dynamics since the end of the 
Cold War and the inter-state relations between Western and Eastern 
European countries regarding the nature of security threats.   
 Secondly, the thesis examines migration policies and border control 
responses following the end of the war in Mozambique and the collapse 
of apartheid in South Africa. The foundation of this objective is that the 
end of the Cold War affected international relations profoundly, with the 
collapse of apartheid being one of the illustrations of this in the Southern 
African region. Moreover, South Africa and Mozambique have a long 
historical cross-border migration relationship tied to the mining sector in 
which cyclical and long-term labour migration has always been a survival 
strategy for many migrants in the Southern African region. Based on this 
background, the thesis investigates the effects of evolving border 
governance and control strategies since the end of the war in 1992.  
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  Thirdly, the thesis seeks to explore and compare some life experiences 
of communities living in and moving through the three selected border 
regions in Mozambique. In order to pursue this objective, the thesis 
compares socio-economic and ethno-cultural factors of interaction 
between Mozambican citizens and their counterparts in the border regions 
of neighbouring countries.  
 Fourthly, the thesis seeks to examine the domestic impact of regional 
and international interests of border control in Mozambique. This 
objective arises from the fact that since the end of the war in Mozambique, 
combined factors (ranging from the return of refugees from neighbouring 
countries, the search for arable land and access to livelihoods across the 
border) have shaped a new context of border, which demands substantial 
analysis, particularly in the face of regional integration and international 
models of border governance. The study ends by exploring how SADC 
and official Mozambican concepts of security can be rethought, by 
focusing less on conflict resolution and more on human development.  
1.5.2 Research question 
How do the Mozambican state and communities in the cross-border 
regions understand ‘borders’ and ‘security’? How can these 
understandings be reconciled or balanced within Mozambican and 
regional border governance arrangements and principles?   
Sub-questions   
 How have the end of the Cold War and of apartheid influenced 
border governance, both at national and international levels, as 
well as realities of cross-border movements in the Southern 
African region and more specifically in post-war Mozambique? 
 
 On the basis of three local case studies, how do communities 
in the border regions experience day-to-day border controls; 
what kinds of border controls can be identified, and in what 
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way do these accommodate – or not – such localised 
understandings of cross-border interactions? 
 
 What impact have the international norms and migration 
governance standards had on the Mozambique borders 
(seaports and airports)?  
 
 To what extent are human development aspects in cross-
border regions taken into consideration in the ongoing process 
of regional integration in SADC?   
1.6 The research methodology 
The thesis applies qualitative research methods to study a multilevel (social, 
economic, cultural, security and political) problem of border interaction, 
crossing and control by the state authorities in Mozambique. It focuses on 
descriptions, human interpretation and meanings of the border, aiming to 
build a deeper understanding of cross-border interaction and the challenges 
emanating from regional integration demands and international models of 
border governance. As Andrade (2009:43) points out, qualitative research 
refers to “a study process that investigates a social human problem […] and 
builds a whole and complex representation by a rich description and 
explanation as well as careful examination of informants’ words and views”.  
 As qualitative research, this thesis uses three border regions as case 
studies to examine meanings of the border elicited from government actors 
and local communities. In each case, a range of information was collected 
through informal discussions, analysis of documents and reports, and 
through more in-depth interviews, Focus Group Discussions and key 
informants (Creswell, Hanson, Plano et al., 2007; Walsham, 1995; George 
and Bennett, 2005. All this was complemented by a thorough review of 
relevant academic literature. By using a collective case study, this thesis seeks 
to explore and compare the concept of border from national, regional and 
international perspectives of control, and in the context of the different 
priorities of governance and socio-economic survival. Addressing the 
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central research question of the different understandings of border, the 
study suggests that a border is not only the geographical lines separating 
sovereign states, but can indeed also be thought of as product of local, 
national and even international social construction. To this end, the thesis 
uses the three local case studies, and also the international border crossing 
regimes at the airport and main seaport of the country, to investigate how 
the border is understood within various real-life contexts, and from the 
perspective of different stakeholders. These stakeholders range from 
politicians who were interviewed or who made statements, to border police 
with whom informal discussions were held, to customs officers who were 
interviewed, immigration officials and others (Yin, 2013). In the case of local 
communities living in border regions between Mozambique and the three 
adjacent neighbouring countries, the researcher was mainly interested in 
hearing of their day-to-day experiences – and the key challenges – of living 
in a border region.  
1.6.1 Interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), and limitations   
In-depth interviews and FGDS are widely used as data collection techniques 
in qualitative cases studies (Creswell et al., 2007; Yin, 2013). In-depth 
interviews provide the researcher with primary data through which he can 
best access participants’ interpretations, views, and aspirations about given 
real-life events (Walsham, 1995; Yin, 2013). According to Gubrium and 
Koro-Ljungberg (2005:694), “qualitative interviews have traditionally been 
framed as explorations or discoveries of the perceptions of an individual 
subject to better understand his or her world”. In the context of this study, 
in-depth interviews were conducted with a purposeful selected sample of 
respondents6 from the National Assembly in Maputo (parliamentary 
members), border police officers, immigration officers, customs officers, 
and technicians at the National Institute of the Sea and Borders. I 
interviewed three to four respondents from each sector. 
 In addition, primary data was collected through FGDs with local 
communities in three border regions. I first contacted the District 
Administrator, who informed local leaders about my study. Discussions 
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were organised in advance, and the local leaders also provided a person to 
facilitate the FGDs and lead the discussion, and to guide me. Where people 
did not speak Portuguese, the research was conducted with the assistance 
of an interpreter from the local community. Once the FGDs had been 
completed, the individual interpreters sometimes explained the context 
more fully in a more informal setting, in their home or over lunch.   
 Initially, the study ruled out FGDs as a data gathering technique with 
borders authorities, immigration and customs officials since it was believed 
that their internal hierarchical structure might negatively affect any 
discussion on sensitive matters such as smuggling and unauthorised 
migration networks. However, during the fieldwork it became apparent that 
the border police did not want to engage in individual interviews without 
the commander being present. For this reason, it was decided to conduct 
FGDs with border police in each local cross-border region, rather than to 
interview them individually. This may well have prevented low-ranking 
officers from openly expressing their opinions during the discussions, or 
from actively participating. Regardless of such constraints, between three 
and four FGDs were organised in each selected border area (Ressano 
Garcia, Machipanda, and Mandimba). Occasionally, following group 
discussions, individuals would confide some further details over a bottle of 
beer. Informal contacts with officials in each area were therefore also very 
important to the researcher.   
 In order to ensure data triangulation7, apart from interviews and FGDs, 
the study gathered secondary data from annual reports from immigration 
and customs departments, and from the border police. This data was 
combined with wider, more general academic literature on migration 
governance, border and cross-border studies. Initially, the study was 
intended to compare annual data of migration into and out of Mozambique, 
between 1992 and 2012. However, it proved impossible to find enough 
reports to construct meaningful comparative data. One difficulty was the 
absence of any consistent system for recording and storing such data, which 
tended to vary from period to period. Two archives were consulted, stored 
respectively at the National Department of Immigration and at the National 
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Command of Border Police of Mozambique. In consulting these archives, 
it emerged, for example, that some immigrants had been recorded at 
provincial level but that the numbers indicated did not correspond to 
numbers provided in the national reports. With regard to border police, 
finding reliable data was complicated by the fact that much of the 
information related to immigrants who were considered to be unauthorised, 
and who may not have been detected or recorded officially when crossing 
the borders. This lack of reliable and consistent data made it difficult to use 
such quantitative information in this study. Some tables have been 
elaborated, however, to show rough numbers of cross-border movements 
from different countries, where appropriate.   
1.6.2 Data analysis 
In qualitative research, since both researcher and participants are involved 
in the process of data collection and analysis (Yin, 2013; Creswell et al., 
2007), data gathered through interviews and FGDs is analysed using 
interpretive case study analysis. Interpretive case study analysis demands 
that researchers access and judge people’s interpretations and meanings of 
their day-to-day practices (Andrade, 2009; George and Bennett, 2005; 
Walsham; 1995). In this study, the analysis process consisted of exploring 
and comparing the significance of borders for the populations in the 
selected regions, their aspirations and the challenges facing them. This 
information was compared with the significance of borders from the 
perspective of state authorities (border police, customs and immigration 
sectors) and their difficulties in complying with regional interests and 
international border security priorities.  
1.7 Significance of the study  
In questioning national security-oriented border controls in Mozambique, 
this thesis has found that border governance in Mozambique is as yet not 
influenced by livelihood dynamics in cross-border regions, which makes 
evident the prevalence of the state’s security interests over the local 
populations. Suffice it to say that, in the Mozambican context, the existing 
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literature (Gastrow and Mosse, 2011; Raimundo, 2009; Lalá, 2003) places 
great emphasis on the role of the border as a stronghold from which to 
fight criminals and stresses that the state needs to reinforce more patrol 
operations. This discourse is predominant among state officials and 
politicians. Their view that strong borders are essential is based on (1) 
legacies of the war and mutual mistrust between countries, and (2) the 
discovery of mineral resources in Mozambique, which has led to the need 
for strict control of borders for the protection and better use of resources.  
 Despite these state security-driven discourses, each of the three cross-
border areas discussed in this thesis are characterised by unique socio-
economic and ethno-cultural dynamics that run counter to international 
and regional perceptions of individuals on the move as security threats. 
These three case studies suggest that different dynamics of interaction in 
cross-border regions need to be included in the debate on regional 
integration in the context of human development, which could help 
Mozambique and other post-colonial states to better articulate 
international models of border governance with local security needs. 
1.8 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is arranged into eight chapters. The first chapter introduces the 
research problem and some theoretical foundations of the transformation 
of the concept of security and its consequences for the movement of 
people, particularly into Western countries. The second and third chapters 
are interrelated in the sense that both respond to the first two objectives 
and the first sub-question. In the second chapter, the thesis explores the 
theoretical debate on transformation of security threats from state military 
attacks to threats posed by individuals (particularly in the post-Cold War 
period, when the opening of international frontiers for global trade 
transactions has been perceived as a conduit for transnational organised 
crime). Building on this, the third chapter examines some of the 
consequences of the end of the Cold War for the Southern African region; 
of these, the end of the war in Mozambique and the collapse of apartheid 
in South Africa are pivotal turning points.  
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    Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are firmly grounded in empirical data collected 
during fieldwork in three different cross-border regions of Mozambique, 
in the period from September 2012 to April 2013, and from January to 
April 2014. These chapters respond to the second sub-questions of the 
thesis and by so doing meet the second objective. Border controls at 
Ressano Garcia (Chapter 4) have been readjusted to respond to migration 
patterns following the end of the war in Mozambique and of apartheid in 
South Africa, which has transformed the border into the busiest crossing 
point from Mozambique to South Africa.  
    Chapter 5 (Machipanda-Mutare cross-border region) presents a case 
study of migration flows led mainly by socio-economic forces, less 
influenced by the end of the Cold War. Rather, these movements have 
been influenced mainly by the economic crisis in Zimbabwe, reversing 
trends of migration across the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border along the 
Beira Corridor. In Chapter 6 (Mandimba-Mangochi border region), the 
thesis presents a different typology of cross-border region, one driven by 
questions of access to land, mainly by Malawians on the Mozambican side 
of the border. The centrality of land makes this particular border region 
distinct from both Ressano Garcia and Machipanda. What these three 
chapters illustrate is the sheer diversity of cross-border controls and 
migration governance arrangements in different kinds of cross-border 
areas of the country.   
    Based on these differences, Chapter 7 examines the impact of 
international models of border governance on Mozambique. The chapter 
responds to the third sub-question and partially addresses the fourth 
objective of the thesis. By examining the impact of prevailing international 
models of border governance, Chapter 7 focuses on international security 
standards for border controls, with reference to the control of sea borders 
and airports in Mozambique. Chapter 8 responds directly to the fourth 
sub-question and to the last objective of the thesis. This chapter attempts 
to explore how SADC approaches border governance reform in Southern 
Africa, and how this might be better reconciled with an appreciation of 
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different life experiences in cross-border regions, using the example of 
Mozambique. In doing so, this penultimate chapter brings together and 
synthesises debates around border governance at three important and 
interconnected levels: international, regional and local.  
 
 
Notes
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1 Border regions are defined as contiguous spaces across national states with 
homogeneous features and functional interdependences (Perkman, 2003). 
More technically, a border region is defined as “an area immediately beside a 
state’s external border or straddling it, and also administrative regions 
abutting a border whose centres are physically and socially distant from that 
border” (Anderson and O’ Dowd, 1999: 595). The homogeneous features of 
border regions entail socio-economic and cultural communalities on the one 
hand, and political and social institutions cooperating for development, on 
the other hand (Perkman, 2003). While the geographical proximity is raised 
as a fundamental element for understanding transformation of border regions 
(Hansen, 1977), a strong political orientation of states’ borders to territorial 
sovereignty has constrained interaction and cooperation as well as the 
consolidation of transition zones, even in areas where populations enjoy 
strong interdependence.  
2 IMAF was established through the decree 18/2001 of 3 July. 
3 COMAF is composed of 10 Ministries: Foreign affairs and International 
Cooperation; Interior; National Defence; State’s Administration; Agriculture; 
Fisheries; Transport and Communications; Mineral Resources; Coordination 
of Environmental Action; Finance. This commission is competent to inter 
alia, coordinate multilateral surveillance activities of airspace, sea and land 
borders; promote national policies and legislation for the protection and 
conservation of the marine environment and its resources; and to propose 
measures for the maintenance of infrastructure of border demarcation, 
particularly fencing and milestones.  
4 Interviewed on 30 October, 2012 in Maputo City. 
5 The Republic of Mozambique (RM) is located in South-Eastern Africa 
between the parallels 10º 27’ and 26º 52’ South Latitude and meridians 30º 
12’ and 40º 51’ East Longitude. It covers a total area of 799.380 km² including 
13 000 km² of inland waters. The country is bordered by the Indian Ocean to 
the east, Tanzania to the north, Malawi and Zambia to the northwest, 
Zimbabwe to the west, and South Africa and Swaziland to southwest. It is 
separated from Madagascar by the Mozambique Channel to the east.  
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6 Given the sensitivity of the topic, I decided not to disclose personal 
information of respondents (local communities, state authorities, and 
parliamentary members). However, in the text, each respondent’s activity, 
place, and day of interview are specified.  
7 The triangulation model is used in qualitative studies; it is used to find 
agreement in the construction of valid data by applying different methods or 
different sources of information about the same phenomenon (Guion et al., 
2011). Moreover, each region is shaped by peculiar specification values that 
are essential to compare in order to establish an objective national security 
policy (Baldwin, 1997).  
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2 
Post-Cold War security threats and 
border control reconfigurations  
   
2.1 Introduction                                                                                                                                                                                   
The previous chapter outlined the central research problem and pointed 
to some theoretical concerns that may have informed the national security-
driven approach that followed the end of the war in Mozambique. Whilst 
contending political ideologies of the Western and Eastern blocks helped 
determine border control strategies during the Cold War, the question 
addressed in this chapter is what has changed since then. According to 
Andreas (2003a:100), “during the Cold War, the borderlines dividing 
Western and Eastern Europe were intensively patrolled and marked by 
barbed wire fencing, watchtowers, land mines, and automatic weapons”.   
This chapter therefore takes a further step to examine key security 
transformations since the end of the Cold War and to identify some key 
actors who may be driving the introduction of new models of border 
control in present-day Mozambique. The chapter traces the dynamics of 
sovereignty from its traditional role of protecting national borders to the 
policing of international borders based on the expansion of international 
models of border control by Western countries. As the previous chapter 
has pointed out, the traditional role of border control is internally driven 
and relies on military capacity, traditional intelligence service and criminal 
policing aimed at responding to internal security (see for example Bigo, 
2007; Herz, 1950). However, this chapter moves away from the theoretical 
dimension of securitisation to day-to-day practices of human interaction 
around the globe. As the review of the literature suggests, there has been 
a growing fear of the dangers posed by desperate people across 
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international borders, which has led to the reconceptualisation of security 
threats, national sovereignty, and how border governance is conceived 
worldwide.   
2.2 From a focus on national sovereignty to the construction 
of transnational security threats   
National sovereignty and border control have been very important issues 
for states since the signing of the Westphalia Treaty in 1648. This treaty 
introduced a regime of sovereignty embracing the view that nation-states 
are independent and the main actors in international relations bounded by 
principles and institutions that govern their behaviour in inter-state 
relations (Chung, 2014; Krasner, 2001; de Benoist, 1999). In order to 
protect national sovereignty, states have transformed themselves into 
fortresses against outside threats to national interests, ranging from 
ideological identity to economic production sectors (Charrett, 2009; 
Andreas, 2003a; Behnke, 2000; Buzan, 1997). Based on these assumptions, 
the major concern of states has been to build up military apparatus capable 
of protecting their borders – a strategy that dominated border governance 
during the Cold War (Morgenthau, 2014; Krasner, 2001; Mearsheimer, 
1995).  
 Military-oriented border control during the Cold War can better be 
described from the perspective of the realists’ conception of the 
international system, which they perceive as grounded in conflicts among 
states (Morgenthau, 2014). Realist scholars understand individual states as 
fearful of being exploited by other states, and such fears keep states in 
constant tension and largely dependent on military power for their sense 
of national security (Morgenthau, 2014; Jervis, 1978). From the 
perspective of the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’, military competition 
between states has divided the world into competing units, in which 
stability and independence can be measured according to a state’s capacity 
to maintain its sovereignty in relation to other states (Sorensen, 2006).  
 However, the end of the Cold War shifted the focus of security theories 
and practices from states back to individuals and communities, including 
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‘suspect’ communities involved in transnational criminal and ‘terrorist’ 
networks. This has led to the perception, not for the first time, but to an 
unprecedented extent, that the transnational movement of people poses a 
significant threat to the self-determination of states. Firstly, people on the 
move, particularly asylum seekers, refugees and less skilled economic 
migrants are now considered the main source of insecurity in the receiving 
countries (Fassin, 2011 Léonard, 2010; Nessel, 2008; Bigo, 2007). As far 
as the literature is concerned, the growing number of human beings in the 
Third World coupled with poverty, disease, environmental change as well 
as the depletion of resources has raised awareness of human migration, 
which has reinforced restrictive border control by rich countries 
(Heusgen, 2006; Buzan, 1997). As Ullman (1983:142) points out, “the gap 
in living standards between populations in rich and poor countries is likely 
to continue to widen and that gives pressures for migration”, something 
confirmed by recent studies of migrants’ lives in the Global North (Lewis, 
Dwyer, Hodkinson et al., 2014). Moreover, in dealing with 
interconnectedness with the developing world, Western countries have 
shifted their focus from development and humanitarianism to 
management of risk, fear, and danger as key components of state security 
(Abrahamsen, 2005).  
 Secondly, the movement of people across borders has led to the general 
securitisation of borders against danger and pervasive insecurity as well as 
violence associated with transnational crime such as terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction, resulting in substantial remilitarisation of 
borders to deter these threats (Morgenthau, 2014; Ashley, 1981). 
According to Seiple (2002:264), “military force came to be viewed as a 
panacea for all sorts of concerns deemed vital to national security, ranging 
from nation-building to refugee control”. As a result, Western societies 
have grown more concerned with controlling immigration from East 
Europe and North Africa, which has led to the merging of internal and 
external security strategies as the rationale for more expansive border 
control cooperation (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006; Andreas, 2003a; 
Grabbe, 2000).  
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 In retrospect, Western countries have undertaken several cooperation 
initiatives with third countries in the form of agreements, support, and 
joint border patrols against so-called common security threats, including 
terrorism. For example, the British have extended their migration 
management through international cooperation, particularly in law 
enforcement regarding drug control, international large-scale traffickers 
and possible links between drug trafficking and professional organised 
crime groups. (Dorn et al. cited in Carrabin et al., 2009).  
 Besides these cooperative initiatives, Western countries have also 
boosted securitisation of their borders, particularly after the 9/11 attacks, 
the London and the Madrid bombings. In the case of the US, securitisation 
has been developed under the Homeland Security Act aimed at fighting 
terrorism on a global scale.     
2.3 Securitisation and externalisation of border control 
strategies by Western countries 
2.3.1 US Homeland security   
Following the 9/11 attacks, the US government focused its attention on 
homeland security and adapted border control strategies from drug 
control to the war on terror (Andreas, 2003a). The American government 
believed that the war on terror would not be effective without strongly 
controlled borders (Andreas, 2003b). As Flynn (2000:58) points out, 
“stopping a threat at the frontier is better than trying to cope with them 
once inside the country…”. As a result, the US government has responded 
to terrorist attacks with several border control operations and training 
programmes such as operation ‘Hold the Line’ (a high technology system 
aimed at making borders tighter); prevention through deterrence in action; 
the Interior Repatriation Programme; and Integrated Border Enforcement 
Teams aimed at sharing intelligence and enforcement resources between 
the US, Canadian and Mexican authorities. Moreover, at the US/Mexico 
border, the number of border patrollers has increased from 334 prior to 
9/11 to over 9000 since (Andreas, 2003a). From a financial perspective, 
Post-cold War security threats and border control reconfigurations 35 
the US government has increased its budget from $1.06 billion in fiscal 
year (FY) 2000 to 3.50 billion in FY 2009 (Nunez-Neto, 2008).   
From the perspective of legal reforms, the US government has enacted 
several legal instruments ranging from the Patriotic Act1 of 2001 (which 
dissolved the Immigration and Naturalisation Service and placed the 
United States Border Patrol within Homeland Service), the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (Ramirez, 2009). Among all the legal reform 
instruments implemented in the war on terror, the Homeland Security Act 
has introduced the most profound reforms to the national security strategy 
by (1) widening the scope of terrorism-related threats, and (2) expanding 
the war from third countries. As President Bush pointed out, “we will 
disrupt and destroy terrorist organisations by defending United States’ 
interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat 
before it reaches our borders” (Bush, 2002:6). Since then, the United 
States has implemented several counter-terrorism programmes. The next 
section comprises an analysis of homeland security since its inception, 
partnerships that have been established and their consequences for border 
management and migration control on a global level.    
 The US Homeland Security Strategy (HSS) was launched by President 
Bush in October 2001 and was passed as the Homeland Security Act in 
2002. The HSS originated from the concept of national security 
(developed between the world wars), which was understood as “the ability 
of a nation to protect internal values from external threats” (Relyea, 
2002:214). This concept integrates four key elements: nation, ability, 
internal values, and external threats. Accordingly, in the context of the 
fight against terrorism, the American government’s concept of a nation 
ranges from Federal States, local governments, the private sector, 
international partners/coalitions, to individuals (Bellavita, 2011; 2008). 
The ability to combat terrorism encompasses several requirements such as 
military and policy capacity, technology, intelligence agencies’ information 
sharing and collaboration, threat recognition, intervention, and risk 
management (Bellavita, 2011; 2008; Relyea, 2002). As far as internal values 
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are concerned, through the HSS the US government seeks to defend its 
citizens, protect its sovereignty, territory and critical infrastructure, and 
preserve the freedom and democracy to its people. The latter ranges from 
protection of human rights, freedom of speech, thought, and religion, 
freedom to choose their governors, rights to own property, to educate 
their children and enjoy the benefits of their work (Ramirez, 2009; 
Bellavita, 2008; Seiple, 2002). The perception among American politicians 
is that these values are threatened by the varied nature of terrorist threats, 
ranging from chemical and biological terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction, small arms, and man-made hazards. 
 Based on this analysis, the HSS was conceived fundamentally as an 
instrument for combating terrorism with a diversified modus operandi by 
adopting different counterterrorism responses in different sectors, such as 
transportation networks, health, environment, and other sectors 
vulnerable to organised crime activities (Bellavita, 2007; Seiple, 2002; 
Bryan and Flynn, 2002). As part of the implementation of the HSS, the 
US government has been making efforts to fight terrorism both 
domestically and overseas2 by unifying intelligence strategies and 
operational planning divisions (Ramirez, 2009). This approach has had 
wide ramifications for border control policies in different parts of the 
world. 
2.3.2 Securitisation at EU external borders  
While the externalisation of the European model of border control has 
prevailed since the late 1990s (Boswell, 2003), the issue has dominated the 
EU debate on integration and security, particularly with the rise of terrorist 
activities. More specifically, the US – EU commitment to closer 
cooperation in fighting terrorism has resulted in the implementation of 
several initiatives such as the trans-Atlantic law enforcement cooperation; 
expanded freezing of terrorist asset operations; development of more 
secure procedures for container shipping; introduction of official 
electronic travel documents; patrol of the EU external borders; and 
coordination of foreign policies, especially regarding the Middle East 
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(Lebl, 2005). The EU has also begun implementing counter-terrorism 
initiatives aimed at boosting security within the Schengen Zone, while 
keeping its external borders strongly securitised.  
In 2004, the council of the EU established Frontières Extérieures 
(FRONTEX3) – an agency responsible for coordinating intelligence and 
operational actions for better management of external borders4 by 
restricting access to foreigners while maintaining the logic of free 
movement of people in the EU (Neal, 2009; Nessel, 2008). As a border 
management board, FRONTEX coordinates initiatives with neighbouring 
countries in different areas aimed at improving border control, ranging 
from training of national border guards from member states and the 
establishment of common standards; undertaking risk analyses; 
conducting research on control and surveillance of external borders; 
technical assistance to member states in external border operations; and 
assisting member states in organising repatriation operations (Neal, 2009; 
Wolf, 2008; Guild and Bigo, 2010).  
As far as the externalisation of EU border control methods is 
concerned, reliable and faster cooperation requires member states to 
comply on their external borders with (1) the Schengen information 
system; (2) a common list of countries whose nationals require visas; (3) a 
common format and rules of issue for short-stay visas; (4) a visa 
information system; and (5) carrier sanctions and passenger data 
transmission (Guild cited in Neal, 2009:345). Apart from direct 
intervention in the countries on its external borders, since 2002 the EU 
has been expanding the limits of border control by admitting new 
members into the Union through the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
In the following section, conditions under which the EU has been 
admitting new members into the Union and the implications of this for 
border governance are discussed, particularly dynamic migration factors 
in the new member states.   
The EU’s efforts to cooperate with countries on its external borders 
have resulted in the inclusion (in 2004) of new member states through the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Under the ENP, new members 
are from Central and Eastern Europe as well as from North Africa, 
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ranging from Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, 
Tunisia and Ukraine. Russia did not enter the Union, but it has committed 
to close cooperation with the EU in combating organised crime (Rees, 
2008).  
     The establishment of the ENP can be contextualised from three 
different prims: political, economic, and security. From a political point of 
view, ENP is an EU mechanism for sharing with neighbouring countries 
common values such as sustainable democracy, rule of law, human rights 
and good governance and thereby fostering international norms for 
multilateral cooperation (Smith, 2005; Berg and Ehin, 2006; Rees, 2008).  
     In terms of economic values, the ENP was designed to influence 
economic reforms that would promote economic prosperity and 
sustainable development in Central and Eastern European countries 
(Bosse, 2009; Rees, 2008). In terms of security, the EU has been 
concerned with extending border control strategies further afield on the 
assumption that security threats in neighbouring countries will have a 
detrimental effect on security in the Union (Heusgen, 2006).  
Despite these efforts, the relationship between the EU and ENP has 
elicited some criticism. For instance, the ENP is viewed as an expansion 
of EU borders and a promotion of EU foreign policies beyond its borders 
while maintaining those supranational bodies with which the incoming 
member states lack previous relationships (Smith, 2005; Lynch, 2004). Not 
only has the externalisation of border control resulted in interference in 
domestic security policies in third countries (Nessel, 2008), but 
standardised border control measures have also imposed several 
restrictions on the movement of persons, particularly asylum seekers, 
refugees, and other categories of migrants (Léonard, 2010). The following 
section analyses the securitisation of borders vis-à-vis the right to 
migration.   
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2.4 Securitisation of borders and the right to migration    
Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights states that, 
every person has the right to leave any country, including his or her own, 
and to return to this country at a later date. However, as a result of security 
practices, people on the move (particularly non-citizens) have faced 
tremendous difficulties in enjoying the right to migration (Bosworth and 
Guild, 2008). As Nessel (2008) points out, “the global focus on 
securitisation and enforcement has weakened the refugee protection 
regime…”. In this context, securitisation has resulted in the lumping of 
organised crime together with desperate immigrants (Fassin, 2011; 
Bosworth, Guild, 2008, Andreas, 2003a). As a result, responses to terrorist 
attacks in the US and Europe have brought about the remilitarisation of 
borders against asylum seekers, refugees and unauthorised immigrants 
(Léonard, 2010; Nessel, 2008; Bigo, 2002). Apart from limiting the right 
to migration, securitised practices have resulted in the violation of human 
rights, particularly in arrest and repatriation operations, and even deaths 
as the result of electrified borders (Walters, 2006).  
In the context of FRONTEX, “intensification of external borders has 
not decreased the number of irregular migrants, but rather has led irregular 
migrants to using alternative, and increasingly dangerous routes” 
(Spijkerboer, 2007:127). In retrospect, FRONTEX’s standardised military 
operations on border control have been depicted by human rights 
organisations as death traps to asylum seekers and refugees since all the 
persons who were arrested were returned to their countries of origin or 
prevented from reaching any European Union country (Léonard, 2010: 
240). In relation to refugees and asylum seekers, the concern of human 
rights organisations lies with the EU’s respect for the non-refoulement5 
principle (stated in the Geneva Convention 1951, article 31) related to the 
status of refugees.   
While human rights organisations in the EU have raised concerns 
about FRONTEX’s acts of brutality, in the US the problem is related to 
the implementation of the zero-tolerance immigration law against asylum 
seekers and refugees and the establishment of more detention centres6, 
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which has resulted in an end to the favourable treatment of Muslims that 
allowed them to enter the US prior to state clearance (Miller, 2005). For 
example, following the 9/11 attacks, persons coming from countries 
where al-Qaeda groups were operating were suspected of belonging to 
terrorist groups and were automatically detained for investigation 
(Messina, 2014; Miller, 2005). The US government has also introduced 
harsh punitive measures against all non-US citizens, which has resulted in 
mass incarceration (pending investigation) and draconian criminal 
convictions (for less serious offences) aimed at incapacitating terrorists 
and their sympathisers (Nunes-Neto, 2008; Miller, 2005). Moreover, 
academic, vocational as well as therapeutic programmes that were 
implemented in prisons and intended to rehabilitate offenders no longer 
produce the required effects, but incapacitate inmates based on their risk 
classification (Messina, 2014; Miller, 2005). 
As far as death rates at borders are concerned, the US policy of 
prevention through deterrence has resulted in several deaths in the post-
9/11 period. In 2003, 19 immigrants were found dead in an airless truck 
trailer in Texas (Nunez-Neto (2008) and in 2009 another 11 were 
discovered dead in a railway car in Iowa. The mortality rate across US 
borders has increased from 1.6 deaths in FY 1999 to 5.5 deaths in FY 2008 
(out of 10 000 apprehensions), which has roused increased criticism from 
human rights organisations (Nunes-Neto, 2008).  
 At the level of labour law, US response to global transnational 
migration with strong barriers aimed at combating unauthorised 
immigration has not had positive results as American farmers and traders 
continue to attract unauthorised Mexican migrants to fill jobs that are 
normally undesirable to local citizens (Dauvergne, 2008). Researchers 
argue that countries fail to prevent unauthorised immigration because of 
the conflicting interests of groups who demand the availability of cheaper 
labour versus those elites who favour more restrictive immigration 
controls (Lewis et al., 2014; Hanson and Spilimbergo, 2001).  
Not only has the securitisation of borders affected the movement of 
cheaper labour, but developed countries now have to cope with huge 
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delays in trade transactions caused by the need to preserve the security-
economy nexus at the border.   
2.5 The security-economy dilemma of securitised borders 
As far as the modern scholar is concerned, the growth of the global 
economic network has facilitated international transactions, but rapid 
movements of people across borders are now considered a risk to 
supply/demand chains as a result of the insecurity embedded in 
Transnational Criminal Groups (TCGs) (Nessel, 2008; Bigo, 2007), 
particularly in Western countries. In view of this, Western countries have 
tightened their borders on the grounds that global flows of capital and 
commodities7 will intensify movements of TCGs (Andreas, 2003a; Fassin, 
2011). For example, the US-Canadian border has become difficult to cross 
owing to securitisation practices aimed at preventing the infiltration of 
terror activities into the US (Newman, 2006b). At the same time, the US 
and Canadian governments have urged immigration officials, border 
patrollers and customs officers to pay maximum attention to potential risk 
travellers and goods (Sparke, 2006). Moreover, the US government has 
adopted antiterrorism operations in the in-depth inspection of individuals 
and private vehicles, trucks and buses moving across the US-Mexico 
border and from Canada to Michigan and New York (Sparke, 2006).  
 The response to these operations has had a hugely negative impact on 
market functions. For example, following the 9/11 attacks, some firms 
dependent on the supply-chain from the US to Canada and vice versa 
announced the termination of their services because of the long wait at the 
border (Flynn cited in Sparke, 2006). In the case of the US-Canada border, 
in the days following the attacks, waiting time for trucks increased from less 
than 10 minutes to about 15 hours, which resulted in long queues of waiting 
trucks (Andreas, 2003a). Long delays have put pressure on the American 
government to counterbalance its fight against terrorism with the need to 
speed shipping times across the border. The US has thus decided to adopt 
a border management system that could fulfil dual objectives: expanding 
trade while protecting internal borders from threats posed by terrorist 
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activities, irregular immigrants, smuggling and human trafficking (Ackleson, 
2005).  
 Western countries have coordinated their efforts to patrol their external 
borders more effectively, but the question of the meaning of such border 
control remains contentious, with a great deal of opposition even within 
Western countries (Leonard, 2010; Bosworth and Guild, 2008). Moreover, 
the overriding of Western methods of border control across the globe has 
suppressed the logic of debate on migration in different locations. In the 
context of the Southern African region, migration is rooted in political 
legacies of wars in the regions, mining in South Africa, and the demise of 
apartheid, but none of these factors have been integrated in the 
contemporary trends of border control in the region. In the next chapter, 
the thesis analyses some border control reforms undertaken in post-war 
Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa, and how these can be 
reconciled with global demands for standardised methods.  
2.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the transformation of the concept and practice 
of security since the end of the Cold War and its influence on the 
contemporary strategies of border control on a global scale. In this 
context, the end of the Cold War signalled a different approach to border 
controls, one aimed at a more coordinated response to global economic 
transactions and the transnational movement of people and resources 
across international frontiers, a paradox mentioned in Chapter 1. From 
the review of the academic literature it was evident that the opening of 
international borders and the establishment of integrated regions has 
demanded a security community bound to common border control 
strategies at a time of growing liberalisation of capital and trade (Andreas, 
2003a).  
 The end of the Cold War brought the long divided Western and 
Eastern blocks onto a more cooperative footing aimed at stopping the 
movement of people from developing countries to developed Western 
societies, under the gaze of the fight against terrorism, trafficking and 
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other transnational ‘threats’. In retrospect, it is clear that this has led to 
large scale restrictive border controls such as militarised borders and smart 
borders that have moved to the top of the political agenda in many 
Western countries, especially following terrorist attacks in New York, 
London, Madrid and elsewhere. US Homeland Security Strategy and the 
EU FRONTEX are two of these new approaches to border control that 
have made considerable progress towards a global regime of border 
control, with which the rest of the world has been challenged to comply. 
Importantly, with these models, Western countries have been able to 
expand their fight against terrorism into third countries, either by direct 
support in border control operations in neighbouring countries or by 
reliance on international standards that are gradually adopted by the rest 
of the world. However, far from being a contribution to new security 
dynamics caused by changes in the environment, depletion of resources, 
and other push/pull factors of migration, international models of border 
control have posed challenges to developing countries in their struggle to 
address local problems of border crossing. 
Notes 
 
 
1The Patriotic Act: its key objective is to allow the government to obtain 
warrants to monitor and search suspects without meeting previous probable 
cause requirements and also to allow sharing of information between police 
and counter-terrorist officials (Ramirez, 2009).  
2 Further, the US has been expanding its coalitions and collaborations to 
fighting terrorism with African countries by offering military training to cope 
with terrorist threats, protection of land borders and coastline security; 
training programmes to control the movement of people and goods across 
borders; general police training programmes; and assistance in regional anti-
terrorism initiatives (Ramirez, 2009).  
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3 In order to operationalise its tasks, FRONTEX is divided into six units 
entailing risk analysis; joint operations at air, land, and sea external borders; 
border guards, training and research and development. The training unit 
focuses on developing a core curriculum for border guards from the member 
states through assessment of deficiencies and loopholes in security, aimed at 
the development and spread of best practices (Neal, 2009). Training 
programmes focus on a broad array of issues as they emerge, such as the 
detection of forged documents, stolen vehicles, dog handling, and other 
relevant security issues (Léonard, 2010).  
4 The EU external borders are with Czech Republic; Estonia; Finland; France; 
Germany; Netherlands; Norway; Portugal; Spain, and Switzerland. 
5 The refoulement principle under article 31 of the Geneva Convention 1951 
states that: (1) “no contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened”. The Contracting States shall allow such 
refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain 
admission into another country; and (2) the Contracting States shall not apply 
to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are 
necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the 
country is regularised or they obtain admission into another country. 
6 The merging of hard borders and anti-immigration policies has led to the 
creation of detention centres and refugee centres, both in Africa and in 
Europe, where migrants can be received, processed and returned to their 
countries of origin (Johnson, 2008). However, detention or refugee centres 
are places were “law is suspended, rights are denied and migrants held in a 
static temporariness that concretises exclusion into permanent state” 
(Johnson, 2008:6).  
7 While The North American Trade Agreements (NAFTA) and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are some examples of how 
globalisation has promoted a borderless approach among states and created 
new forms of legality to facilitate capital flows, the crackdown on extra-legal 
migration has intensified worldwide in response to transnational threats 
reinforced by the internationalisation of production, the liberalisation of 
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trade, the mobility of finance, and advances in transportation and 
communication technology (Andreas, 2003a).  
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3 
The political context of intra-Southern 
African migration: reflections on post-
war Mozambique and post-apartheid 
South Africa   
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, patterns of security threats since the end of the 
Cold War and their influence on global migration policies and border 
control strategies were examined. As was suggested, the perception of 
inter-state military threats diminished while perceptions of threats from 
individuals-on-the move increased; the latter has come to be identified as 
a major security threat, reviving the militarisation of borders as well as the 
deployment of a whole range of biometric technologies for the purpose 
of internal and external border control. The result has been to strengthen 
cooperation between Western and Eastern countries in seeking to deter 
‘undesirable’ non-citizens from crossing into ‘heartlands’ from the 
peripheries (Fassin, 2011; Adamson, 2008; Nessel, 2008; Bigo, 2007; 
Adamson, 2006; Andreas, 2003a). Individuals on the move have come 
more and more to be associated with transnational organised crime, 
especially following international treaties concerning smuggling and 
trafficking, and anti-terrorism legislation. This perception has increasingly 
reinforced the implementation of restrictive immigration policies and 
tighter border controls around and within Western countries. These 
assumptions are accompanied by what was referred to in Chapter 1 as the 
‘securitisation’ of migration and borders. As Western and Eastern 
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countries have become more concerned with the need to fight 
transnational crime and terrorism, and to support border control 
operations, they increasingly involve and require the participation of 
countries in the global South, as the ‘remote control’ border control 
regimes extend their reach globally, in particular through a range of 
international security agreements. 
 While Western countries were tightening their borders in a bid to 
prevent transnational security threats from non-citizens, the Southern 
African region was facing its own significant political challenges. The end 
of the war in Mozambique and the end of apartheid in South Africa 
constituted two major events that converged to produce new patterns of 
migration in the Southern Africa region (Trimikliniotis, Gordon and 
Zondo, 2008). In response to the first sub-question of this study, this 
chapter examines border control strategies implemented by the 
Mozambican and South African governments since the early 1990s, and 
considers their impact on the socio-economic integration of immigrants 
in both countries. There are some similarities between the responses to 
security in post-war Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa’s 
migration policies and border control strategies. Despite the reconnection 
of both countries with global markets and trade relations, however, there 
are some significant differences in respect of migration reforms, especially 
the more marked exclusion of less skilled labour immigrants from 
neighbouring states. 
3.2 Transnational and international patterns of migration in 
post-war Mozambique   
Migration patterns across Mozambique are closely related to the end of 
the war in the country, the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa 
and to the effects of the end of the Cold War (Emerson, 2014). With the 
end of the war in Mozambique and the demise of the apartheid regime in 
South Africa, the Southern African region has been fully reconnected to 
the circuits of the global economy. At the same time, more attention than 
ever has been given to controlling the movements of people across intra-
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regional borders, giving rise to a sharp distinction between regular and 
irregular forms of migration, the latter being defined mainly in response 
to the powerful attraction for regional migrants of the South African 
economy (Crush, Williams and Peberdy, 2005; Raimundo, 2009; Gastrow 
and Mosse, 2002; Andreas, 2003a; Adamson, 2006). In the case of 
Mozambique, the dominant discourse among academics is that soon after 
the end of the armed conflict, borders became more permeable to the 
trafficking of drugs and human beings, to smuggling and to other crimes 
such as money laundering, homicides, vehicle theft and bank robbery 
(Chachiua, 2000; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002). Press reports constantly 
point to the Mavalane Airport in Maputo as a transit point for cocaine 
shipped en route from Colombia and Brazil to Europe and East Asia, or for 
heroin and hashish shipped from Pakistan to Dubai, for example 
(Gastrow and Mosse, 2011; 2002).  
Concomitantly, post-war Mozambique has been marked by the 
‘feminisation’1 of migration patterns, amidst reports that women migrants 
have been involved in transnational crime across the Mozambican-South 
African border, for example (Ama, Mangadi, and Ama., 2014; Peberdy, 
2000). According to some sources, circuits of transnational crime involve 
both Mozambican and South African men and women trafficking 
migrants and refugees from other, third countries across the Mozambican 
border into South Africa (Crush, 2005:79).  
From a socio-economic standpoint, the appearance of women in 
international migration flows is not a new phenomenon. Women traders 
constitute perhaps the majority of traders crossing the Mozambican-South 
African border, and studies have shown that these women’s economic 
activities often support the housing, food and schooling costs of their 
families, including not only their spouses and children, but also siblings 
(Peberdy, 2014; 2000). As contemporary cross-border migration has 
become more gender-balanced, the active economic roles of women have 
become more evident. Thus the flow of women in international migration 
demands a shift to a migration structure based on their historical and live 
participation in household decisions all over the world. Although more 
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women migrate than in the past, in the context of the Southern African 
region the problem is that labour contracts remain male-oriented, 
particularly in the mining industry in South Africa, which has always 
diminished the presence of women in the labour market (Posel and Marx, 
2013; Posel, 2004). Notwithstanding the increase in socio-economic-led 
migration, Mozambique and other states in the region have prioritised 
national security-driven migration and border control arrangements. 
3.3 Preparation for border control responses   
During the war, the Frelimo government was concerned with 
counteracting the infiltration of apartheid2 elements into Mozambican 
territory. These elements were engaged in supplying Renamo guerrillas 
with weapons, ammunition systems, uniforms, financial assistance, 
intelligence support and training. In addition, South African troops were 
involved in insurgency operations in Mozambique (Emerson, 2014; 
Robinson, 2009; Davies, 1987). As Emerson (2009:64) points out, “to 
assist in the infiltration and exfiltration of guerrillas across the Rhodesian 
Mozambican border, [in 1979] the South Africans supplied some seven 
vehicles, including heavy duty tracks”. Based on these facts, the 
Mozambican government’s major priority was to establish a modernised 
and professionalised army at a level at which it would be capable of 
responding to conventional attacks from apartheid South Africa and 
Rhodesia (Chachiua, 2000:55). Internally, the government introduced the 
systematic control of movement of people, based on four security 
divisions that were acting within the Immigration Department: economic, 
ideological, military and counter-intelligence affairs. As a result of these 
reforms, the immigration department was renamed the National 
Department for Migration (NDM) and subordinated to the Ministry of 
the Interior. At a later point, the NDM was integrated into the State 
Intelligence Information Bureau (Serviços de Informação Secreta do Estado 
SISE). As these reforms were taking place, the Mozambican government 
created the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) subordinated to the army. These 
parallel security sectors were established to protect territorial sovereignty, 
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to stop cross-border criminal activities and to prevent populations in the 
border regions and state-owned properties from the most serious external 
threats (NDM Report, 1999).  
While the government perspective of border control was projected to 
fight external security threats (including cross-border crime), the new 
democratic dispensation began to pressurise the country to implement 
security and legal reforms that would contribute to sustainable democracy, 
good governance, rule of law, respect for human rights and protection of 
the most vulnerable (Lalá, 2003). As part of the response to these 
demands, the National Assembly passed an anti-trafficking law in 2008 
aimed at protecting women and children against sexual and labour 
exploitation. At the level of border management, since 1992, the 
Mozambican government has given priority to reaffirmation3 and 
delimitation4 of the country’s borders. In doing so, the government gave 
the responsibility for the reaffirmation process to the Institute of the Sea 
and Borders (IMAF), which coordinates activities with other sectors such 
as the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Agriculture and Health. According 
to the Mozambican President of the Institute of the Sea5 and Borders,  
the rise in mineral resources discovery has attracted international firms to 
invest in the country, which requires clearly delimited borders in order to 
prevent resources-driven conflicts with neighbouring states, ensure better 
control of immigration flows, and better protection of state’s sovereignty. 
It is thus evident that borders can perform different roles based on the 
position one takes. For example, as the above discussion suggests, 
delimited borders can establish the legal possession of natural resources 
to the extent that no other state can make a claim to these resources. From 
the perspective of national sovereignty, borders of neighbouring states can 
now be regarded as international rather than transnational, which in turn 
underpins the tension between border authorities and communities in 
cross-border regions.  
The political context of Intra-southern Africa migration: reflections on post-war 
Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa   
 51 
3.4 The establishment of the Mozambique Border Police   
Following the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in 1992, 
the Mozambican government created the Police of the Republic of 
Mozambique (PRM), which replaced the People’s Police of Mozambique 
(Polícia Popular de Moçambique). With these reforms, the PRM created the 
Mozambique Border Police (MBP) as a special division assigned to control 
the border, particularly to prevent cross-border crime and to preserve 
territorial sovereignty6. In 1997, government implemented major reforms 
in the security sector, in which the erstwhile National Service Public 
Security (SNASP) was (re) named to SISE and the Armed Forces for the 
Liberation of Mozambique (FLM) was (re) named the Mozambique 
Armed Defence Forces (FADM).  
The FADM are entrusted with preserving national independence, state 
sovereignty, and the protection of territorial integrity from external threats 
including armed aggression. For example, during the celebration of the 
48th anniversary of the FADM, those holding office reaffirmed their 
commitment and readiness to preserve state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity towards sustainable development, to promote national unity and 
patriotism, which are believed to be fundamental factors in bringing about 
cohesion among Mozambican citizens (Jornal Notícias, September 20, 
2012).  
  Although the government has constantly implemented reforms in the 
security sector, the country has not yet achieved visible change since the 
police are poorly trained and under-resourced and thus unable to 
effectively provide public security in this new transforming environment 
(Alar, 2010; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002). In part, Mozambique has been 
relying on joint border patrol operations with neighbouring states aimed 
to address what are believed to be common problems, ranging from 
clandestine migration and smuggling to poaching. At the same time, the 
Mozambican border authorities have established simplified7 crossing 
points aimed at facilitating socio-economic interaction between 
communities in restricted8 border zones of Mozambique and 
neighbouring countries. For the Mozambique border police, as discussed 
The political context of Intra-southern Africa migration: reflections on post-war 
Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa   
 52 
in Chapter 1, these simplified borders are not characterised by the same 
stringent controls as official crossing points, where a passport regime is 
supposed to be enforced. In principle, a simplified border regime allows 
communities who live in the border areas to cross the border regularly for 
socio-economic reasons, without being checked automatically. Such 
reasons may range from family visits, to medical treatment and attendance 
of ceremonies such as marriages or burials. These individuals should carry 
ID cards and simply sign a register when moving back and forth across 
the border.  
However, Mozambique did not receive any cooperation from 
neighbouring states since they continued to rely on bilateral agreements 
aimed at fighting crime (Crush and Dodson, 2007). This has resulted in 
different regimes of border control and migration management regardless 
of their inadequacy in the post-colonial African context of border regions. 
In pursuance of regime-based border control, the Mozambican border 
police tend to pay little attention to socio-economic convergence factors 
across border regions.    
3.5 The Mozambique Border Police border controls priority  
With the primary interest lying in fighting cross-border crime, the MBP 
have become more concerned with the modus operandi of the perpetrators 
and the categories into which they fall. As the National Commander of 
the MBP9 explained in an interview, “border violators can be divided into 
simple violators and criminal-related immigrants”. From his perspective, 
and for the MBP generally, a ‘simple violator’ refers to any immigrant from 
a neighbouring state who enters Mozambique through a non-official 
crossing point in search of casual work, medical assistance, a family visit 
or any other socio-economic need; in other words, for any non-criminal 
purpose. The ‘criminal-related immigrant’ referred to as an unauthorised 
immigrant, often coming from beyond the borders of neighbouring states 
who is involved or suspected of criminal-related activity. These 
immigrants are defined in categories that range from smugglers, 
counterfeiters, traffickers to thieves.  
The political context of Intra-southern Africa migration: reflections on post-war 
Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa   
 53 
 Since the MBP are concerned with understanding the modus operandi of 
those involved in cross-border crime, they have established an internal 
intelligence division, which is tasked with conducting a deep trial process 
with intercepted border violators. In the same interview quoted above, the 
National Commander of the MBP10 observes: “among asylum seekers, 
refugees, and deported immigrants, we are always concerned with 
potential spies, which is why we need more detention centres so that the 
trial process can be conducted in a more detailed manner”. As well as 
reflecting a generally hostile attitude towards foreigners, something which 
is also evident in approaches to border control in the European Union, 
this remark suggests that the civil war and the apartheid era has left its 
mark on the MBP today. As is reflected in the establishment of 
FRONTEX, which was aimed at stopping asylum seekers and refugees, a 
further legacy of the era of apartheid has been a heightened suspicion of 
infiltrators from South Africa (Léonard, 2010). The distinction between 
unauthorised border violators without criminal intent and those whose 
aims are criminal in the context of the Southern African region is 
summarised in Table 3.1 below. The distinguishing categories range from 
nationality, destination, used routes and reasons for relocation. 
Table 3.1  
Categories used by the MBP to classify immigrants crossing Mozambique 
borders  
Trial 
categories  
National citizens and foreigners from 
neighbouring states 
Foreigners from other parts 
of the region 
Nationality Simple border violators; spies Illegal immigrants; drug 
traffickers; spies 
     
Destination Neighbouring countries; livelihoods; 
firewood; arable land  
Economic reasons; transit 
country; trafficking 
Used routes  Porosity; common borders; cross-border 
communities 
Porosity; international 
borders  
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Reasons for 
relocation 
Hospital treatment; traditional ceremonies; 
family visits; informal cross-border trading; 
smuggling; facilitation of clandestine 
migration; unsustainable extraction of 
resources 
Spying; terrorism; asylum 
seekers; refugees; illegal 
extraction of natural 
resources; political 
instability: ethnic or religious 
conflicts; family reunification 
Source: Author’s table based on interviews conducted with Mozambique border officials.  
In line with the categories presented in the table above, the MBP 
understands that immigrants from neighbouring states such as Tanzania, 
Malawi and Zimbabwe, particularly those who live in the border regions, 
mostly cross the border for socio-economic reasons. Regardless of such 
socio-economically driven border crossing, the MBP believes that 
immigrants from neighbouring states can be involved in spying, which is 
why they urge local communities to be vigilant. With regard to immigrants 
from outside the neighbouring states, the MBP believes that these are 
mostly economically driven and are closely linked to criminal activities 
such as trafficking and smuggling. On many occasions, such immigrants 
try to find a transit country (with less secure borders) to reach their 
destination. As far as the literature is concerned, Africa is characterised by 
permanent interaction of people across border regions, but the continent 
has negative connotations as a relatively safe migratory route to Europe as 
a result of the permeability and weak monitoring of borders, as well as the 
ease with which false documents can be acquired (Melde et al., 2014; 
Ramirez, 2009; Ratha and Shaw, 2007). In the context of Mozambique, a 
senior border police officer in Maputo11 claims that: 
Country of origin is a fundamental element to take into account to the 
extent that most immigrants who are involved in trafficking and 
exploitation of natural resources are from non-neighbouring states. 
Therefore, information on country of origin allows accurate decisions 
about real reasons leading to the relocation of the immigrant concerned.  
Based on the above, the distinction between simple border violators 
(from neighbouring states) and unauthorised immigrants (from outside 
neighbouring states) provides the field of migration studies with an 
alternative discourse that can better differentiate the context of border 
regions in post-colonial African states from those in Europe. It can also 
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be seen as an emerging discourse in migration studies that can help to 
distinguish undocumented from unauthorised migrants in the context of 
intra-Southern African migration. For example, South African authorities 
understand undocumented immigrants as those from neighbouring states, 
including Mozambique. Similarly, unauthorised immigrants are generally 
defined in South Africa as being those from the rest of Africa, Asia, 
Europe and America, more often expected to use illegal routes to reach 
their destinations (Sablonnière, Auger, Taylor et al., 2013; Crush and 
McDonald, 2000).  
On the subject of illegal immigration routes, the MBP accepts that 
immigrants from beyond the borders of neighbouring states use illegal 
routes either to reach Mozambique or to enter South Africa (the main 
destination for immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa). The map below 
indicates routes used frequently by unauthorised immigrants (across land 
and borders), as classified by the MBP over the last few years.  
Map 3.1  
Illegal immigration routes across Mozambique by land and sea borders 
Note. This route map was drawn using information for 2012/2013, provided by the 
Mozambican Border Police. 
 
The political context of Intra-southern Africa migration: reflections on post-war 
Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa   
 56 
 
 
The MBP is aware that two inter-related factors have made these routes 
the most accessible to unauthorised immigration; these are firstly, 
immigrants’ country of origin and secondly, language similarity. With 
regard to country of origin, the bulk of unauthorised immigrants who are 
arrested by border patrollers are from Ethiopia, Somalia, Congo and 
Burundi, reaching Mozambique through Cabo Delgado province (by 
crossing the Rovuma river). These immigrants can easily reach Pemba and 
Nampula by flying to Ethiopia or Kenya on scheduled flights. According 
to the National Commander of the MBP12,  
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Mozambique has been targeted by immigrants from the democratic 
Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Rwanda as a final destination while South 
Africa (often via Mozambique) is the final destination sought by 
immigrants from Ethiopia and Somalia.  
He explains that unauthorised immigrants reach Mozambique 
predominantly across the northern and the central borders. The northern 
border comprises three provinces, namely Cabo Delgado, Niassa and 
Nampula. The central border includes four provinces, namely Tete, 
Manica, Zambézia and Sofala. The northern Cabo Delgado Province has 
become a point of easy entry for unauthorised immigrants into the 
country, particularly Tanzanians and those who come from the Great 
Lakes. According to the Mozambique Information Agency (AIM), 
fishermen in Cabo Delgado make illegal crossings of the Rovuma River, 
using their small boats at night and unloading them in the coastal districts 
of Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, Quissanga and Macomia. From there, 
immigrants are directed to other points where they either make their way 
to other parts of Mozambique on long distance trucks or head to South 
Africa (AIM, 2012). Although unauthorised Tanzanian immigrants are 
referred to as simple border violators (since they come from a 
neighbouring state), the Mozambican border authorities believe that they 
are involved in illegal exploitation of natural resources, particularly in very 
remote areas where local authorities are unable to access current patrolling 
capabilities.  
As for language similarity, most immigrants from the countries of the 
Great Lakes speak Kiswahili, which facilitates their communication and 
rapid informal integration in the Northern provinces of Mozambique. On 
many occasions, immigrants are hosted and integrated in local 
communities by their relatives while preparing to migrate to South Africa, 
a preferred destination for various categories of migrants because of its 
attractive economy and the relatively easy border crossing from 
Mozambique (Raimundo, 2009).  
The political stability since the end of the war in Mozambique has also 
turned the country into a destination for asylum seekers and refugees, 
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especially the Marratane Refugee Centre in Nampula Province in the 
Northern part of the country. With regard to refugee centres, some 
members of parliament from the Frelimo and Renamo political parties 
claim that Mozambique has been unable to control the flow of refugees 
from the perspective of both economic and security factors, which has 
become a burden to the country. For example, a member of parliament 
from Frelimo13 observes that “with more detention centres, refugees 
would not be able to mingle with Mozambicans and compete for access 
to basic services”. As section 3.3 highlights, border can be interpreted 
from different perspectives. For example, some members of parliament in 
Mozambique are of the opinion that strong border control or detention 
centres can prevent desperate immigrants from entering Mozambique. A 
similar response occurred in post-apartheid South Africa as a way of 
discouraging the proliferation of refugees and asylum seekers. In this case, 
the South Africa Department of Home affairs proposed the establishment 
of a Detention Centre to host asylum seekers while their applications were 
being processed (Truong et al., 2014; Handmaker, 2001). As the following 
section argues, in implementing immigration reforms, the post-apartheid 
South African government has been reinforcing anti-immigration policies, 
the impact of which ranges from human rights abuse, incitement of 
violence to xenophobia.  
3.6 Post-apartheid South African migration management 
As noted in previous sections, the end of apartheid in South Africa and 
the end of armed conflict in Mozambique resulted in the intensification of 
both regular and irregular forms of migration across the borders of 
neighbouring states. Accordingly, the Mozambique border authorities 
have given priority to the control of entry by unauthorised immigrants and 
cross-border crime. By the same token, the post-apartheid South African 
government has adopted cross-border management policies guided by 
national migration and refugee legislation (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; 
Oucho, 2014; Crush et al., 2005). This section looks at policy reforms, 
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institutional reforms, and border control arrangements aimed at 
responding to immigration in post-apartheid South Africa.  
3.6.1 Legacies of the past 
Prior to 1994, South Africa had very restrictive security-oriented migration 
policies. As Handmaker and Parsley (2001:42) point out, “the security and 
control oriented approach was evident in the focus on deterring 
undocumented migrants and bogus asylum seekers”. By implementing 
contract-based employment and the Aliens Control Act of 1991, apartheid 
South Africa was able to control the movements of people (inside the 
country and from other African countries). In order to limit permanent 
employment for immigrants and to restrict movement of people from 
rural to urban centres, immigrants were contracted for a maximum period 
of two years, after which they could be repatriated (Posel and Marx, 2013; 
Posel, 2004).  
Restrictive migration policies under the apartheid regime were a 
prototype of British colonial policies designed to exclude the entry of 
Indians, Jews and communists as well as foreign activists and journalists 
into South Africa (Truong et al., 2014; Oucho, 2014; Handmaker and 
Parsley, 2001; Handmaker, 2001). In 1991, the apartheid regime 
introduced the Aliens Control Act, which included several matters related 
to border control and migration under its rule, such as entry and residence 
(Melde et al., 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). As a result of massive 
flows of undocumented immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees 
(particular from Mozambique) into the country, South Africa continued 
to give priority to repatriation operations and strict control of entry and 
residence of immigrants. However, with the dawn of a democratic South 
Africa, one of the major challenges facing the country was the 
implementation of far-reaching migration reforms aimed at achieving 
standards of administrative justice.    
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3.6.2 Migration policy reforms 
The first attempt to bring about reform of the migration policy in post-
apartheid South Africa came in 1995. This was aimed at amending the 
Aliens Control Act (ACA of 1991). The ACA was considered draconian 
and an apartheid dinosaur because of its policies rooted in racism that 
perpetuated the violation of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers 
(Oucho, 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). The major objective of the 
1995 amendment was to review the detention period under which people 
could be held without judicial decision. While the ACA had established 
that detained persons could be held in detention indefinitely, the 1995 
amendment removed this provision and stipulated that detentions of 
longer than a period of three days should be reviewed (Oucho, 2014; 
Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). However, the 1995 amendment has not 
brought any change since the provisions have been applied, which has led 
to the need for further reforms.  
The next attempt to reform migration policy came through the Green 
paper on International Migration in 1997 and the Refugee Act of 1998. 
The point of departure for the establishment of the Green paper was the 
lack of protection afforded asylum seekers and refugees, since they could 
be repatriated at any time. Therefore, the Green paper fixed a five-year 
period before either repatriation of a refugee or the granting of permanent 
residence in South Africa could occur (Handmaker, 1999). The main 
objective of the Green paper was to “provide temporary protection to 
persons whose basic human rights were at risk in their country of origin, 
until they could return home safely” (Handmaker, 1999:300). The Refugee 
Act of 1998 was intended to protect vulnerable groups on a permanent 
basis in accordance with international practices, reflecting South Africa’s 
obligations and various international human rights conventions 
(Donnelly, 2014; Handmaker, 1999). The Green paper was contested by 
the Human Rights Commission for its consistent failure to achieve 
standards for the protection of human rights, particularly with regard to 
repatriation within five years. Regardless of people’s expectations of the 
Refugee Act 1998, its implementation has raised concerns because of its 
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origins in the ACA, thus representing a continuation of a draconian regime 
(Melde et al., 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). However, efforts to 
produce more contextualised migration policies continued. Post-apartheid 
South Africa introduced the Immigration Act of 2000 and its amendment 
Act in 2004. With these instruments, South Africa has embodied a 
different approach to immigration control, with particular focus on 
economic-related immigration and a link to border control (inside the 
country and on the remainder of the border). In doing so, the Immigration 
Act of 2000 in its preamble provides that the new immigration control 
system aims at ensuring inter alia that (1) security considerations when 
entering South Africa are completely satisfied, including strengthening 
border monitoring aimed at preventing illegal immigrants and deporting 
them in cases where they are detected; (2) foreigners promote and 
contribute to the growth of South Africa’s economy. Post-apartheid South 
Africa’s focus on the migration-economic development nexus is driven by 
the needs of global economic competitiveness on the one hand, and the 
need to strengthen border control in order to exclude desperate 
immigrants on the other. It is suggested that South Africa needs to take a 
step back in order to fully understand the dynamics of migration across its 
borders and at the continental level, and then to formulate more 
contextualised migration policies. 
3.6.3 Integration of immigrants: a losing battle  
3.6.3.1 Labour policy  
Despite different attempts to adapt post-apartheid South Africa to a new 
migration context aimed at establishing a less racialised society and 
promoting respect for human rights, the country’s migration policies have 
left many migrant workers from neigbouring countries undocumented and 
exposed to labour exploitation and police brutality (Trimikliniotis et al., 
2008). As Crush and Dodson (2007:451) point out, “since 1994, there has 
been a growing disconnect between the regional reality of migration and 
the inherited policy tools which seek to manage those movements”. In the 
matter of labour migration, post-apartheid South Africa has been plagued 
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by high rates of unemployment, a result of downsizing policies in the 
mining sector and job restrictions applied to low skilled workers. This has 
increased hostile sentiments regarding immigrants (Fine, 2014; van and 
Moppes, 2006; Wentzel and Tlabela; 2001; Posel, 2004). For example, the 
1996 Amendment Act prescribes that if qualified South Africans are 
available, South Africa will no longer grant foreign work or immigration 
permits (Crush, 1999:6). At the same time, South Africa has undertaken 
further labour adjustments, including the signing of bilateral labour 
agreements with Lesotho, Botswana14, Malawi and Swaziland, aimed at 
ensuring legal access to South Africa by workers from these states (Fine, 
2014; Melde et al., 2014; Crush, 1999).  
Apart from these arrangements, the South African government has 
made specific recommendations to neighbouring states stating, inter alia, 
that (1) all governments should provide work for their own citizens; (2) 
problems of immigration can only be solved by a coordinated regional and 
international strategy; and (3) there should be a fair and proper control of 
entry of migrant workers into host countries (Melde et al., 2014; Oucho 
and Crush, 2001). This suggests that countries in the region that are 
relatively advanced in terms of economic development, such as South 
Africa, Botswana and Namibia, tend to see other states as transit points 
for unauthorised immigrants on the grounds that those countries’ borders 
are less well protected and there are higher levels of corruption among 
their border officials (Solomon, 1997). Based on this, South African 
recommendations to neighbouring states could be regarded as a manifesto 
of hegemonic power in the region, which could seriously undermine 
mutual coexistence. Moreover, with this hegemonic positioning, other 
states in the region may find it difficult to cooperate openly in integration 
on the grounds that they might be dominated by South Africa (Ngoma, 
2003).  
Against this background, the former Vice President of South Africa 
(Thabo Mbeki) appealed to South African authorities to look carefully and 
holistically at causal factors and their potential impact on neighbouring 
countries. Job losses among mine workers, for instance, could easily 
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intensify clandestine immigration, which in turn would undermine South 
Africa’s own interests as well as those of neighbouring countries (Crush 
and Dodson, 2007; Davies and Head, 1995). Despite this concern, South 
Africa has not yet adopted new immigration policies other than 
repatriation and securitisation of borders. 
3.6.3.2 Border control   
As has been highlighted in the previous sections, post-apartheid South 
Africa’s immigration policies and border controls have prioritised pre-
dawn searches and repatriation of immigrants who have irregular status in 
South Africa. Although these operations have been implemented under 
the guise of fighting cross-border crime (particularly trafficking), they have 
been characterised by police brutality and little respect for human rights, 
provoking criticism from humanitarian organisations who believe that 
these acts impair democracy and ignore the rule of law. As Crush et al. 
(2005:25) point out, “arrest, detention and repatriation procedures do not 
always protect irregular and regular migrants from abuse and have the 
potential to cause conflict between neighbouring countries”. As a result of 
these practices, the bulk of the literature proclaims that “South Africa’s 
new democratic government inherited a system of cross-border migration 
management rooted in the abusive practices of the past, which became in 
direct conflict with government to transparency, equality, accountability, 
and fundamental human rights” (Crush, 1999:1). 
In the matter of patrol operations, South Africa has raised concerns 
with its control of its extensive land borders, particularly those with 
Mozambique, where the border has been electrified and is patrolled by the 
South African National Defence Force (Melde et al.¸ 2014; Vigneswaran, 
2013; Crush, 1999).  
Concomitantly, the post-apartheid South African government has 
increased its budget and resources for police raids and deportation 
operations including the tracing, arrest and repatriation of refugees and 
undocumented immigrants, particularly Mozambicans and Zimbabweans 
(Vigneswaran, 2013; Crush and Dodson, 2007; Crush, 1999). As a result, 
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in 1994 the South African immigration authorities deported about 91 000 
immigrants to Mozambique and Zimbabwe, whom they believed to have 
entered South Africa clandestinely (Oucho, 2014; Oucho and Crush, 
2001). As these operations have continued, South African authorities have 
also begun to deport non-Mozambican foreign immigrants (such as 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian and Chinese immigrants, as well as people 
from other parts of the region) on the grounds that they entered the 
country through Mozambique. This has damaged diplomatic relations 
between the two states (Melde et al., 2014; Crush, 1999).   
Briefly stated, the increase in the budget for restrictive border control 
measures has not produced sustainable results for the South African 
government. From the legal perspective, South African arrest and 
deportation operations have fallen below international standards for the 
protection of human rights. From an economic perspective, South African 
arrest and deportation operations cost the government large sums of 
money, while the impact of this expenditure is nil (Vigneswaran, 2013; 
Oucho and Crush, 2001). From a socio-economic perspective, the focus 
on highly skilled immigrants who will meet the country’s economic 
demands has resulted in the marginalisation of the majority of immigrants, 
who have had to ‘fight’ for their own survival.   
3.6.3.3 Legal protection of immigrants and social discrimination   
While police brutality against immigrants has been increasing (such as 
police dog attacks on Mozambican immigrants in 2001), negative 
sentiment about immigrants has grown apace in post-apartheid South 
Africa. As far as the literature is concerned, massive arrest and deportation 
operations have embodied a discourse in which foreign citizens are seen 
as the cause of high rates of unemployment and crime, and this has 
sparked conflicts with local citizens (SAMP15, 2014; Crush, 1999). As 
Handmaker (1999:292) points out, “South Africa is reported to be 
experiencing a pronounced and worsening climate of anti-foreigner 
sentiment, extending to widespread social discrimination, which has 
occasionally translated into violent attacks”. For instance, the xenophobic 
attacks in May 2008 (resulting in several deaths, and destruction and 
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looting of foreigners’ property) illustrates that post-apartheid South Africa 
has prioritised selective immigration policies such as economically driven 
immigration (Adjai and Lazaridis, 2014; Crush and Dodson, 2007).  
 In the context of refugees and asylum seekers, South African anti-
immigration policies have deprived immigrants of several of their rights. 
For example, section 22 of the Refugee Act of 1998 prescribes that asylum 
seekers have no right to study or work for 180 days while their status is 
being processed (Handmaker and Parsley, 2001: 43). Post-apartheid South 
African immigration policies have tended to move in tandem with 
Western receiving countries’ models in which immigrants face 
tremendous difficulties in achieving social integration, ranging from 
shrinking opportunities for language instruction, xenophobia and racist 
public opinions about immigrants ( Boucher and Gest, 2014).    
While post- apartheid South African anti-immigration policies have 
resulted in violations of human rights, discrimination and raised anti-
foreigner sentiment, policy makers have also failed to explore different 
approaches to migration and border control, particularly the concept of 
intra-Southern African migration, which is grounded in the historical 
context of migration between Southern Africa states. The concept of 
intra-Southern African migration can be better understood in the context 
of south-south migration as an alternative to migration and border control 
strategies in an ongoing process of regional integration in SADC. 
Regardless of restrictive border controls in many countries of the world, 
south-south migration has been intensified by globalisation and by the 
increase in regional agreements on the free movements of people 
(Donzelli, 2013). In the case of the Southern African region, table 3.2 
below illustrates the socio-economic and ethno-cultural factors of cross-
border interaction, which stand as fundamental features of intra-Southern 
African migration. These deserve further discussion towards finding an 
alternative approach to migration studies in the region. To be more 
specific, cross-border interactions can offer an alternative to migration 
management, in contrast to international standards of border control, 
which are fundamentally designed to restrict the movements of so-called 
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criminals across international borders. How intra-Southern African 
migration might provide an alternative that diverges from the criminal-
migration nexus of border control is discussed in the following section. 
3.7 Prospect of intra-Southern African migration: a response 
to anti-immigration policies 
Up to this point, this chapter has analysed various legal and institutional 
reforms that have been implemented since the end of the war in 
Mozambique and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, and the impact 
of these on the movements of people. Evidence from the literature 
illustrates that these reforms have perpetuated anti-immigration ideology 
and have led to the spread of xenophobic sentiments about foreign 
immigrants (Boucher and Gest, 2014; Fine, 2014; Handmaker, 1999).  
However, as table 3.2 below illustrates, migration flows from and 
within the Southern African region are marked by local dynamics of 
border crossing intertwined with the effects of the end of war and 
apartheid (as fully explored in chapters 4, 5 and 6) and by historical labour 
migration to South Africa. These require a deeper analysis of the 
usefulness of international models of border control that seek to lock 
down borders against so-called unwanted immigrants across Western 
countries. By focusing on migration from and within the Southern African 
region, an alternative to international models of border control by placing 
emphasis on the views of local people in cross-border regions instead of 
on sovereignty, which concerns national states (Asiwaju, 2011). 
In the case of migration from and within the Southern African region, 
communities living in cross-border regions interact on both sides of the 
border on a day-to-day basis for different reasons, particularly those 
related to socio-economic needs. The table illustrates that since the end of 
the war in Mozambique, cross-border interaction has increased and local 
communities have been able to expand their informal trade activities 
across borders to access water, firewood and arable lands, all vital to their 
livelihoods. While cross-border interaction has tended to intensify, 
variations have occurred in border control regimes from country to 
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country. While these variations in border control (weak, strong and very 
strong) are related to each country’s material capacity to monitor the 
border, states have tended to develop similar concerns about border 
control that are often in conflict with the concerns of the local population. 
In short, these regimes of border control reflect states’ perspectives of 
border security, which merge transboundary socio-economic interactions 
with cross-border crime, particularly poaching, illegal exploitation of 
mineral resources and smuggling.  
Table 3.2  
Key interaction factors shaping intra-Southern African migration 
Countries 
bordering 
Mozambique  
Border 
length 
(km) 
Transboundary 
ethnic/linguistic 
groups 
Transboundary 
legally 
trafficked 
goods 
Transboundary 
illegally 
trafficked 
goods 
Transboundary 
prominent 
concerns 
Security 
regime 
type 
Tanzania 800  Makonde; Yao Fabrics; 
consumer 
goods; 
electronic 
items; bicycles 
and spare parts 
Minerals; 
timber 
Poaching; 
illegal 
extraction of 
minerals; 
smuggling; 
illegal 
migration  
Weak:  
extensive 
with few 
patrol units 
Malawi 1500 Emacua; Chiyao; 
Chichewa  
Maize; beans; 
salt; 
vegetables; soft 
drinks; 
bicycles, 
motorbikes and 
spare parts; 
mattresses 
 
 
 
Fertilisers; 
firewood; 
timber; 
bamboo; 
rustled cattle; 
alcohol 
Smuggling; land 
disputes; illegal 
fishing; felling 
of trees 
Weak:  
very 
extensive 
and porous 
border; 
land-
oriented 
border 
crossings; 
limited 
control 
capacity 
Zambia 400 Nyanja; 
Nyungwe  
Dried fish; 
maize; beans; 
potatoes; 
plastic items; 
Bales of 
second-hand 
clothes; spirits; 
cigarettes; 
Smuggling; 
illegal 
migration  
Weak: 
Porous; 
search for 
livelihoods 
on both 
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fabrics; soft 
drinks 
minerals; 
rustled cattle 
sides of 
borders  
Zimbabwe 1200 Shona; Manhyka  Sugar; maize 
flour; rice; 
meat; milk; 
soap 
Bales of 
second-hand 
clothes; spirits; 
cigarettes; 
minerals; 
rustled cattle 
Smuggling; 
illegal 
migration; 
illegal 
extraction of 
minerals; water 
for agriculture 
Strong: 
Constantly 
patrolled 
border; 
socio-
economically 
oriented 
crossing 
Swaziland 100 Swazi; 
Chichangana  
Meat; maize 
flour; potatoes; 
tomatoes; 
clothing; shoes 
Rustled cattle; 
stolen vehicles; 
firearms 
Smuggling of 
goods and 
rustled cattle 
Strong: 
Patrolled 
border; 
economically 
oriented 
crossing 
South Africa 500 Tsonga; 
Chichangana; 
Zulus  
Meat; maize 
flour; shoes, 
clothes; plastic 
items (chairs, 
tables; bowls, 
basins); soft 
drinks; 
mattresses 
Cosmetics; 
drugs; stolen 
vehicles; 
firearms; 
spirits; 
cigarettes; 
rustled cattle 
Smuggling; 
trafficking; 
illegal 
migration; 
poaching of 
rhinos; rustled 
cattle    
Very strong: 
Highly 
patrolled 
border; 
economically 
oriented 
crossing 
Source: Data collated by the author on the basis of interviews in the field  
 
 
 Historically, the discovery of minerals on the Witwatersrand and in 
Kimberley stimulated labour migration by creating a demand for a labour 
force from several neighbouring countries: Mozambique, Zimbabwe, 
Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and Uganda (Fine, 2014; Wentzel 
and Tlabela, 2001). This migration has always been economically driven, 
which is a crucial factor underlying intra-Southern African migration. For 
example, following the end of the war in Mozambique and the collapse of 
apartheid in South Africa, immigrants from other Southern African 
countries such as Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe began to look for 
alternative destinations such as Mozambique and Botswana for trade 
opportunities and better living conditions. This gave new impetus to 
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regional economies, particularly for local populations (Ama et al., 2014; 
Peberdy, 2000).   
Given the renaissance of migration from and within the Southern 
African region, the concept of intra-Southern African migration can be 
expressed in the idea of south-south migration, which is referred to as the 
migration that occurs between developing countries or regions (Melde et 
al., 2014; Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Bakewell, 2009). Based on the World 
Bank development indicators16, developing countries are characterised by 
low income, low levels of human capital and economic vulnerability 
(Bakewell, 2009). Among the drivers of south-south migration, this 
research concentrates on those that might lead to more integrated border 
management in the context of a migration – development nexus. Here, 
south-south migration is motivated by reasons ranging from income (also 
a determinant for south-north migration), petty trade, geographical 
proximity, social and ethnic networks, conflict and natural disasters and 
transit purposes (Melde et al., 2014; Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Hujo and Piper, 
2007).  
Southern African countries could use a more responsive definition of 
border to meet challenges related to the building of a more interconnected 
society, in which the exchange of skills and culture better reflects the needs 
of communities divided by the legal lines of state borders. Thus, while 
states have always regarded foreign immigrants as a burden rather than as 
a boon, local inhabitants tend to view foreigners from the perspective of 
partnerships and skills exchange for local development. For example, this 
research uncovered many examples: a resident in the Ressano Garcia 
community (Mozambique-South Africa border) stated that “people from 
the great lakes have shown different experiences by introducing container-
based grocery shops, which are now common in the country17”. In the 
Machipanda community (Mozambique-Zimbabwe border), local residents 
understand that Zimbabwean immigrants (who come in search of jobs) 
have skills in areas such as construction and plumbing, from which they 
can benefit. In the same vein, a senior border police officer stated that “it 
is relatively easier to hire and pay relatively low wages to persons from 
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developing countries rather than European worker”.18 Such statements 
imply that intra-Southern African migration may arise as an alternative 
concept in the context of post-colonial Africa, one that has not yet been 
addressed from the perspective of social and developmental issues, 
particularly in terms of opportunities for the countries, local communities 
and migrants involved (Melde et al., 2014; Hujo and Piper, 2014; Hujo and 
Piper, 2007).  
As has been emphasised in the previous sections, Mozambique and 
South Africa together with other Southern African states have prioritised 
border controls that have tended to view immigration as a threat rather 
than as an opportunity, and this has prevented them from incorporating 
migration management into social policy frameworks such as poverty 
reduction (Hujo and Piper, 2014; Hujo and Piper, 2007; Crush et al., 2005). 
In this scenario, each country in the Southern African region has been 
concerned with the control of immigrants in terms of “who is allowed to 
enter the country, for what purposes and under what conditions, but 
fundamentally also about the settlement and integration of migrants who 
intend to remain in the country” (SAMP, 2014:5). This notion can be 
separated into two strands of integration: economic and political. 
From the perspective of economic integration, states in the Southern 
African region may need to explore the core values and potential 
contribution of immigration to their development strategies (SAMP, 
2014). As the literature makes evident, such states may need to refrain 
from regarding immigrants as a threat and instead treat them as an 
opportunity (Adjai and Lazaridis, 2014; Sablonnière et al., 2013; Crush et 
al., 2005). At the practical level, they may need to work with local 
communities and immigrants to establish development strategies in which 
nationals and immigrants participate, to facilitate and strengthen both 
immigrant integration and the hosting communities and countries. This 
matter is discussed further in chapter 8. 
 In terms of political integration, development strategies established to 
achieve the integration of immigrants can contribute to social cohesion and 
the building of a national identity beyond cultural similarities and territorial 
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belonging. From this perspective, social cohesion and national identity 
mean more than living together in the same neighbourhood; they include 
how foreign immigrants are integrated into local communities (SAMP, 
2014).  
 Southern African countries may need to view borders as points of 
contact rather than barriers, particularly since borders can no longer be 
confined by political geography and territorial identity owing to the volatile 
nature of these subjects (Newman, 2006b; Kolossov and O’Loughlin, 1998). 
Moreover, state border officials, particularly in the context of post-colonial 
border regions, need to be adaptive and adaptable to security complexities 
influencing global policing. This represents a structural demand in that 
states and communities in the border regions may need to frame a concept 
of security that balances socio-economic, cultural and sovereignty interests.  
3. 8 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined border control strategies adopted in post-war 
Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa, and the driving forces that 
have led to these strategies.  
 Findings indicate that the post-war political environment in 
Mozambique has resulted in new migration trends related to the return of 
refugees from neighbouring countries and travellers from beyond the 
regional borders in transit to South Africa. In response to this new pattern 
of migration, the Mozambican government has implemented several 
reforms aimed at keeping the border protected against unauthorised 
immigration and cross-border crime (such as trafficking, smuggling, illegal 
exploitation of natural resources) that it views as serious threats to security. 
Border authorities’ fears concerning border security are rooted in the 
legacies of the war, particularly the threats posed by penetration by 
apartheid elements in support of Renamo guerrillas in Mozambican 
territory. As a result, the MBP has focused on the training and deployment 
of patrol agents on the border for surveillance and patrol missions. In 
addition, immigration authorities have undertaken related operations 
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ranging from back checks, arrests and the deportation of immigrants in 
irregular situations.  
In a similar manner, post-apartheid South African migration policies 
and border control strategies have continued the segregating policies of 
the past when dealing with immigrants, particularly those from 
neighbouring countries. The reconnection of South Africa to global chains 
of transaction has resulted in the implementation of migration reforms 
that have punished the majority of unskilled labour immigrants from rural 
South Africa and from neighbouring states. The Immigration Act of 2002 
and its amendment Act of 2004 is a vivid illustration of how post-
apartheid South Africa’s economically oriented migration policies have 
discriminated against the majority of unskilled immigrants, dating from 
the discovery of gold and diamonds in the late 19th century. South Africa 
has not been able to address internal migration problems nor migration 
pressure resulting from downsizing policies and the consequent loss of 
jobs for thousands of foreigners and national citizens. Foreign immigrants 
are seen predominantly as a threat to socio-economic stability, increasing 
unemployment and the spread of disease and criminality.  
Notes 
 
 
1 Women’s visibility in “networks of cross-border migration” in SSA is a new 
pattern that has emerged since the 1970s. At one end of the spectrum this has 
resulted in competition with men for social responsibilities, and this is 
grounded in an economic perspective of migration, particularly since the end 
of apartheid in South Africa. That is, trader women make up the majority in 
the flow of traders crossing the Mozambican-South African borders and have 
been shown to support their dependents including spouses, children and 
extended families in terms of housing, food and the education of children 
(Peberdy, 2000). 
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2 The intensification of war and penetration of elements of the apartheid regime 
across the Mozambican borders led to the signing on 16 March 1984 of the 
Inkomati Accord of “non-aggression and good neighbourliness” between the 
Mozambican government and the South African apartheid regime. The key aim 
of the Accord was to end the war and its legacies since it was believed that if 
Pretoria would fulfil its goals under the accord, the intensity of bandit activity 
would rapidly decline. 
3 Reaffirmation is a topographic activity that is conducted using maps and 
previous border treaties to replace milestones that have been removed or 
destroyed during a period of war, by animals or by natural phenomena. 
4 While delimitation of the border is the description of its line in text, maps 
or cartographic letters, demarcation is an indication of the physical alignment 
of the border in own grounds (Brownile, 1987). 
5 Interviewed in October 2012, in Maputo. 
6 Although violation of a state’s borders is a contravention in Mozambique, it 
can be sanctioned as a crime in some cases. In cases of violation of a state’s 
borders by a warship, by border forces from neigbouring countries or by spying 
airplanes, all measures have to be taken against the perpetrator. In addition, 
administrative or criminal sanctions can be applied to any person found guilty 
of border violation (Provision Guide, 1979).   
7 However, there are cases in which a given state decides unilaterally to close 
the border, as the South African authorities did at the simplified post of 
Mbuzine in Maputo Province. 
8A restricted border zone is the territory within the administrative boundaries 
immediately adjacent to the state border line, the territorial length of which 
stretches up to 20 km from the official border line. This area includes 
Mozambican inland waters, rivers, lakes and islands.  
9 Interviewed in October 2012, in Maputo. 
10 Interviewed in October 2012, in Maputo. 
11 Interviewed in October 2012, in Maputo. 
12 Interviewed in October 2012, in Maputo. 
13 Parliamentarian and rapporteur for the International Relations Commission 
at the National Assembly, interviewed on 12 November 2012. 
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14 While South Africa has been concerned with the implementation of both 
downsizing and anti-immigration policies, Botswana has tended to take a 
capability approach to migration management. In this sense, Botswana has 
become more interested in skilled immigrants with temporary entry (Crush, 
1999). 
15 SAMP, or the Southern African Migration Programme, was founded in 1996 
in Cape Town. It is an international organisation aimed at promoting awareness 
of migration-development linkages in the SADC region. Its focus is on applied 
research on migration and development issues that serve to provide policy 
advice and expertise to the countries of the region through training 
programmes and education campaigns.   
16 Based on World Bank development indicators, developing countries/regions 
include Africa, the Americas excluding North America, the Caribbean, Asia 
excluding Japan, Oceania excluding Australia, and New Zealand (Bakewell, 
2009). Other organisations such as the UN and the UNDP define developing 
countries based on the Human Development Index (HDI). 
17 Resident in Ressano Garcia border, interviewed in October 2013. 
18 Interviewed in March 2014. 
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4 
Ressano Garcia: internationalised, 
securitised border controls  
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter it was argued that following the end of armed 
conflict in Mozambique and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, the 
Southern African region witnessed an escalation in migration flows. 
Concomitantly, Mozambique’s position shifted from a country that 
traditionally sent labour migrants to South Africa to one that received 
migrants, including those in transit, from across the Southern African 
region. Today it receives immigrants from north Sahara who are 
pressuring Southern African borders as a result of the tremendous 
difficulties they encounter in trying to enter Europe, caused particularly by 
the intensified war on terror. Mozambique has thus become the 
preferential transit country for those wishing to enter South Africa, 
resulting in greater migration into the region.   
 In light of this, chapter 4 examines migration flows, border control 
responses (by the Mozambican and South African border authorities) and 
their impact on local communities situated across the busiest and most 
contentious crossing point between Mozambique and South Africa – 
Ressano Garcia. Since the end of war, Ressano Garcia has been targeted 
by travellers from all over the country as well as beyond its borders, 
significantly increasing migration flows. Given this scenario, the 
Mozambican border authorities have intensified patrol operations along 
this border and have abolished the ‘long period stamp’ certificates that 
were previously issued to local residents to allow them to cross the border 
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into South Africa. These changes have been introduced (1) as a response 
to pressure from neighbouring countries (particularly South Africa) to 
clamp down on clandestine migration; (2) in response to international 
security standards applying to official travel documents; and (3) as a result 
of increased concern over territorial sovereignty and the protection of 
natural resources. These changes have had a marked effect on the life of 
local residents, particularly from a social and economic perspective. This 
in turn has resulted in differences in perceptions held by the Mozambican 
border authorities and local communities of the role and meaning of the 
border.  
4.2 Ressano Garcia and the dynamics of border control 
Ever since the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley and gold on the 
Witwatersrand, the South African mining industry has attracted a 
considerable labour force from its domestic boundaries and from 
neighbouring countries, particularly Mozambique, Lesotho and Swaziland 
(Spaan and van Moppes, 2006). As Mozambique was the area responsible 
for the greatest labour supply, the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek signed a 
labour agreement with the Portuguese in 1897, aimed at ensuring a more 
regulated and cheaper labour supply (Fine, 2014; Wentzel and Tlabela, 
2001). In terms of the agreement, the South African gold mines 
established the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA) – 
a recruiting agency for migrant workers intended to ensure controlled and 
legal male labour migration. Since then, immigration flows into South 
Africa have been restricted by means of internal control operations and 
reinforced border patrols. 
However, the end of the war in Mozambique in 1992, coupled with a 
growing demand for cheap labour in informal sectors in South Africa, has 
resulted in increased flows of migrants (particularly undocumented 
migrants) from different parts of the country and beyond, all of whom 
expect to cross the Ressano Garcia border (Adepoju, 2000). In response, 
the South African government has strengthened border patrol operations 
in order to crack down on clandestine and undocumented migrants (Fine, 
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2014; van and Moppes, 2006; Wentzel and Tlabela; 2001; Adepoju, 2000). 
For example, in 1996 South African border authorities pledged to raise the 
electrified border fence to a lethal mode if clandestine crossings were not 
significantly reduced (McDonald, Zinyama, Gay et al., 2005).  
As the Ressano Garcia border has been identified as a conduit for 
clandestine migration, human trafficking and other transnational crimes 
(facilitated by an extensive criminal network in Sub-Saharan Africa [SSA]), 
scholars have related this problem to the lack of adequate apparatus, 
technology and patrolling required to defend the border on the 
Mozambican side (Gastrow and Mosse, 2002; Adepoju, 2006; Raimundo, 
2009). As a result, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia have argued that 
weak border control in neighbouring countries is likely to increase 
migration flows into the most prosperous countries, thereby distorting 
regional development rather than creating equilibrium. This has 
postponed the implementation of the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) protocols on the free movement of people in the 
sub-continent (Oucho and Crush, 2001). Discrepancies in free movement 
agreements have meant that each member state has a different agreement 
regulating the movement of persons. This opens the way for irregularities 
and unilateral arrangements.    
In most of the cases, unilateral border control arrangements are in 
direct opposition to the perceptions of local residents. In the Mozambican 
context, the state defines and controls the border from a political 
perspective (sovereignty), while local residents perceive it as presenting 
socio-economic and cultural opportunities for their survival. Given these 
contrasting viewpoints, neither set of actors (neither the state nor local 
residents) has been able to establish a common ground from which to 
negotiate the border. This failure has provided this research study with an 
opportunity to bring human security border control into the ontology of 
migration studies. 
In the context of post-colonial countries, border control requires an 
analytical framework that pays attention to the interplay of kinships 
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divided by colonial borders, economic differences between countries and 
other socio-economic conditions that impair human life in border regions. 
In the following section, the state’s views on border control and the 
consequences for local views on border crossings are considered from the 
perspective of social constructivism. 
4.3 Securitisation and human security perspective of borders  
The end of the Cold War altered the concepts of security and border 
considerably, imbuing them with wide and contradictory meanings. On 
the one hand, the notion of security has been expanded, integrating 
protection of individuals and communities from internal violence, natural 
disasters, transmissible diseases and other aspects of deteriorating human 
circumstances and shifting the referent of security from state to individual 
(Amouyel, 2006). On the other hand, security has become a divisive 
concept in that interest in the individuals at the centre of the security 
discourse has remained twofold.  
At one end of the spectrum, the protection of individuals in issues 
related to the provision of public goods and human rights, which 
constitute the building blocks of national security, has become the focus 
of the state’s attention (Amouyel, 2006). At the other end of the spectrum, 
individuals have come to the attention of the state as they are viewed as a 
threat to security. In the case of the latter, there is a growing belief that the 
globalisation of transactions, terrorism and increased organised 
transnational crime is a threat to the identity of states and societies (Bigo, 
2007). As a result, state borders are regarded as conduits for criminals. For 
this reason, it is believed that these borders should be more restrictive to 
those who are perceived to pose a threat to security, thereby making law 
enforcement the last bastion of sovereignty (Dauvergne, 2008; Nunez-
Neto, 2008). For example, in the Eurocentric perception of sovereignty, 
migration controls have changed the logic of surveillance in the protection 
of people and national identity, giving borders the connotation of racism 
and intolerance directed at so-called ‘unwanted’ immigrants (Bigo, 2002).  
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However, scholars of security studies understand that the association 
of migration with crime is a result of the social construction of security 
threats. Social constructivism is defined as “the manner in which the 
material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction in 
the dynamic process and epistemic interpretations of the material world” 
(Adler, 1997:322). It expresses the human capacity for reflection and the 
creation of meanings of the world he or she knows, experiences and 
understands (Adler, 1997). In security studies, constructivism is concerned 
with conceiving the components of social reality and world politics and 
how they are linked to each other (Balzacq, 2010).  
However, critiques of social constructivism have come from various 
quarters, particularly from advocates for human security. Departing from 
the perspective of speech acts, advocates of human security hold that 
securitisation is theoretically restrictive and methodologically unrewarding 
as it is concerned with what matters to the power holder. The theoretical 
contradiction of constructivism is that the material, the subjective and the 
intersubjective worlds become disconnected in the way that a state’s 
security and human security are not the same (Balzacq, 2010). For 
example, from the perspective of security’s referent object, security 
interests between the concerned actors (state and individuals) become 
dissimilar since satisfaction of human needs is linked solely to protection 
of sovereignty, regardless of various aspects of human needs that remain 
unsatisfied (Floyd, 2011).  
Based on this, social constructivism as it is perceived by the 
Copenhagen School (CS) is deemed incapable of making 
recommendations that can improve the lives of the most disadvantaged 
citizens (Floyd, 2007:38). Therefore, constructivists and scholars of 
human security find themselves in disagreement regarding security. This 
increases the inability of the CS to conceptualise the security concerns of 
dispersed local inhabitants (from below), who are ‘forced’ to accept the 
state imposed security policy without any bargaining power (Doty, 1998; 
Balzacq, 2010). While advocates of the CS understand that security is a 
social construct, advocates of human security see it as an actual human 
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need that demands political intervention, beyond battalions (Thomas, 
2001). From this perspective, human security has embodied a paradigm 
shift, from a concern with weapons to a concern for human life and 
dignity, which has theoretically expanded the analytical framework of 
security (Floyd, 2007; Amouyel, 2006). However, if the making of a 
referent security object is intended to achieve survival purposes, the 
concept of security itself is blurred, lacks a single logic and needs further 
analysis, which implies that the state’s agenda on security demands critical 
analysis (Weaver cited in Stritzel, 2007). 
For example, in the matter of cross-border communities, human 
security analysis focuses on family bonds and cultural identity, issues 
which force communities into continuous interaction regardless of the 
state’s views on security. Given that every state border is unique 
(Medeiros, 2015; O’Dowd, 2002), cross-border communities in the 
context of post-colonial countries are informed by a complex mixture of 
factors that clash with the Westphalian system of border control. As 
Newman (2006a:174) points out, “the division of tribal and ethnic 
territories between more than one state, or the inclusion of numerous 
ethnic groups in a single territory has plagued Africa and parts of Asia until 
today in constant strife”. Given the transforming nature of the concept of 
security, such strife can be pinpointed as the result of a lack of access to 
potable water and food, medical treatment, adequate education and other 
human necessities. Based on similar examples, the following section 
highlights how the Ressano Garcia border has become the most important 
and busiest land border in Mozambique, and most particularly, how 
different perceptions of security held by the Mozambican border 
authorities and local communities have turned this border into a site of a 
battle for survival. 
4.4 Context and case study 
While chapter 3 has interrogated general national security views that have 
driven Mozambique and South Africa to prioritise anti-criminal responses 
to border control, this chapter concentrates on a specific border region 
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and analyses the position and practices of these states and the local 
community on the border. During the period of civil struggle, Ressano 
Garcia played a crucial socio-economic role for local residents, but its 
transformation into the busiest border in the country has set the stage for 
a conflict of interests between the Mozambican border authorities and 
communities living in cross-border regions. However, despite the 
Mozambican Government’s concerns about effective border control, 
Ressano Garcia remains the most important pipeline for the supply of 
commodities to informal sectors in Matola, Maputo and beyond. The 
following subsections illustrate how Ressano Garcia has evolved as an 
important point of intersection between South Africa and Mozambique, 
and how local residents have reacted to the changes that have occurred 
over time. 
4.4.1 Ressano Garcia border: historical overview  
Map 4.1 
 Ressano Garcia border region  
 
Author’s own map  
Source: https://maps.google.nl/maps?hl=en&tab=wl 
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The Ressano Garcia border region is located in the southern part of 
Moamba District1 (in Maputo Province)2. It borders the Republic of South 
Africa in the south, the Namaacha District in the east, the Sabié District 
in the west and the Moamba village in the north. As a result of a 
preponderance of stones and sand, the soil is unsuited to agriculture3. 
Initially, a village was established in the region in 1891 and the name was 
given as a tribute to Frederico Ressano Garcia, a Portuguese engineer who 
was prominent in the construction of the railway line from Lourenço 
Marques (now Maputo) to Pretoria (in South Africa), initiated in 18874.  
The railway line played an important role in the Portuguese colony and 
in South Africa under the apartheid regime, being used as it was especially 
for the shipment of gold and other resources to the international market 
through the port of Lourenço Marques (today Port Maputo). While the 
transportation of raw material was common, immigration from 
Mozambique to South Africa was severely restricted and intended 
primarily for mine workers on short-term contracts. However, following 
the end of the war, the Mozambique-South Africa borders became the 
most important points for cross-border trade between the two countries, 
with Ressano Garcia playing a particularly key role. Factors that led to this 
transformation included the low cost of road transport, expansive 
transportation networks from north to south, and the demand for jobs 
and business opportunities in South Africa. As a result, Mozambican 
traders have increased their imports from South Africa as prices are 
relatively low. The South African traders have also started to expand 
markets for their businesses in Mozambique.  
As a result of these business opportunities, informal traders, brokers, 
taxi-owners and travellers from different parts of Mozambique and 
beyond have turned the Ressano Garcia border into the busiest crossing 
point in the country. This transformation has led the authorities in both 
countries to increase border control measures. For instance, on the South 
African side, the border is protected by barbed wire and reinforced by 
patrol units, while on the Mozambican side, patrol units undertake 
surveillance and patrol operations aimed at fighting all manner of criminal 
activities, ranging from smuggling, poaching and trafficking to vehicle 
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theft. But while the state attempts to undertake unilateral security 
measures aimed at fighting cross-border criminality, local communities 
struggle to make their lives easier over the border. The following 
subsection describes how the Mozambican immigration authorities have 
responded to changes in migration flows across the Ressano Garcia 
border.  
4.4.2 Immigration control 
About 3,000 travellers and 1,000 vehicles cross the Ressano Garcia official 
land port daily. During the border’s busiest times (particularly during 
festival seasons), these numbers reach 25,000 travellers and 3,000 vehicles. 
In response to this increased flow of travellers and vehicles, the 
Mozambican government has introduced interventions aimed at speeding 
up the flow of passengers while ensuring the maintenance of security. The 
border has started operating 24 hours a day and there is an ongoing ‘one 
stop5’ border project, aimed at reducing the time travellers spend at an 
attendant’s desk. These interventions were reinforced in 2010 with the 
introduction of independent lanes for pedestrians and vehicles. These 
lanes were created to avoid passengers on public transport using the same 
lane as those travelling in private vehicles. As a result, mine workers, 
tourists and mukheristas6 use different pedestrian lanes. During the busiest 
seasons, the Mozambique-South Africa border authorities make joint 
arrangements designed to expedite dealing with long queues of travellers.  
In addition to these arrangements, Mozambican immigration officials 
have been involved in the implementation of measures to improve checks 
on official travel documents and passengers. For instance, the Head of 
Immigration Office at Ressano Garcia Border Post7 has observed that: 
in coordination with USA border authorities, there was an attempt to 
establish a database system to control foreigners’ travel information, but 
this arrangement could have made Mozambique a target of Al-Qaida as it 
is with other countries that have formed a strong relationship with the 
Americans in their war on terror from third countries.  
This reveals that the war on terror has become an influential securitisation 
discourse in border control, which has had the effect of turning the bulk 
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of travellers into illegal immigrants (Dauvergne, 2008). For example, 
Mozambican immigration authorities8 believe that Somalis, Bengalis, 
Nigerians and Pakistanis are pose the highest risk in the context of 
Mozambique as these countries are generally deemed to be associated with 
networks involved in the falsification of travel documents related 
transnational crime. 
In order to control these citizens, the Mozambican immigration 
authorities have started demanding (from family living in Mozambique) a 
form accepting responsibility for the traveller. This illustrates how the war 
on terror and the globalisation of security has brought about the 
prioritisation of international security standards over domestic concerns 
about security, particularly local perspectives of the crossing of borders. 
In responding to high migration flows, for instance, an immigration 
inspector at Ressano Garcia border post9 explained that Mozambican 
immigration authorities have introduced a ‘passport regime’ in order to 
ensure that every border-crosser complies with immigration requirements 
(a valid passport and related official travel documents), and purchases only 
the quantity of goods allowed by law. This has resulted in the prohibition 
of ‘long period stamp’ certificates10 as valid documents for local residents 
crossing the border.  
This prohibition suggests that, in view of the state’s securitisation 
policies, local residents have become criminals who have to face all 
changes made without any kind of negotiation. Immigration authorities 
have for instance banned long period stamp certificates on the grounds 
that local residents used these to host and facilitate non-residents in 
crossing the border to South Africa. They also hold the view that local 
residents used to assist their relatives (particularly mukheristas from 
Maputo) in obtaining long period stamp certificates and using them to 
import goods for business purposes. This led to a breakdown in 
collaboration with border authorities as they could no longer distinguish 
local from non-local residents, which in turn has resulted in an increase in 
security measures recommended for restricted border zones11. In line with 
the provisional guide12, these security measures range from the prohibition 
of any construction within the restricted border zone to the prohibition 
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of fishing and hunting activities. These measures include the prohibition 
of non-residents from entering or exiting this zone without official travel 
documents.  
Apart from increased concerns with security within the restricted zone, 
border authorities have become more attentive to security along the 
remainder of the border. Factors that have led to this increase in vigilance 
include poaching, smuggling, and undocumented migrants, all of which 
constitute major problems that have informed bilateral meetings and 
cooperation between the Mozambican and South African border 
institutions. This suggests that the human aspects of border crossings are 
discussed in direct relationship with criminality, thereby reducing the 
scope for the negotiation of a more integrated border between countries 
and cross-border communities. Moreover, sovereignty is reduced to the 
political and economic level of border control, and is thus far removed 
from the human aspects informing economic and social discourses from 
the perspective of local populations. 
4.4.3 Patrol operations 
Despite the fact that the war has ended, its legacy continues to inform 
border patrol operations in Mozambique as a whole. In the case of the 
Ressano Garcia border, border control strategies since the end of war in 
Mozambique have changed the interplay of security factors at the border, 
presenting a challenge to both border authorities and local residents. For 
example, the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the Border Patrol Unit at 
Ressano Garcia13 observes that “most of [the] residents along the border 
line cross the border for hospital treatments, commercial exchanges, and 
family visits. According to the Commander, in Mphuza, Manhoca and 
Statuene border communities (District of Ponta D ‘Ouro) local residents 
and their counterparts from South Africa organise international market 
fairs for exchanging their products”. He also explains that cross-border 
communities serve as transit points for undocumented migrants 
pretending to be local residents, which increases the need for a more 
closely patrolled border. From this perspective, “border control should be 
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understood from state legitimacy of use of power on the grounds that 
undocumented migrants, smugglers, and cross-border criminals are 
prepared to fight border patrollers14”. This suggests that clandestine 
migration and smuggling are key factors that have changed the state’s view 
of the border to that of a more restrictive space, ranging from its attitude 
to the socio-economic contribution of the border to the role played by 
local residents. 
However, as the border plays different roles, so border institutions in 
the Mozambican context have different views of the border. For instance, 
while border patrol units undertake control from the standpoint of the 
preservation of the state’s sovereignty, customs officials on the other hand 
regard the border from an economic perspective, that is, as a source of 
revenue collection, and so focus their operations on the prevention of 
contraband and tax avoidance. From this perspective, customs and border 
patrol units understand the role of the border in a way that clashes with 
local views informing the crossing of the border. This diminishes the 
scope of the border as a space for negotiating human security-based 
border control, with the result that state authorities and local people are 
placed in a skewed power relation that has a detrimental effect on any 
bargaining process. In this regard, from the perspective of the CS, a speech 
act gains its power according to the capacity of the actor to deploy the 
means to protect the threatened security object, which people from below 
lack (Floyd, 2011). 
As economically driven border control is central to customs 
operations, the need for a high quality system of technology and highly 
qualified personnel has led to reforms aimed at ensuring increased tax 
collection in the face of growing volumes of contraband, particularly since 
the end of the war. In relation to this contraband, the MRD estimates that, 
between 2000 and 2001, about 90,000 tonnes of sugar were illegally 
imported from South Africa, which forced the director of Mozambique’s 
National Institute of Sugar to warn that “the dumping of sugar below cost 
price in the Mozambican market could suffocate the country’s own sugar 
producers” (Gastrow and Mosse, 2002:15). USAID’s report in this regard 
found that the Mozambican and South African authorities have given little 
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attention to informal sector cross-border transactions. This represents a 
risk to economic development since most informal traders resort to paying 
bribes to customs agents in order to allow their goods to pass across the 
border without complication (Peberdy, 2014; Peberdy, 2000). In response 
to this, the MRD has gradually increased control of imported goods, 
particularly in the busiest places of entry such as Mavalane Airport, Port 
Maputo and the Ressano Garcia border.  
On the operational front, the MRD has established FAST15 brigades – 
mobile teams designed to prevent the movement of contraband goods 
across the ‘green border16’. FAST teams operate 24 hours a day, every day, 
in permanent coordination with border patrol forces. The Chief Customs 
official at the Ressano Garcia Border notes that “the Ressano Garcia 
border is a route of contraband goods in a double-circuit between 
Mozambique and South Africa17”. Mozambican informal traders focus on 
goods from South Africa referred to as specific or luxury products such 
as alcoholic beverages, cigarettes and cosmetics. Their objective is to avoid 
the high import taxes imposed on these goods. South African traders enter 
the double-smuggling circuit in order to get exemption from Value Added 
Tax (VAT). In this circuit, they pretend to have imported goods from 
Mozambique. Regardless of persistent contraband evidence, the MRD’s 
goal is to increase tax collection, which is assumed to have been achieved 
with the introduction of a single window system that is to be linked to all 
border posts. Moreover, “an integrated control of imported goods can 
remarkably reduce contraband and speed up clearance procedures18”. This 
suggests that, while the MRD’s reforms were initially aimed partly at 
preventing tax avoidance at the domestic level, they were also intended to 
comply with international security standards in ensuring legitimate trade 
by preventing the import and export of prohibited goods such as weapons, 
explosives and general goods unsuitable for public consumption. Based 
on this, the Ministry of Health and Agriculture has intensified its work 
with customs officials at the border. It is clear from this that border 
management has become a complex and cross-cultural space that should 
involve different actors in addressing issues of concern, particularly 
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disadvantaged local communities who have less influence on the state’s 
views of border control.  
4.4.4 Community perceptions  
Since colonial times, the local residents of Ressano Garcia have always 
been allowed privileged access to South Africa for the purposes of 
shopping. The status quo persisted during the period of war as the region 
was totally isolated from Maputo, with the result that local residents were 
more closely connected to South Africa. With the increased economic 
interplay between the two neighbouring countries, local residents have 
made the border an important part of their daily subsistence. For example, 
members of the Transport Association of Ressano Garcia regard the 
border as an opportunity to provide transportation services to passengers 
and their goods from Komatipoort (in South Africa) to the Ressano 
border and vice versa, thereby providing them with self-employment. For 
the mukheristas (informal traders), the high point was the abolition of visas 
in 2002. The visa abolition agreement between Mozambique and South 
Africa “is the best achievement by government in the post-war period as 
this has significantly reduced clandestine border crossings19”. However, 
local residents understand that there is more work to be done, particularly 
with regard to the improvement of water supply networks, the 
construction of roads, and a supermarket with relatively low prices 
compared to those in Komatipoort20. This reveals that local residents are 
concerned about the lack of government intervention in basic social needs, 
which forces them to cross the border in order to gain access to an 
infrastructure that provides for these needs. 
In the case of the abolition of visas, low income people enjoy no 
advantage from the agreement. For example, a local unemployed 
youngster21 states that “3,000 meticais is too expensive to get a passport. 
Moreover, passports contain few pages, which brings no compensation as 
on a day-to-day basis we need to stamp them22”. In line with these 
complaints, some local residents (particularly people on low incomes) rely 
on the goodwill of border authorities for permission to cross the border 
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without stamping their passports. One of their key arguments is that “we 
live here and there is no life for us without this border”.23 This argument 
reveals how local residents have related their survival to the border; they 
see the border not only as a space for their economic security, but also as 
a space to fight outsiders. For example, the Chief of Ressano Garcia village 
observes that in the past, security was concerned with mushwapo24, while at 
present local residents are concerned with marihanes and challengers. 
The term Marihanes refers to a group of youngsters who are involved 
in providing illegal access, in exchange for money, to undocumented 
migrants who wish to cross the border into South Africa. The crossing 
rate ranges from 100 to 250 South African Rand per person. An unnamed 
young man25 associated with the marihanes group explains that “there are 
many travellers who arrive at Ressano Garcia without passports on their 
way to South Africa and we show them pathways to cross the border until 
they reach the other side”. It is worth mentioning that, based on 
observations conducted at Ressano Garcia, when a taxi reaches the bus 
stop with passengers from Maputo, the marihanes’ major concern is to 
engage with travellers interested in crossing the border without official 
travel documents.  
However, it is not only marihanes who are involved in assisting 
undocumented migrants in crossing the border. “Some local residents are 
complicit in clandestine migration to South Africa in exchange for 
money.”26 Moreover, undocumented migration has increased widely 
throughout the country to the extent that “it involves brokers who use 
their own vehicles or negotiate with long-distance trucks for 
transportation of potential migrants from their own villages, particularly 
Gaza and Inhambane Provinces, to the Ressano Garcia border27”. A local 
informal trader states that “clandestine migration is a networked activity 
because on South Africa’s side these migrants find taxi-buses waiting for 
taking them to Johannesburg28”. Moreover, regardless of constant road 
block operations in South Africa, vehicles transporting undocumented 
migrants experience no difficulty in reaching their destination, which 
reinforces the notion that there is a network of human smuggling across 
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the Ressano Garcia border29. This strengthens the argument that the 
Ressano Garcia border will always be a contradictory space as a result of 
different peoples’ opportunistic approaches to the border. For example, 
challengers30ambush smugglers and undocumented migrants, robbing them 
of their goods. In some cases, “they rape women, kill undocumented 
migrants, and engage in human trafficking31”.  
In the eyes of the local residents, challengers, marihanes, mukheristas, street 
vendors and informal money exchangers are all outsiders. They come 
from different parts of the country and establish themselves in Ressano 
Garcia, from where they engage in various illegal activities for their 
survival. A local informal trader32 notes that outsiders engage in criminal 
activities because they are unemployed, forcing them to come to the 
border to steal passengers’ goods and vehicle parts. For instance, when 
the border is very busy, these youngsters deceive tourists by pretending to 
be facilitators who will help them to avoid queuing to have their passports 
stamped, but these stamps (including South African stamps) are fake; they 
also cheat their ‘customers’ when these want to exchange money. This 
highlights the fact that the Ressano Garcia human-security border control 
faces challenges, ranging from the relationship between local people and 
outsiders (alleged criminals) to the perception that the border authorities 
have of the local residents, and perceptions of the security on this border 
held by other countries. 
Given the existence of cross-border crime in Ressano Garcia, local 
residents recognise the challenges faced by the border institutions. As an 
informal trader33 remarked, “the green border should be well protected so 
that our children can abandon illegal transboundary activities and devote 
themselves to school and other legitimate activities. All those who are 
engaged with facilitation of clandestine migration have no time to go to 
school as they know they can survive from illegal border activities”. 
However, strong patrol measures or repatriation operations remain 
inadequate solutions since Mozambique lacks the favourable socio-
economic conditions that could prevent deported migrants from returning 
to South Africa. 
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From the perspective of human rights, “arrest, detention and 
repatriation procedures do not always protect either irregular or regular 
migrants from abuse and have the potential to cause conflict between 
neighbouring countries” (Crush et al., 2005:25). For example, 
economically, repatriation operations are expensive and experience shows 
that, while many countries in the SADC region have been expending large 
sums on the deportation of undocumented migrants from neighbouring 
countries, the impact has been insignificant (Oucho, 2014; Melde et al., 
2014; SAMP, 2014; Oucho and Crush, 2001). Analysts understand that an 
ideal solution for addressing cross-border criminality goes beyond highly 
securitised borders. It requires “an analysis of factors leading to socio-
economic interplay between cross-border communities. It implies 
understanding why people cross the border undocumented and most 
importantly, it implies understanding different typologies of the border in 
spatial-temporal dimensions34”. In the context of state security, this 
statement emphasises how border authorities have been concerned with 
infiltration by saboteurs, particularly given the rise of the extraction 
industry in Mozambique. 
However, regardless of border authorities’ concerns with 
undocumented migration, smuggling, and immigrants presenting a risk to 
the state, the selected interviewees in Ressano Garcia community 
understand that foreigners are welcome as long as they create job 
opportunities for the local population. They recognise that foreigners 
(particularly those who are not engaged in transnational crime) have 
experience, from which they can expand their knowledge to better manage 
their lives. For example, unlike the Congolese in the Goma border region 
who want a border like a Berlin wall to protect against the possible 
penetration by Rwandan aggressors (Doevenspeck, 2011), Ressano Garcia 
residents want a border that can be negotiated with authorities and that 
will increase contact with foreigners and allow for better opportunities. 
They believe that “foreigners should create job opportunities taking into 
account the type and capability of the local labour force35”. Based on this, 
“any foreigner who does not contribute to the economic growth of 
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Ressano Garcia is not welcome; a foreigner should not solely occupy the 
land, but should also contribute to the development and welfare of the 
local people36”. This reveals that local people relate a capability approach 
with the security of their social boundaries. They understand the border 
as a space for cooperation and mutual coexistence, while upholding the 
state’s security interests.   
4.5 Cross-border cooperation: lessons from the case study   
Whether they are in Europe or in Africa, cross-border regions are marked 
by differences and similarities, an understanding of which is crucial to 
framing greater cooperation or regional integration strategies. For 
instance, the European Community has adopted cross-border cooperation 
initiatives in the Rhine Basin (aimed at addressing specific problems 
ranging from pollution, transfrontier workers and land use) and applied 
them to the integration of the European Union (O’ Dowd, 2003).  
 In the case of the Ressano Garcia border region, local communities and 
state authorities are the main drivers of the various typologies of borders 
on which any model of cooperation depends. From the perspective of 
state security, the border is perceived as (1) a coercive space, which gives 
the state a legitimate monopoly over the protection of territorial 
sovereignty; (2) as a legal line, which implies that travellers must use 
official checkpoints with valid official travel documents; (3) as an 
international and global border, which appeals for cooperation for global 
security and compliance with international border control methods; (4) as 
a criminal space that is associated with porous borders, smuggling, human 
trafficking and other transitional criminality; and (5) as an orderly process 
that demarcates peaceful and secure territories from those that are not. 
From the perspective of local communities, the border is perceived as (6) 
a barrier, to the extent that those with little financial capacity encounter 
limitations in crossing it legally. Moreover, it is a barrier to foreigners who 
are perceived as a risk and a threat to national security; (7) as a deliberative 
space in which local residents understand that a negotiable border with 
authorities can lead to the resolution of their security concerns regarding 
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the border; and (8) as a set of opportunities that have allowed local 
residents to establish small scale business initiatives such as currency 
exchanges, transportation services and casual employment.  
The typology of borders mentioned above suggests that the state is the 
crucial actor in the establishment of cooperation with local communities 
aimed at addressing security concerns from the perspective of local 
populations. This approach is central to understanding the concept of 
security and its transforming patterns. For example, scholars of 
international relations recognise that the shift in security priorities from 
the state’s perspective of territorial sovereignty to the centre of society is 
the result of the evolution of the concept of security itself (Anderson, 
2013; Rudolph, 2005; Doty, 1998). On the one hand, human security has 
been recognised as a global public benefit that states have been integrating 
into their domestic security policies (Amouyel, 2006). On the other hand, 
state policies can reflect the human security dimension of the border based 
on the degree of cooperation with people from below and the extent to 
which they are given the power to map and discuss their security concerns 
about the border.  
In the context of the case study, cross-border cooperation is reflected 
on two different levels. Firstly, at the domestic level, cooperation requires 
the establishment of a ‘win-win’ partnership between border authorities 
and local communities. Secondly, cross-border cooperation needs to 
involve a partnership between Mozambique and its neighbouring states in 
the matter of transboundary issues (such as access to supermarkets), the 
solution to which depends on bilateral cooperation. In retrospect, African 
heads of state have recognised that the African Union Border Programme 
(AUBP) requires greater cooperation between states in the management 
of cross-border issues if peace is to be promoted and conflict prevented 
(African Union Conference, 2007). As is discussed in Chapter 8, it should 
be kept in mind that cross-border regions in Mozambique are not 
necessarily marked by conflicts (stritu sensus); they lack the mechanisms of 
coordination that could address fundamental human security needs on a 
daily basis.    
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4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has examined life experience and border control priorities in 
one of the busiest border posts between Mozambique and South Africa – 
the Ressano Garcia border. In the post-war period, this border region has 
faced increased migration flows, which have become a concern to both 
the Mozambican and South African border authorities. In the case of 
Mozambique, the country’s concern with security measures is inextricably 
linked to high migration flows into South Africa, which are related to the 
smuggling of goods, clandestine migration and other transnational crimes. 
These perceived threats have resulted in security reforms regarding the 
crossing of borders. One of these security reforms has been the 
introduction of a ‘passport regime’.  
    These reforms have had a considerable effect on the lives of local 
inhabitants, so much so that they have had to rely on the goodwill of 
border authorities in order to cross the border and purchase basic 
consumer goods. Much like Mozambican border patrol responses, the 
South African border authorities have increased patrol operations, which 
have also been reinforced by the deployment of the defence force. These 
moves are aimed at stopping clandestine migration and preventing an 
increase in transnational cross-border crime. 
    One common theme arising from these findings is that the fighting of 
crime and the protection of sovereignty has become a buzzword for the 
border authorities, regardless of particularities related to the socio-
economic dynamics in each border region. This implies that national 
security logic ‘blinds’ state authorities to local characteristics of border 
crossing, particularly those that are related to human security. The 
problem is that state officials give no recognition to these human aspects 
of border crossing, which results in security practices that clash with local 
needs.  
Given the persistent perception and practices of border control as 
crime-fighting, this chapter suggests that state officials should be trained 
to understand the complexities of borders, with more emphasis placed on 
the role of border patrol forces as protectors of human life. While this 
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remains a theoretical suggestion, findings indicate that a state’s 
deployment of more patrol units along the border reinforces the 
connection between migration and security, which this chapter has 
revealed to be inadequate in the development of a more localised theory 
of border, particularly in the context of post-colonial countries.  
Notes 
1Moamba District is situated in the northern part of Maputo Province, about 
70 km from the capital of the country, and is the artificial border line with the 
South African Province of Mpumalanga. 
2Maputo Province is divided into seven districts, namely Boane, Magude, 
Manhica, Marracuene, Matutine, Moamba and Namaacha 
3As a result of soil being unsuitable for agriculture, some local inhabitants have 
fields in Chanculo Locality (in Moamba District) where they grow peanuts, 
corn, potatoes, cassava and beans. 
4 At that time, the village was composed of a few settlements and some 
canteens made of wood and zinc owned by local Portuguese and Indian 
traders. The only brick buildings were the railway station and related facilities 
and a brewery for local residents. As a result of the Anglo-Boer war between 
1900 and 1901, the village expanded, forcing the Portuguese to build a 
strategic military station composed of an immigration office and a residence 
for its officials.  
5The one stop border project on the Ressano Garcia/Lebombo border is 
coordinated by the Mozambican immigration authorities and their 
counterparts in South Africa.  
6Mukheristas is a local name (particularly in the southern part of Mozambique) 
used to refer to informal traders (mainly women) who import goods from 
South Africa and Swaziland. 
7 Interviewed on 15 October 2012.  
8Chief Immigration Officer at Ressano Garcia border, interviewed on 15 
October 2012. 
9 Interviewed on 2 October 2012. 
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10With long period stamp certificates, local authorities were allowed to cross 
the border at (South Africa) to shop for consumer goods.  
11The restricted border area is a space that stretches up to 20 km into the 
interior from the official state border line. It is under permanent guard by the 
border patrol units. Its area includes Mozambican waters, rivers, lakes and 
islands within this established area.  
12The provisional guide is a blueprint that was established in 1979 for the 
Mozambican border forces. It prescribes operational procedures for protection 
of state borders against security threats.   
13Interviewed on 2 October 2012.  
14Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the Border Patrol Unit in Ressano 
Garcia, interviewed on 2 October 2012. 
15Originally, FAST was a US Marine company established in 1987. Its duties 
today are to perform security missions such as combating operations and 
other military operations aimed at protecting military cargo ships. 
16The green border is the rest of the extension of the state border that is under 
the direct control of patrol forces. 
17Interviewed on 10 October 2012. 
18 The Customs Operational Chief at the Ressano Garcia Border, interviewed 
on 10 October 2012. 
19Community Leader in the Ressano Garcia border region, interviewed on 10 
October 2012.  
20Community Leader on the Ressano Garcia border region, interviewed on 10 
October 2012. 
21An anonymous respondent interviewed in the Ressano Garcia border region, 
October, 2012  
22A respondent interviewed in anonymity in Ressano Garcia border region, 
October 2012 
23A respondent interviewed in anonymity in Ressano Garcia border region, 
October, 2012. 
24Mushwapo was the practice of jumping into a train while it was in motion 
(coming from South Africa) in order to rob miners.  
25Interviewed in October 2012 on the Ressano Garcia border. 
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26Community Leader in the Ressano Garcia border region, interviewed on 10 
October 2012. 
27Immigration Inspector, interviewed in Maputo on 5 November 2012 
28Interviewed on 12 October 2012 in Ressano Garcia. 
29Immigration Inspector, interviewed in Maputo on 5 November 2012.  
30Challengers is a local name given to the criminal group that operates along 
the green border. 
31A local informal trader, interviewed in October 2012 in Ressano Garcia 
border community. 
32Interviewed on 12 October 2012. 
33Interviewed on 12 October 2012. 
34Chief Immigration Officer at Mavalane International Airport, interviewed 
on 17 October 2012 in Maputo City.  
35Community Leader in Ressano Garcia border region, interviewed on 10 
October 2012. 
36An informal trader, interviewed on 12 October 2012. 
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5 
Machipanda region: blurred boundaries 
of a border economy  
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter highlighted the fact that the Ressano Garcia-
Lebombo border has become the busiest crossing point between 
Mozambique and South Africa, but also a most contentious issue between 
local dwellers and state authorities as a result of the restrictive border 
controls imposed after the end of the war in 1992. In the case of 
Mozambique, restrictive border controls were intended to halt the 
penetration of organised criminal groups, which had been associated with 
a lack of adequate patrol and surveillance technologies and the extensive 
and porous borders of the country (Raimundo, 2009; Gastrow and Mosse, 
2002). On the other hand, South Africa has made its border a stronghold 
to deter foreign immigrants, particularly Mozambicans and Zimbabweans, 
thanks to barbed wire fences at the border and patrols reinforced by the 
South African Defence Force (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; Crush and 
Dodson, 2007; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001; Crush, 1999). However, 
none of the mechanisms implemented by these countries has been able to 
deal with the day-to-day pressures of socio-economic migration patterns 
that have been transformed since the early 1990s. 
 This chapter moves on from this position of stalemate to an analysis 
of the interaction across the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border, particularly 
in the border regions between and across the Machipanda and Mutare 
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areas. The cross-border interactions between these communities located 
on either side of the land border in Machipanda and Mutare have evolved 
historically. In the early 1980s, many citizens from Manica Province in 
Mozambique fled civil war, crossing the border into Zimbabwe to seek 
shelter and land, particularly along the border regions of Chimanimani, 
Chipingue, Mpenhalonga and Mutare (Hughes, 1999). Conversely, with 
the deterioration of the Zimbabwean economy since 1997 in particular, 
Zimbabwean citizens have started crossing the border into Mozambique 
and have sought to reach neighbouring states such as South Africa and 
Botswana. Their main goal has been to find better opportunities for 
employment, trade and seasonal work on farms in the regions bordering 
the two countries, between Manica and Machipanda. 
5.2 Contextualising migration flows across the Mozambique-
Zimbabwe border  
This section provides an overview of migration flows across the 
Mozambique-Zimbabwe border (MZB). The focus is on socio-cultural, 
economic and political factors that affect the interactions between people 
living within and moving between the border areas of Espungabera, 
Rotanda and Machipanda and across the MZB border. With regard to the 
control of immigration, specific attention is paid to the Machipanda 
border post itself. It should be mentioned here that I conducted two 
rounds of data collection in this area. On the first visit, I conducted FGDs, 
while on the second I presented my earlier findings, a process that allowed 
me to obtain further feedback through these validation seminars. People 
responded to the initial findings and this generated a great deal of 
discussion, enabling me to better understand their perceptions than if I 
had used FGDs alone. The feedback was helpful in discovering additional 
information that the first round of FGDs had not revealed, such as the 
historical context of the war and how this helped to explain the present 
patterns of human movement. One example that illustrates this process is 
that during the first round of FGDs I was not fully aware of the daily 
practices of border control within the border post. A local leader told me 
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that locals, too, were concerned about security and all local residents who 
received guests had to introduce them to the local leader, a practice that 
was common during the civil war. He believed that this was necessary to 
avoid local youths being recruited by Renamo. On my return, the question 
of the role of SADC became much clearer; much was lacking but it could 
be the basis for different regimes of border control, rather than having 
more securitised controls as in Ressano Garcia, for example. In this 
chapter, interviews with officials, notes from FGDs and archives in the 
local Border Police offices were drawn on.   
 Map 5.1  
Mozambique-Zimbabwe and the Beira corridor linking the Machipanda 
border to Port Beira. 
 
Source: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125738837197329995; accessed on 10 August 2014 
5.2.1 Political and economic factors underlying border crossing  
The Mozambique-Zimbabwe border stretches for over 1200 kilometres, 
linking Tete, Manica and Gaza Provinces. In Manica Province, the border 
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has three official crossing points: Machipanda (in Manica District1), 
Rotanda (in Sussundenga District) and Espungabera (in Mossurize 
District). Over the past two decades, the border has been shaped by 
fluctuating migration patterns and cross-border trade, which has plagued 
the two countries and presented new challenges to border management. 
A comprehensive human migration pattern across the MZB border can 
be traced, based on three main periods: the armed conflict in 
Mozambique, the economic crisis in Zimbabwe and the introduction of 
the American dollar as currency in Zimbabwe. 
As far as the effects of the war are concerned, by 1992 Zimbabwe had 
hosted an estimated 60 000 Mozambican refugees (Toole and Waldman, 
1993). This increased flow of Mozambicans to Zimbabwe was also related 
to famine and a long dry season in Mozambique; some Mozambican 
citizens fled to Zimbabwe in search of jobs while others relocated to find 
shelter and fertile land.  
In relation to land, the literature reveals that “in 1991, a large wave of 
refugees from war and drought in Mozambique’s Mossurize and 
Sussundenga Districts streamed across the Rusithu River into Zimbabwe’s 
Chimanimani District” (Hughes, 1999:533). However, land allocation 
became a source of conflict between Mozambican refugees and local 
Zimbabwean citizens. On many occasions, these refugees were treated as 
smugglers or migrant workers, resulting in unfavourable land allocation 
and their exploitation by local leaders (Tornimbeni, 2005; Hughes, 1999).  
The second phase in the migration across MZB is related to the 
economic crisis that has disrupted Zimbabwe since 1997. As a result, huge 
numbers of Zimbabwean citizens began to cross borders of neighbouring 
countries, particularly South Africa and Mozambique. The Head of 
Immigration in Manica Province2 observes that “since 2007, Machipanda 
and Espungabera border posts started to register higher immigration flows 
compared to the past. On a daily-basis, there were about 2, 500 travellers 
crossing Machipanda border and about 500 crossing Espungabera border 
and this has never happened”. He explains that despite regular migration 
flows through official crossing points, there has been an increase in 
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unauthorised migration associated with a lack of travel documents and 
smuggling of basic requirements from Mozambique to Zimbabwe along 
the border line. Most Zimbabwean citizens have entered through the 
Machipanda or Espungabera border regions in search of casual jobs (such 
as construction and plumbing). For example, since the economic crisis 
began, many Zimbabwean citizens from Mutare have been employed as 
seasonal agricultural workers in border regions between Machipanda and 
Manica in Mozambique (Duri, 2010).  
The third phase in the shift in migration patterns across MZB is related 
to the introduction of the American dollar into the Zimbabwe currency 
system after 2012. The Head of Immigration Department at Machipanda 
border post states that, “with the introduction of USD in Zimbabwe, 
massive flows of Zimbabweans citizens to Mozambique have declined, 
but some of them wish to purchase their goods in Mozambique on the 
grounds that with USD currency they can get more goods than in 
Zimbabwe3”. Also, Zimbabwean immigrant-traders understand that 
precious goods such as mineral resources can be sold at higher prices in 
Mozambique, triggering smuggling. In fact, price differences are well 
documented as a factor that could stimulate certain types of activities 
across neigbouring countries (Perkman, 2003). In the case of the 
Machipanda-Mutare cross-border region, it has been documented that 
illegally panned diamonds are smuggled into and sold in Mozambique at 
high prices (Duri, 2010). This suggests that communities in the border 
regions will always be attracted by opportunities arising from economic 
differentiation between neighbouring states, and that is unsustainable to 
prevent these movements by insisting on anti-criminal responses at the 
border. Essentially, “the crucial point in the analysis of borders requires 
linkages to social standing of migrants rather than the extent to which 
borders are permeable to people’s movement or community networks” 
(Tornimbeni, 2005:314). This suggests that the movement of local 
populations across borders is determined by the socio-economic interests 
at stake, not by a lack of means to patrol these borders. As is illustrated 
below, Zimbabwean and Mozambican border authorities have prioritised 
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controls that fragment the economic and socio-cultural factors driving 
border crossings. 
5.2.2 Socio-cultural factors 
Apart from economic factors, MZB is shaped by other elements leading 
to cross-border interaction such as language, religious and historic events, 
which strengthen social bonds between populations in the border regions 
of the two neighbouring states.  
The division of Mashonaland between Mozambique and Zimbabwe by 
the British and the Portuguese in 1890 meant that there were Shona-
speakers on both sides of the border. For example, in Manica Province, 
Shona is spoken in all border districts (Manica, Mossurize, Sussundenga 
and Báruè) as well as in other regions across the province, while in 
Zimbabwe it is spoken all over the country. 
Historical factors have also had an influence on the strong relationship 
between Mozambican and Zimbabwean citizens across the border. For 
example, the Head of Immigration on the Machipanda border4 observes 
that “to celebrate some events, militants of the Zimbabwe African 
National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), members of the armed 
forces, police, musicians, athletes, teachers and students from Zimbabwe 
cross the Machipanda border in joint trips aimed at paying tribute to 
Zimbabwean heroes buried in mass graves at Inhazónia and Tembwe in 
Manica Province”. Furthermore, he adds that populations of the border 
regions cross the border to attend joint religious ceremonies and burials 
of their relatives on both sides of the border. These facts reveal that other 
than colonial factors, the context of war in Mozambique and the economic 
crisis in Zimbabwe have presented new factors that demand attention in 
the analysis of interaction between communities of these neighbouring 
countries. In the Rotanda border region, for instance, local populations 
prefer to cross the border into Zimbabwe for many reasons; inter alia (1) 
it is only a short distance to a hospital on the Zimbabwean side; (2) 
relatively high quality of medical treatment at affordable prices; (3) easy 
access to supermarkets where food can be bought at lower prices than 
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those charged by informal local traders. With regard to school attendance, 
most children from Mossurize District attend schools in Zimbabwe. An 
example is that “Mozambicans regularly ford the Rusithu to attend the 
Vhimba Primary School, located only 50 metres across the border” 
(Hughes, 1999:536-37). 
Other factors driving closer relations between communities in the 
border regions of Mozambique and Zimbabwe are related to access to 
arable land, access to water and to firewood. For example, the 
Commander of Border Police in Manica5 points out that “in Espungabera 
border region, Zimbabweans citizens have expanded their farmland into 
Mozambican territory, which has generated conflict between local 
communities. In Chinhambuzi border region, Mozambican farmers 
opened dams to reserve water to irrigate their crops and this process has 
resulted in shortage of water for farmlands on the Zimbabwean side, 
which has created another conflict between communities”. While these 
facts reveal that border management requires analysis from socio-
economic, cultural, and political perspectives (Duri, 2010; Tornimbeni, 
2005), authorities believe that border conflicts are related to unclear 
demarcation of borders and feel thus that stronger measures of control 
should be taken. The following subsections focus on security 
arrangements made by the Mozambican border police, immigration 
officials and customs at the provincial level in response to new trends in 
immigration in the aftermath of the Zimbabwean crisis.  
5.3 Patrol operations 
5.3.1 Border police operations 
As a result of new migration patterns (from Zimbabwe to Mozambique), 
border police in Manica Province have expanded their operations along 
the border in an attempt to put a stop to the smuggling of goods 
(foodstuffs, bales of clothing, cigarettes and alcohol), particularly from 
Mozambique into Zimbabwe. At the practical level, border patrol 
operations are often constrained by a lack of appropriate facilities to 
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monitor the most recondite sites of the border such as mountains, rivers 
and dense forests where smugglers frequently hide. For example, during 
my fieldwork6, I had the opportunity to accompany a platinum patrol in 
the Mugoriondo community. I noticed several pathways used by 
smugglers in crossing the Machipanda/Mutare border. On the 
Zimbabwean side of the border, smugglers frequently use the bush paths 
leading from Forbs border post to Cecil Kopje Game Park, while from 
Manica they cross through the Bvumba Mountains (Duri, 2010).   
Besides foodstuffs smuggled over the border, the Mozambique border 
police are also concerned about unauthorised migration (particularly 
immigrants from Malawi7, who use Mozambique and Zimbabwe as transit 
countries from which to reach South Africa). Other concerns include 
deforestation and land mines along the border8, illegal and unsustainable 
extraction of mineral resources and the rustling of cattle from Zimbabwe 
to Mozambique through the neighbouring Mossurize District. Based on 
these difficulties, the District Police Commanders of Manica and Mutare 
have acknowledged the need for ongoing bilateral meetings with joint 
border patrol operations to address and coordinate attempts to find 
common solutions with those over the border. For example, the 
Commander of Border Police in Manica District9 states that “smuggling 
in rustled cattle is a networked cross-border crime inasmuch as cattle are 
stolen in Zimbabwe and carried in rented trucks which are supposed to go 
through several checks”.  
As far as the smuggling of minerals (particularly gold and diamonds10) 
is concerned, border police in Manica Province have concentrated their 
patrol operations on the Machipanda, Zónue, Mpenhalonga and 
Espungabera borders, given their proximity to the industrial centres of 
Mutare and Chimoio. Apart from intensified border patrol operations, 
border police conduct regular awareness campaigns with local 
communities aimed at gaining their cooperation in the fight against 
unsustainable and illegal exploitation of natural resources and smuggling. 
Smuggling is of concern not only to border police; customs authorities in 
Manica Province have been carrying out control operations focusing on 
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potential areas and routes used by smugglers. In some cases, customs 
control operations consist of mobile brigades and raids on households 
suspected of concealing smuggled goods.  
5.3.2 Customs operations  
According to the assistant delegate of Internal Revenue in Manica 
Province11, “the economic crisis in Zimbabwe has contributed to rampant 
smuggling across the border in such a way that smuggling has become a 
survival strategy involving networks of households from both sides of the 
border”. He goes on to explain that goods in smuggling circuits vary from 
one side of the border to the other. In activities from Zimbabwe to 
Mozambique, smuggled goods range from fresh milk, eggs, sugar, 
cigarettes, stolen electric cables and stolen vehicle spare parts (wheels, 
batteries, mirrors). In operations from Mozambique to Zimbabwe, 
smuggled goods include alcohol, bales of second-hand clothes, rice and 
meat. The spread of smuggling from Zimbabwe can also be related to the 
high prices at which goods can be sold in Mozambique. For example, 
smuggled goods from Mutare can be found in markets in Manica Village 
and Chimoio City (Duri, 2010). The Chief of Operations: Customs at 
Machipanda border post12 explains that the main smuggling paths along 
the Machipanda border region include Magaka and Tsetsera, where 
smugglers take advantage of the extremely porous state of the border and 
the difficulties police have in reaching these areas.  
In response to high levels of smuggling, customs authorities have 
established FAST brigades to undertake counter surveillance and 
permanent operations along the main roads and in some border regions 
where there is the potential for smuggling to occur. According to the Chief 
of Operations: Customs in Manica District13 “these mobile teams are 
constituted by inspectors and detectives who are responsible for 
undertaking thorough checks on imported goods aimed at preventing the 
entry of prohibited or harmful goods and thereby contributing to 
legitimate trade”. Should reliable checks not be conducted manually 
(owing to the high volume of commodities or suspicions of prohibited 
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goods), the goods concerned are taken to Beira City for electronic 
scanning.  
In Manica Province, FAST brigades operate from the Inchope control 
station to the Machipanda border post on national road 6, and they also 
expand their operations into bordering districts such as Sussundenga and 
Mossurize. During their operations, FAST brigades pay special attention 
to long distance vehicles that are suspected of concealing smuggled goods. 
Apart from operations targeting vehicles on the main roads, FAST 
brigades also undertake back checks and raids on warehouses and informal 
markets to verify compliance with customs taxes on imported 
commodities.  
Apart from patrol operations, customs authorities depend on 
collaboration with local communities and with border patrol forces, 
particularly on the remainder of the border. For example, the Chief of 
Operations: Customs at the Machipanda border post14 noted that “in 
2012, based on alerts given by some local members to border police on 
the Machipanda border, police were able to apprehend a large quantity of 
cigarettes concealed in the fuel tank of a lorry that was coming from 
Zimbabwe”.  
As far as cooperation with other border divisions is concerned, a 
bilateral meeting was held in Mpenhalonga (Mutare) in March 2013 and 
brought together border authorities from the Mutare and Manica Districts 
who agreed to exchange information related to the smuggling of bales of 
second-hand clothes. Accordingly, surveillance operations were intended 
to focus on wholesale traders of second-hand clothes in Chimoio and 
Manica, from where smugglers could be tracked to the border. 
Surveillance operations were also planned to focus on vehicles that are 
used to carry smuggled goods to Zimbabwe. Bilateral meetings and joint 
operations have always been the priority when the Mozambican and the 
Zimbabwean border authorities take action. For instance, in 2008, the 
Mozambican authorities restricted the quantity of foodstuffs allowed into 
Zimbabwe on the grounds that most of the commodities were used for 
sale, which could result in increased prices in Manica. On the other hand, 
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Zimbabwean customs authorities allowed free duty on foodstuffs 
equivalent to UDS1 (Duri, 2010).  
Besides these arrangements, customs authorities run awareness 
campaigns with potential taxpayers in various local communities and 
villages, aimed at urging inhabitants to comply with import and export 
duties. The assistant delegate of Internal Revenue in Manica Province 
states that “we warn potential taxpayers to comply with their duties on the 
grounds that taxes are the main source of state revenue, from which all 
activities related to redistribution of wealth are undertaken15”. He explains 
that in order to expand tax collection, customs authorities in Manica 
Province have planned to establish more fixed control points along the 
border to ensure greater compliance among importers with customs 
duties. The first fixed tax collection posts will be established in Chipuje 
and Mpengo communities as they have become alternative routes for 
smuggling across the MZB (given their good road conditions). While 
smuggling and unauthorised migration has become the common concern 
for border authorities in Manica Province, the next section focuses on 
particular border posts across Mozambique-Zimbabwe-Machipanda and 
provides an analysis of both state and local community perceptions of 
crossing and controlling the Machipanda border.  
5.3.3 Immigration control at Machipanda border post 
      Map 5.2  
Machipanda border in Manica Province in central Mozambique 
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Source: http://www.gorongosa.org/plan-your-adventure/getting-here/car/driving-zimbabwe; retrieved on 12 
August 2014 
 
The Machipanda border is located in Manica district16 in central 
Mozambique and it is the main official crossing point into the Republic of 
Zimbabwe through the bordering province of Mutare. It is a strategic 
border post that links adjacent countries (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo) to the second-largest port in 
Mozambique, Beira, in Sofala Province. Large numbers of vehicles laden 
with various goods leave the Beira port every day. Given the strategic role 
of the Machipanda border, Zimbabwean authorities have raised concerns 
about security over the border as a result of the resumption of hostilities 
in central Mozambique in October 2012 with the return of the Renamo 
leader to the bush to take up arms once again. In view of renewed political 
instability in Mozambique, the Zimbabwean authorities have realised that 
the Zimbabwean economy could further deteriorate if the high costs of 
using alternative routes for importing and exporting commodities were 
incurred. The existing literature makes it evident that in the context of 
military tension, “borders can negatively affect regional economies by 
splitting economic catchment areas and by increasing transaction costs” 
(Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999: 597).  
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From the standpoint of migration control, Machipanda is the busiest 
official crossing point over MZB. Day-to-day immigration flows range 
from 800 to 1000 travellers and at busy times, particularly Easter and at 
the end of the year, numbers are even higher. However, since the start of 
the Zimbabwean crisis in 1997, the number of travellers crossing the 
border has been increasing and can reach up to 2500 in a single day. The 
migrants’ plight forces them to seek opportunities for trade and work in 
Mozambique, including in the agricultural sector. The immigration 
authorities in Machipanda border post are not able to provide accurate 
numbers of travellers because of unauthorised movements across the 
border. Given these circumstances, the Immigration Department in 
Manica Province has paid more attention to checking all travellers’ official 
travel documents such as passports, visas, residence permits and 
emergency certificates.17  
These measures have been reinforced by periodic and random post-
entry internal checks18, for example of migrants residing in hostels and 
hotels, or working in businesses, markets and other public places. An 
immigration inspector in Chimoio City interviewed by the researcher 
observed: “these measures are aimed at warning foreigners to comply with 
legal requirements for [entering and remaining]… in the country and that 
no person should be allowed to stay abroad illegally19”. The inspector 
made reference to the Foreigners Law (Lei de Estrangeiros), which governs 
the entry and residence of foreigners, and prescribes that “it is prohibited 
for foreigners who may be considered hooligans, beggars, or without the 
means of subsistence, or judged unable to raise such means, to enter or 
remain in the country20”. Discussions and interviews in and around the 
border crossing post provided evidence that the Immigration Department 
in Manica has developed partnerships with some local hotels and 
guesthouses, urging them to provide Immigration Officers with 
information about their guests’ nationality, occupation, the purpose of 
their trip, length of stay and planned departure date, for example. In this 
way, the border authorities have established administrative procedures for 
internal border control through which immigrants are placed into different 
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risk categories, based especially on their nationality and their financial 
situation (Boucher and Gest, 2014; Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; Crush 
and Dodson, 2007).  
Interviews with officials involved and discussions of the 
documentation revealed that in this risk category stratification process, 
immigration authorities at Machipanda border post were particularly 
concerned about certain nationalities, namely Somalis, Malians and 
Pakistanis. Several immigration officials explained that these groups were 
considered particularly high risk in terms of involvement in transnational 
crime. For example, the Head of Immigration in Machipanda noted that:  
if a British foreigner says he is coming to Mozambique for tourism 
purposes, this is easily acceptable because they come regularly for leisure 
activities. On the contrary, it becomes doubtful to the immigration 
authorities when a Pakistani foreigner says he [sic]…is coming for tourism 
reasons because it is not their practice in Mozambique21.  
This suggests that people of different nationalities are being pre-judged on 
the basis of categories that are not necessarily legal, but which may include 
colour, religion and nationality. Local officials are influenced by media 
reports and international discourses around the war on terror, and this has 
resulted in the criminalising of Muslims, including women wearing the veil, 
for example. Thus because Somali and Mali are countries that have 
experienced military conflict with separatist and militant religious groups, 
referred to as terrorists, their citizens are categorised as high-risk. This 
process of classifying migrants is returned to and discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 7. Officials at the border in Machipanda are reflecting the 
widely expressed views of the media and academic literature, that nationals 
from Pakistan, since they come from one of the most dangerous countries 
in the world when it comes to terrorism, may be involved in sponsoring 
or promoting terrorism themselves (Vigneswaran, 2013; Gastrow and 
Mosse, 2011; Riedel, 2008). In the US, for example, following the 9/11 
attacks exclusion, detention and surveillance were expanded to non-
citizens, especially to asylum seekers, and there is a general perception that 
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immigrants from Muslim countries pose cultural, economic and public 
safety threats (Messina, 2014; Ramirez, 2009; Miller, 2005).      
Border authorities in many countries have begun to adopt risk 
identification criteria based on international norms, without careful 
analysis of the internal/local context of security threats. For example, the 
suicide bombing in Britain in 2005 was carried out by individuals born in 
the United Kingdom, making it clear that border control operations reflect 
how security threats have become a social construct aimed at preventing 
the entry of certain categories of immigrants. However, bombings by a 
country’s own citizens have challenged the idea that borders can protect 
people from threats from outsiders and that when they affect us it is 
because our borders and their guards have somehow failed (Dauvergne, 
2008: 92).  
Besides the risk-based categorisation of immigrants, immigration 
officials at the Machipanda border post believe that it is necessary to 
ensure that immigration control measures are applied to any traveller who 
crosses at an official migration control post. Moreover, their concern with 
the control of immigrants is extended along the length of the border.  
As section 5.6 later illustrates, the long standing economic crisis in 
Zimbabwe and its effects on the Mozambican side of the border has not 
been given priority by the government’s responses to migration 
management and border controls. The following section provides 
evidence of interaction based on social, cultural and economic needs 
between populations in the three neighbourhoods in the Machipanda 
border region, namely Mugoriondo, Chizipa and Nhamatanda.  
5.4 Life experience in the Machipanda border region    
In this section, concerns raised by the inhabitants of three border regions 
in Machipanda, namely Mugoriondo, Chizipa and Nhamatanda, are 
discussed. Those who live in these border neighbourhoods share strong 
cultural affinities and long standing authority bonds with their 
counterparts in Mpenhalonga and Chimanimani (in Zimbabwe). As far as 
local leadership is concerned, in some areas leaders based on the 
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Mozambican side exert authority on both sides of the border and vice 
versa. A resident of the Nhamatanda neighbourhood22 states that 
“Makuiana and Chirara are local leaders who also perform authority on 
the Zimbabwean side. From the Zimbabwean side there is Mandeia local 
leader who rules on the Mozambican side as well”. He adds that these local 
leaders play a crucial role in addressing local problems related to land 
conflicts, leading awareness campaigns against cattle rustling, and 
bargaining with border authorities about the social and economic role of 
the border among local populations.  
With regard to social relationships, there is some evidence of socially 
motivated border crossings. For example, the Operational Chief of Border 
Police in Manica23 notes:  
most of border dwellers of Ruela border community in Mozambique are 
seasonal workers in Zimbabwe; most of the school children from Chirara 
study in Zimbabwe on the grounds that those schools are closer to their 
homes; border dwellers of Nhaligue community purchase their foodstuffs 
in Nhamaropa village (Zimbabwe) there is grocery shops in their area.  
Such examples suggest that border management should give specific 
attention to local contexts in constant flux. From the literature it is evident 
that “borders and their associated regions require localised study and repay 
detailed comparison” (Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999: 594).  
In the process of consultation with communities in the Machipanda 
border region, local border dwellers have raised concerns about security 
threats posed by criminal groups, smugglers and unauthorised immigrants 
from across the border. For example, a resident of the Nhamatanda 
border neighbourhood24 believes that the most threatening situation is 
related to evidence of abduction and the trafficking of children across the 
border between the two countries. Previous research into threats posed by 
criminal groups and smugglers has highlighted the fact that on both sides 
of MZB, there are bandits along the bush paths who intend to rob 
smugglers of their goods (Duri, 2010). Further evidence illustrates that 
special operations that are regularly launched by border police from the 
neighbouring countries always result in the arrest of large numbers of 
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smugglers (both Zimbabwean and Mozambican citizens), which increases 
feelings of insecurity among local communities. For example, a press 
report states that “an operation launched by the Mutare police in 
September 2001 netted 200 smugglers while hundreds more were 
languishing in Manica jails…” (Duri, 2010:142).  
Based on these facts, local leaders have committed themselves to 
implementing security measures intended to share information related to 
guests. The local leader for the neighbourhood of Mugoriondo states that 
“every resident who receives any guest has to present him/herself to local 
authorities within two days and state the purpose of the visit, its duration 
and his/her permanent residence25”. He goes on to explain that the 
monitoring of visitors is intended to control the movement of people in 
these areas, given the fact that during the war infiltrators from Renamo 
were sometimes hosted there as guests. The inference that can be drawn 
from this evidence is that local dwellers face challenges on two levels. 
Firstly, the need to keep criminals away from local populations, which 
demands a well patrolled border. Secondly, they need to cross the border 
to fulfil the demands of everyday life, which requires a border that allows 
such interaction. Arguments in favour of an open border are related to (1) 
marriage bonds on both sides of the border; (2) transfer of skills in 
carpentry, construction, mechanics, plumbing and others from 
Zimbabweans to Mozambicans. For example, a resident of Chizipa 
remarked that “we like Zimbabweans because we learn from their 
experience and they charge affordable prices for services they perform26”. 
This makes it clear that the MZB establishes a limit to territorial 
sovereignty between the two neighbouring countries, but local border 
dwellers are driven by cultural, social and economic boundaries that are 
always constrained by state securitisation policies regarding the formal 
border. 
 Importantly, the Machipanda border region and that of any post-
colonial state offers a distinctive approach to transition boundaries/zones. 
One point that deserves to be highlighted is that the creation of transition 
zones depends on the integration of the political and economic goals of 
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the bordering states. States oriented towards economic goals give priority 
to prosperity, while those led by political goals give priority to power, 
making it difficult to establish transition zones. Based on the example of 
Machipanda-Mutare as a colonial border, the next section addresses 
whether this region can be turned into a transition zone. Considering all 
the elements of interaction in border neighbourhoods, the Machipanda-
Mutare region is marked by a high degree of integration between 
communities on both sides of the border, which could easily result in a 
complementary zone. Such complementarity depends on the policies of 
the states in question.  
5.5 Reflections on the Machipanda-Mutare border region as 
an economic transition zone  
Studying the detailed and localised context of borders implies an 
understanding of their social, cultural, security, political and economic 
roles in local communities. The management of borders requires a 
collaborative process of consultation with local leaders aimed at listening 
to different views of the functions of borders that might influence a state’s 
policies. An integrative and consultative process is also required at the 
interstate level in order to reduce the unilateral management of the border, 
which could lead to military intervention that has the potential; to damage 
the regional economy (Medeiros, 2015; Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999). In 
effect, border regions require a degree of interconnection among local 
communities and interstate institutions if cross-border concerns are to be 
managed in a transparent and integrated manner.  
 This section unpacks socio-cultural, economic and political factors 
underpinning border interactions across the Machipanda-Mutare border 
and reflects on their role in a transition zone. Transition zones have come 
to exist as state borders are transformed from barriers into spaces of 
interaction between people in adjacent areas, the result of differentiated 
policies implemented by authorities of each state (Newman, 2006a). They 
result as a combination of (1) state policies aimed at transforming border 
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regions into spaces of interaction and (2) in the existence of mental 
exclusion between communities in the border regions (Newman, 2006b).  
 In the context of socio-cultural factors, communities in Manica 
(Mozambique) and Mutare (Zimbabwe) are Shona speakers and are linked 
by marriage and ethnic bonds, which foster interaction between those 
communities. Therefore, a state’s concerns with better patrolled borders 
can only reduce the interaction between these communities, but never 
eradicate socio-cultural factors. As Chapter 8 will illustrate, one 
fundamental weakness in the debate of integration in the SADC region is 
a careless definition of a ‘security community’ with the effect that the 
overlapping cultural and language similarities either side of the border 
remain totally ignored while they form one of the determinant factors of 
border crossing. For this reason, neighbouring states have a crucial role to 
play in the monitoring of borders that can secure socio-culturally oriented 
interaction between communities across borders such as in the 
Machipanda-Mutare region.  
As far as economic cooperation is concerned, the Machipanda-Mutare 
border region is characterised by strong and longstanding informal cross-
border trade between cross-border communities. Also, as a result of 
colonial legacies, Mutare is more developed in terms of its infrastructure 
and its economic sector, which over the past years has led to consolidation 
of informal cross-border trade between communities from the 
Machipanda-Mutare cross-border regions and beyond. In the case of 
Ressano Garcia, the local Association of Road Transport and its 
counterpart in Komatipoort in South Africa cooperate in the 
transportation of informal traders to and from each side of the Ressano 
Garcia-Komatipoort border point. However, informal cross-border trade 
in the area of the Machipanda-Mutare border has always suffered from 
restrictive state measures such as increases in customs duties or the 
prohibition of certain categories of goods, which in turn has been 
perceived as a factor that has had a negative impact on the economy of 
the two neighbouring countries (Duri, 2010). Lessons from European 
integration indicate that after little success yielded by sector-based 
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economic integration (coal and steel as well as atomic energy 
communities), Europe decided to launch a more advanced strategy aimed 
at breaking down national separatism and deepening economic integration 
in a broad manner (Niemann and Ioannou, 2015; Lindberg, 1963). The 
projected strategy was designed to reduce production costs, improving the 
standard of living, and was to be achieved through the abolition of trade 
barriers and the establishment of common external tariffs, (Niemann and 
Ioannou, 2015; Lindberg, 1963). As a result of substantial benefits derived 
from this strategy, “the economy of border regions has been rationally 
subject of regional development theories (Gualini, 2003:43).  
As far as regional integration in SADC is concerned, border regions are 
characterised by trade opportunities that vary according to the type and 
volume of goods that are exchanged. This requires local cooperation 
initiatives if this integration is to benefit the cross-border communities. 
The Machipanda-Mutare border region itself requires a balance between 
opportunities and constraints that are fundamental to extending the 
formal (regional) and informal (local) processes of transition to a wider, 
more integrated community (Newman, 2006a).   
Politically, the Southern African states all regard borders as 
fundamental spaces for the protection of territorial sovereignty and the 
fight against cross-border crime. This has led to the constitution of 
different regimes of border control by neighbouring states. Border policies 
that are sovereignty-oriented have limited the authority of local bodies 
such as municipalities or districts to establish cross-border cooperation 
initiatives. In such a context, the transformation of the Machipanda-
Mutare region into a transition zone will continue to depend on central 
government. Moreover, taking into account different contexts in each 
cross-border region in SADC member states, it seems that the ongoing 
regional integration has not yet produced any ideas on how local 
communities might benefit from the integration process. As the next 
chapter argues (section 6.4), regional integration can contribute to the 
establishment of either transition zones or co-managed borders if local 
aspects of border crossing are addressed specifically in the integration 
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process. Most importantly, a constellation of local features in the border 
regions such as extensive forested areas, limited access to public transport 
and lack of socio-economic infrastructure are crucial elements that 
support the need for transitions zones or co-managed border zones as 
platforms for the redefinition and implementation of regional integration, 
different from the European model, in SADC.   
5.6 Conclusion   
This chapter has presented an examination of patterns of migration across 
MZB, particularly in the Machipanda-Mutare official crossing point. It has 
also examined responses to border control that have been implemented 
by neighbouring countries, and their implications for local communities in 
their daily economic activities. Findings indicate that MZB has been 
characterised by a reversal in migration flows since 1997, with migration 
into Mozambique largely replacing the movements out of the country 
during the civil war, especially in the 1980s. The war that ravaged 
Mozambique at that time led to an exodus by Mozambican citizens from 
the bordering regions of Manica into Zimbabwe. Together with this 
political instability, emigration to Zimbabwe was motivated by the search 
for employment. However, since the late 1990s, the economic crisis in 
Zimbabwe has brought about a shift in migration patterns with 
Mozambique becoming the preferred destination for Zimbabwean 
citizens, especially those living along the Beira corridor, who are either in 
search of employment or informal trade opportunities.  
 Over the years since the 1980s, informal trade exchange between 
communities across the Machipanda-Mutare border regions has been 
consolidated, so much so that the main supplies to local markets in the 
Manica District are refined products from Zimbabwe, such as soap, flour, 
rice and other staples.  
However, the political change in Mozambique brought by the end of 
the war has led to security sector reform which has altered the state’s 
approach to border control. This has in turn affected socio-economic 
interactions among communities living in cross-border regions as a whole. 
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In the context of the Machipanda-Mutare border, the Mozambican and 
Zimbabwean customs authorities have become concerned with increasing 
the collection of external taxes on goods being traded across the borders. 
As Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 showed, this has led to a fairly stringently 
patrolled border in an effort to prevent smuggling. Likewise, immigration 
authorities have become more concerned about compliance with passport 
regimes, with visas and other documents required for entry and legal 
residence. This has led to border patrols conducting internal searches as 
well as preventing unauthorised migration at the border. Although 
accurate data on this subject was not available at the border crossing, it 
seemed from observations and interviews that daily rejections of entry 
were in the hundreds rather than in the tens.  
Regardless of these reforms, none of them have been focused on 
longstanding informal trade exchanges between communities in the cross-
border regions. Neither Mozambique nor Zimbabwe has established 
communication mechanisms with local communities in order to respond 
to political and economic changes in the neighbouring states in a 
sustainable manner. From the perspective of the African Union Border 
Programme, the Machipanda-Mutare border region could shift from 
barrier to point of connection by strengthening such trade exchanges in 
coordination with neighbouring state institutions. In this context, the 
Machipanda-Mutare cross-border region could be developed from a 
transboundary conservation area or from a more classically patrolled 
border such as Ressano Garcia-Lebombo border. These variances remain 
unexplored in the region, which also makes these regions less visible in the 
face of international border governance.  
Notes 
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1 Other districts in Manica Province are Báruè, Gondola, Guro, Machaze and 
Macossa. 
2 Interviewed on 5 March 2013. 
3 Interviewed on 7 March 2013. 
4 Interviewed on 7 March 2013. 
5 Interviewed on 17 January 2013.  
6 This visit was on 8 February 2013. 
7 Zimbabwean immigration officials complain about Malawian immigrants who 
are denied entry to South Africa. They enter Zimbabwe through Mozambique 
with an Emergency Certificate, but this document is not accepted by South 
African immigration authorities. The difficulty lies in the fact that Malawian 
immigrants in irregular situations are understood to be a financial burden on 
Zimbabwe, especially when it comes to their deportation. Based on this, 
Zimbabwean immigration authorities have requested Mozambique to be 
vigilant in order to limit the entry of Malawian travellers in transit to South 
Africa through Zimbabwe.   
8Zimbabwean border authorities complain about deforestation that has 
resulted from the rampant felling of trees by Mozambican citizens in their 
production of charcoal. This in addition to deforestation caused by bush fires 
(mostly originating on the Mozambican side of the border) and the degradation 
of soil resulting from the illegal extraction of minerals in the Machipanda 
border region. Based on regular bilateral meetings, the District Commanders 
of Police in Manica (Mozambique) and Mutare (Mozambique) have decided to 
undertake permanent awareness campaigns and joint operations to educate 
people in the border areas in an attempt to reduce human activities that destroy 
the environment.  
9 Interviewed on 17 January 2013. 
10 10 In the past, Manica District was a corridor for traffic in diamonds from 
Zimbabwe. The situation was brought under control when the Zimbabwean 
authorities conceded the diamond mine in the area to a Chinese mining 
industry.   
11 Interviewed on 5 March 2013 in Chimoio City. 
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12 Interviewed on 7 March 2013 in Manica Village. 
13  Interviewed on 7 March 2013 in Manica Village. 
14 Interviewed on 6 March 2013 in Manica Village. 
15 Interviewed on 5 March 2013. 
16 Manica District is situated in the western part of Manica Province, about 
80 km from its capital city Chimoio. Geographically, it occupies a total land 
area of 4391 km2 which is surrounded by mountains, plains and valleys. 
Manica District is divided into five Administrative Posts (APs) and five 
localities. The first AP is Machipanda and it is divided into three localities, 
namely Machipanda Village, Muzongo and Maridza. Mavonde is the second 
AP and has two localities: Mavonde headquarters and Chitunga. The third AP 
is Messica and this is made up of five localities: Messica Village, Bandula, 
Chinhambuzi and Nhaucaca. The fourth AP is Vanduzi and this has four 
localities, namely: Vanduzi Village, Chigodole and South Púngoe. The last AP 
is the Manica municipality, which is the Headquarters of the District. Statistical 
data from the general population census of 2007 indicates that there are about 
215 275 inhabitants in the area, 107 076 males and 108 199 females. The area 
is subtropical and there are two seasons. The first is from October to March 
and is hot and rainy; the second, dry season begins in April and lasts till 
September. The altitude varies between 600 and 1900 metres and the highest 
point is Mount Muriangane in Machipanda AP. The district is traversed by 24 
rivers (Honde, Nhancuarara, Mavuze, Chimedza, Ticue, Révuè, 
Messambudzi, Vanduzi, Messica, Zónue, Topodzi, Ruace, Mudzidzi, 
Munene, Nhamatanda, Zombe, Chirambadini, Nhamatchassi, Vermelho, 
Condeja, Citheo, Tchaka and Machinga), providing it with agro-ecological 
conditions that make it favourable for agriculture. People grow corn, pearl 
millet, sorghum, beans, peanuts, sweet-potatoes, onions, tomatoes, kale, 
cabbage and tropical fruits such as mango, avocado, litchi and pineapple. In 
addition, the agro-climatic conditions are favourable for the production of 
some crops for income generation such as tobacco (burley and Virginia), 
sunflower, ginger, Rhine potato and wheat. These crops are sold in 
Zimbabwe and in Beira and Chimoio cities under the monitoring of local 
agricultural companies. There is a culture of ancestor worship (spirits are 
invoked through songs and traditional dances), the payment of dowries and 
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respect for traditional holy places such as Chinhamapere cave paintings, the 
ruins of Nhamachato, Fort Massequesse, the Fort at Mudza, the mass grave at 
Révuè and the Sepulchre of Guindingue. The majority of the .inhabitants of 
Manica speaks three languages: Chimanhica, Chitewe and Chibarue. 
Chimanhica carries a Zimbabwean influence as long before the Portuguese 
colonisation, the Manica region belonged to the Kingdom of Mwenemutapa. 
Soon after his fall, it changed hands and became the ultramarine province of 
the Portuguese colony. As far as its governance is concerned, the district is 
headed by Filomena Meigos Manhiça, supported by the heads of APs and 
localities as well as by community leaders in the dissemination of government 
programmes and performance. In line with this, there are regular visits to the 
local communities aimed at assessing the impact of various projects in the 
field and their main concerns. As a result, local communities are concerned 
about unemployment, electricity supply and public infrastructure (particularly 
roads). As Chico António points out, “in the past, lack of employment and 
interest in English language (in primary schools) were the principal factors 
that led to high emigration flows to Zimbabwe”. However, at this point the 
situation has changed because unemployment in Zimbabwe is high and the 
Mozambican government has introduced the English language to primary 
schools.  
17The Emergency certificate is a document issued by the Immigration 
Department to citizens from neighbouring countries who have lost their 
passports. It is valid for a maximum of 90 days.  
18  In 2012, 11 joint operations (police and migration) were conducted in 
Chimoio and Manica as well as in the villages of Catandica and Guro, aimed at 
establishing the legality of foreign citizens and discouraging illegal mining. 
19 Interviewed on 7 March 2013 in Chimoio City 
20 Item (f), article 34, of the law 5/93, of 28 December. The law establishes the 
legal regime of foreigners in the Republic of Mozambique; establishes standards 
of entry, stay and departure as well as rights, duties and guarantees. 
21Chief of Immigration Office on Machipanda border, interviewed on 7 March, 
2013 
22 Interviewed on 12 March 2013. 
23 Interviewed on 8 March 2013 in Manica Village. 
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24 Interviewed on 12 March 2013. 
25 Interviewed on 12 March 2013. 
26 Interviewed on 12 March 2013. 
124 
 
6 
Mandimba region: rethinking land-
related cross-border governance  
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
As was pointed out in Chapter 1, every border region is unique in the 
sense of the variation of socio-economic factors over time and the 
mechanisms of border control that have been implemented by border 
authorities. This chapter examines land-driven socio-economic 
interaction in the Mandimba-Mangochi border region in the north of 
Mozambique. On the subject of cross-border management, the chapter 
examines the socio-economic relations of communities on either side of 
the border and considers the literature on transboundary conservation 
schemes. Based on an analysis of the experience of transboundary 
conservation areas in Southern Africa and in Latin America, this chapter 
proposes that productive land in Mozambique can reinforce the belief 
that the SADC concept of a security community might be expanded in 
future to incorporate the concept of borders from the perspective of local 
people and their interests. This topic is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
8. The method used in the data collection for this case study was similar 
to that used in the other border areas, although more time was spent in 
the field, with the result that observations over longer periods were 
possible. This enabled me to better understand the meaning of the 
porosity of the border, and how people had social reasons for crossing it, 
something I had not encountered in the other border areas I researched. 
This made the Mandimba border area an interesting one to study and 
about which to theorise. For some local people, the border appeared to 
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be no more relevant to them than the vegetation! However the main 
purpose of movement and the main point of contention was land, land 
use and the harvesting of resources from this land, especially on the 
Mozambican side, for use in Malawi. Hence the centrality of land issues 
in the analysis of the border in this chapter.  
6.2 Return of refugees from Malawi and a new landscape of 
border in Niassa Province 
Niassa Province is located in northern Mozambique and has the most 
extensive land border with the Republic of Malawi, stretching over 1500 
km from Mecanhelas District (Zambézia Province) up to Mecula District 
(Cabo Delgado Province).1 During the armed conflict in Mozambique, 
Malawi became the most receptive country of refuge in Southern Africa, 
with an estimated number of 780 000 Mozambican refugees by 1989 
(Babu and Hassan, 1995). 
Following the end of the armed conflict, the majority of these refugees 
returned to Niassa and established their settlements in the bordering 
districts of Mandimba, Mecanhelas, Lago, Sanga, Mavago and Mecula. 
They established themselves in these cross-border regions for one major 
reason: in case of the resumption of war, they would easily be able to cross 
the border back into Malawi. The cross-border regions across 
Mozambique-Malawi border have also been shaped by disputes over 
fertile farmland with Malawian citizens, who have overextended their 
lands, planting crops on the Mozambican side of the border.   
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Map 6.1  
Mozambique-Malawi border 
 
Source: http://blog.jamminglobal.com/2013/03/mozambique-part-1-remote-north-and-lake.html; accessed 
on 15 August 2014 
The escalation in land disputes between Mozambican and Malawian 
citizens in the border regions has seen the government of Niassa Province 
trying to address the problem with local leaders, but three key factors have 
hindered solutions: ethnicity and family bonds, local arrangements, and 
political legacies of the war. Mozambican and Malawian citizens in the 
border regions (across Niassa Province) belong to the Chichewa and Yao 
ethnic groups, which binds them closely together. Besides their ethnic 
bonds, over the years family bonds have been strengthened by marriages 
between Mozambican and Malawians citizens. These bonds have allowed 
members of the same household (split between Malawi and Mozambique) 
to obtain farmlands on the Mozambican side of the border.  
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Local arrangements have resulted in influential members (particularly 
community leaders) in the border regions of Niassa hiring Malawian 
citizens as labourers on their tobacco farms; they then allocate pieces of 
land to these labourers in payment. Such local land allocation has given 
rise to conflicts between local leaders and the district government of 
Mandimba. The administrator for Mandimba District indicated two cases 
of land dispute that local leaders had not been able to deal with. One case 
occurred in 2010 in the Luelele Administrative post. Malawians citizens 
claimed to belong to the Mozambican in order to gain access to fertile land 
there. A second case, in the Chivande border region, involved local leaders 
who were accused of selling land2 to Malawian citizens. This led to conflict 
among members of the local population who were deprived of their land.  
As far as the political legacies of the war are concerned, land disputes 
have become difficult for local authorities to address given the role played 
by Malawi in hosting Mozambican refugees during the war. Today this has 
resulted in reluctance on the part of immigration officials to control the 
Mozambique-Malawi border very tightly. At one end of the spectrum, 
local government lacks the authority to take political decisions on cross-
border policies of control. Informally, however, though policy issues 
remain decided at central government level, local practices do vary from 
region to region. To some extent, the national border authorities 
understand that border controls, seen from the perspective of territorial 
sovereignty, can come into direct conflict with the needs of those living in 
cross-border communities that are located in neighbouring states on both 
sides of the border line. According to the Director of Human Resources 
of the Niassa Province Immigration Department:3  
Illegal migration has become a common problem under discussion in      
bilateral meetings with Malawian and Tanzanian border authorities. The 
common belief is that the problem is associated with porous borders and 
complicity of some elements within local communities in facilitating illegal 
border crossing and smuggling […] which makes control of migration 
flows challenging.  
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The evidence above suggests that state authorities tend to have a fixed 
understanding of the role of the border as a space for fighting crime and 
securing sovereignty. As was illustrated in Chapter 5, to date restrictive 
customs regulations across the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border have 
resulted in widespread smuggling and unauthorised immigration, instead 
of – as intended – the control of cross-border crime. From the point of 
view of central state authorities, there are divergences. Some understand 
the need for relatively open borders, while others insist that tighter 
controls are needed throughout the border areas to prevent crime. Since 
both Mozambican and Malawian citizens from cross-border areas have 
relatives on both sides of the border, however, local immigration officials 
recognise pragmatically that these individuals will find a way to cross to 
border both specifically to access land and their relatives, and more 
generally for survival purposes.  
 For scholars, too, as Whiteside (1998:43) points out, “cross-border 
migration is perhaps something of an outsider’s construct – the local 
populations do not really see themselves as Malawians or Mozambicans, 
but as members of a lineage who have moved over centuries in an area 
across which there is now a border defined by others”. Against this 
background, the Mozambique border police in Niassa province are intent 
on the protection of territorial sovereignty across the Mozambique-
Malawi border.   
6.2.1 Socio-economic factors   
Mandimba4 is a district in Niassa Province situated in north-west 
Mozambique. It borders Ngauma district in the north, Mecanhelas and 
Cuamba districts in the south, Majune and Maua districts in the east and, 
for 110 km in the west, the Republic of Malawi. Mandimba is a very busy 
district given its location in the Nacala corridor and its proximity to the 
Republic of Malawi, which attract traders from Lichinga and Cuamba 
districts. The economy is based essentially on agriculture, fishing and small 
scale commercial activities. The population grows maize, sweet potatoes, 
beans, rice, and peanuts as well as tobacco for commercial purposes. While 
the population of Mandimba produces surplus food, their counterparts in 
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Mangochi face food insecurity as a result of the over-cultivation of their 
soils, which has forced them to look for fertile land in Mandimba. For 
example, the Administrator of Mandimba District5 has observed that “good 
ecological conditions for agriculture in Mandimba have resulted in a high 
demand for land by Malawian citizens, but the problem is concerned with 
community leaders who allocate land without informing government 
officials”. He explains that “community leaders tend to hire Malawian 
citizens to work on their tobacco farmlands and in turn grant them pieces 
of land as payment, which attracts them to stay in Mozambique6”. Further 
evidence of this lies in the fact that most family members belonging to a 
household that is scattered on both sides of the border possess farmlands 
in Mozambique. After the harvest, they take part of the crop to Malawi.  
 These problems related to land allocation are given special attention by 
the district government in regular meetings with community leaders where 
the latter are alerted to the imperative to prevent Malawian citizens from 
building their settlements along the border. For example, the administrator 
of Mandimba district states that “the central government does not allow us 
to allocate land to Malawian citizens on the grounds that Malawian citizens 
do not belong to Mozambique7”. However, he adds that despite this macro-
tension8, it is not easy to take the radical decision of expelling Malawians 
citizens, given the historical relationship between Malawi and Mozambique. 
He recognises that “Malawi has been the major hosting country of 
Mozambican refugees compared to other neighbouring countries, and it 
remains a historical solidarity gesture that comes to mind before a radical 
decision could be taken9”.  
 The evidence provided above reveals that land-related cross-border 
movement in Mandimba district is grounded on two unsustainable options. 
First, border control arrangements driven by the protection of sovereignty 
and a lack of competence among local government officials to find a 
definitive solution to land allocation will not prevent Malawians citizens 
from securing land in Mandimba (through family ties or through bribes paid 
to local leaders). As far as the literature is concerned, crossing the border 
between Mozambique and Malawi is driven predominantly by family and 
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social connections, and new members are rapidly integrated into local 
communities (Whiteside, 1998). Very often, through family ties, local 
communities allocate land based on mutual benefit.  
Apart from land, informal trading is a contributory factor in cross-
border interaction between the communities in Mandimba and Mangochi. 
The district governments of Mandimba and Mangochi have decided to 
establish international fairs where local dwellers can exhibit and sell their 
goods. Based on this initiative, there is one market fair in Chiponde Village 
(Malawi), one in Mandimba village and a third in Luelele locality. In 
Chiponde, fairs are open on Sundays, in Mandimba on Thursdays, and in 
Luelele on Fridays. Malawian citizens mostly exhibit manufactured goods 
such as plastic items for domestic use, clothing, roofing materials, bicycles 
and their spare parts; fruit (particularly avocados and apples) as well as 
electronic items for domestic use. On the other hand, Mozambican stalls 
are dominated by agricultural commodities10 ranging from maize, cassava, 
and capulanas11, to homemade goods. Apart from agricultural commodities 
from market fairs, Malawians are interested in other goods for commercial 
purposes such as fertilisers, fuel, firewood and coal for domestic use.  
In addition to this economically driven contact, border dwellers interact 
for social reasons, particularly medical treatment either in Malawi or in 
Mozambique. As these communities are mostly located along the border, 
they go to the hospital nearest to where they live (which could be in 
Malawi or in Mozambique). For example, a community member from the 
Ndaua neighbourhood in Mandimba village states that “Mozambican 
citizens from Mandimba go to hospitals in Malawi in cases of serious 
health conditions such as injuries demanding surgical interventions which 
are not available in local hospitals. On the other hand, there are Malawian 
citizens who come for malaria treatment in Mozambique because health 
services in their country are expensive12”.  
Regardless of socio-economic concerns such as health-driven border 
crossings, border authorities in Mandimba and local dwellers believe that 
Malawian border authorities are hostile to Mozambican citizens, 
particularly to local traders. For example, the administrator of Mandimba 
 Mandimba region: rethinking land-related cross-border governance  
 
                                           131 
district points out that “very often Malawian police seize money from 
Mozambican importers after they have sold their goods under allegations 
that kwacha13 belongs to Malawi and not to Mozambique14”. He explains 
that the Malawian government has established an efficient and 
systematised justice system at their official border, which is made up of 
police officers, prosecutors and judges. In view of this, the district 
government of Mandimba believes that the system that has been 
established at the Malawian border post is detrimental to Mozambican 
importers inasmuch as in most cases, Malawian authorities take snap 
decisions that result in huge losses without any real possibility of 
recovering the money or merchandise.  
As a result of these circumstances, local dwellers requested the 
Mandimba Administrator to participate in bilateral meetings (arranged by 
the two bordering district governments) where they could raise their 
concerns directly with the authorities concerned. In the face of this, in 
2012 the district government of Mandimba negotiated with its counterpart 
in Mangochi to reach a reasonable solution that would contribute to good 
neighbourliness.   
Notwithstanding the fact that the bordering district governments 
(Mandimba and Mangochi) have reached a bilateral agreement on cross-
border matters, border authorities and the bulk of Mozambican citizens in 
Mandimba continue to complain that Malawian police officers remain 
intolerant towards them. For example, one of the respondents remarked 
that: 
When we enter Malawi with our motorbikes, we are arrested by police 
officers and our motorbikes apprehended under allegation of lack of 
insurance documents. On the contrary, Malawian citizens come to 
Mozambique with their motorbikes and they do not get any complication 
from Mozambican police officers. Moreover, on many occasions, we try 
to ask the police to concede permission on our way to hospital in 
Mangochi, but due to long ‘negotiating’ time some patients perish before 
they get to hospital15.  
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Based on these claims, the main appeal from the population in Mandimba 
village is that Malawian police officers should desist from confiscating 
their motorcycles because these are used primarily to transport patients to 
hospital. These facts make it evident that Mangochi border authorities 
(immigration and customs officers) regard the border as performing a 
selective role regardless of local context, such as market fairs, health needs, 
and other socio-economic concerns. As a result, the Mandimba villagers 
have developed a hostile attitude to Malawian border authorities, which is 
also reflected in some social relations, particularly where family bonds do 
not exist.   
Local leaders in Mandimba, for instance, allegedly believe that 
Malawian citizens disrespect Mozambican law and perpetrate most of the 
abominable new crimes that have occurred, such as the exhumation of 
dead bodies, abduction for purposes of trafficking and armed robberies, 
which local residents had not seen before the end of war. Based on these 
criminal acts, local residents see Malawian citizens as being the ‘exporters’ 
of a new criminal index. A community leader in Mandimba village 
observed that “new typology of crime is the result of close 
interconnectedness with Malawian citizens in the post-war period and this 
situation is rampant due to porosity status of the border which allows 
unauthorised migration across the border16”. The belief among local 
inhabitants that Malawian citizens perpetrate most of these crimes can be 
interpreted in two ways. Firstly, it is a reaction against the hostility of 
Malawian authorities at the border, which could lead to xenophobic 
reactions to Malawian citizens. Secondly, regarding Malawian citizens as 
responsible for bringing these crimes to Mozambique can be interpreted 
as a social construction as there is no evidence that Mozambicans are not 
involved in these criminal acts. From this perspective, constructivism 
manifests in how border dwellers in Mandimba associate Malawian 
citizens with terrible crimes. In short, the perception that Malawian 
citizens are criminals can be consolidated by the collective human 
consciousness and generates a structure of relationships that did not exist 
in the past (Adler, 1997). Regardless of claims by Mozambican citizens in 
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Mandimba that Malawian citizens are involved in crime, the interaction 
between these cross-border communities deserves deeper analysis because 
of the evolving day-to-day interdependence between communities in cross 
border regions.    
6.2.2 Cultural factors 
Two main local languages are spoken in Mandimba District: Emacua and 
Chiyao. A third language is Chichewa, originally a Malawian language. In the 
matter of religion activities, the cross-border communities in Mandimba 
and Mangochi (Malawi) celebrate Ceara (an Islamic ceremony held in both 
Malawi and Mozambique). Apart from religion, the traditional ritual 
ceremony in Mandimba is Unhago, which is celebrated soon after the 
harvest of crops. Unhago is celebrated to prepare young girls and boys for 
future marital life. During the ceremony, they are indoctrinated in values 
that prepare them to deal with adult life. However, over the years, the 
period in which the ritual usually took place was changed because the 
harvest period (April – June) did not coincide with school holidays. The 
reason for this is that during the traditional ritual boys and girls are 
circumcised and time must be allowed for the wounds to heal. Based on 
this, Unhago celebrations were moved to the end of the year when school 
children are on holiday.  
6.3 Border patrol operations  
As indicated in the previous section, Mozambique shares the most 
extensive land border with Malawi, in mainly in the Niassa Province. 
Physically, the border runs through a landscape ranging from mountains, 
rivers and dense forests, which make the monitoring process difficult for 
border patrols. As the Chief of Operations of Border Police in Niassa 
Province17 put it, “our challenge at the border is to control smuggling and 
unauthorised immigration across Malawi and Tanzania border”. 
According to him, Malawians are largely involved in the smuggling of 
fertilisers and firewood, goods for domestic use, and stolen cattle, 
especially through the Mandimba and Entrelagos border districts. 
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Furthermore, the Chief18 explains that Tanzanian citizens engage in the 
illegal and unsustainable exploitation of natural resources, particularly 
poaching in Niassa Reserve, and the illegal exploitation and smuggling of 
timber and gold from the Lupilichi19 border region in the Lago District, 
and the M’Sawise border region in Mavago District (Unpublished Report, 
Border Patrol, Niassa Province, 2012).  
 Other related cross-border crimes comprise motorcycle20 theft and 
illegal fishing in Mozambican lakes and rivers. With regard to illegal 
fishing, border police in Niassa Province see this as a problem related to 
their lack of equipment that makes it difficult to patrol the border 
effectively. The Operational Chief of Border Police in Mandimba 
District21 points out that “at night we witness a veritable plunder of natural 
resources from Mozambique; Malawian and Tanzanian fishermen 
regularly come sneaking into our country, either through Lakes Niassa, 
Chirua, Chiuta and Amaramaba or through Lugenda and Rovuma Rivers 
without any capacity from our side to pursue them”. He explains 
furthermore that effective control of a border depends not only on 
material capacity or well trained staff, but requires strong cooperation with 
local communities. For example, the Operational Chief of Border Police 
at Luelele border post22 observes that “information related to smugglers is 
gathered by trusted elements from local communities”. He explains that 
these elements are also aware of possible transboundary activities by 
members of Renamo, who may recruit people for combat.  
 Historically, Mozambique and Malawi have developed political 
relationships based on mistrust, particularly with regard to Malawi’s 
support for the Renamo movement and suspicions related to the death of 
the late Mozambican President, Samora Machel (Lalbahadur, 2013). As 
Robinson (2009:2) points out, “it is well-documented that throughout the 
civil war the Renamo rebels […] used the territory of neighbouring Malawi 
to supply their forces in Mozambique and seek refuge from the operations 
of the Mozambican armed forces”. Very recently (particularly during the 
mandate of the late Malawian president Bingo Wa Mutharika), 
Mozambican and Malawian relationships have become strained for two 
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reasons. Firstly, in 2009, the Malawian border guards confronted the 
Mozambique police at the Caloca border post (Niassa Province) and set 
fire to the Mozambican border post building (Lalbahadur, 2013). 
Secondly, in 2012, the Mozambican authorities confiscated a barge 
destined for the inauguration of the Shire-Zambezi Waterway Project 
before the approval of the feasibility study by the Mozambican 
Government (Lalbahadur, 2013). With these political-diplomatic tensions, 
the Mozambican border forces have sought to increase patrol operations 
in order to reinforce the protection of state sovereignty.   
6.4 Customs operations  
As referred to above, the paramount goal of the border police is to prevent 
cross-border crime and ensure the protection of territorial sovereignty. 
For the customs authorities in Niassa Province23, territorial sovereignty is 
directly linked to the collection of taxes, which is their chief concern. The 
Chief of Operations: Customs Division in Niassa Province24 points out 
two reasons for the drop in the collection of taxes. Firstly, the rampant 
spread of smuggling, with growing participation among local inhabitants. 
Secondly, owing to their nature, imported goods from Malawi and 
Tanzania contribute very little to the collection of higher taxes. These 
goods include bicycles, motorbikes and spare parts, mattresses, shoes, 
clothing and household utensils.  
In order to counteract smuggling, customs officials have created 
mobile brigades to intercept potential smugglers, particularly those 
heading for Lichinga City. Mobile teams are spread over the main border 
posts in Niassa Province, namely Entrelagos, Mandimba, Lago and 
Cuamba. Thirdly, during the rainy season, the road linking Lichinga to 
Cuamba District becomes very muddy, leading to a low volume of 
imports. This situation is perceived by local customs officials as the main 
factor leading to low tax collection. For example, when I returned from 
fieldwork in Mandimba, it took nine hours to travel 258 km to Lichinga, a 
distance that would take one third of the time in normal road and driving 
conditions.  
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In the face of multiple factors leading to low collection of duties, 
customs officials in Niassa Province propose a two level solution. Firstly, 
they believe that the installation of an Electronic Single Window could 
control tax evasion significantly while ensuring legitimate trade. Secondly, 
they demand improved surveillance along the remainder of the border. In 
this regard, the Chief in Charge of Revenue Collection in Niassa 
Province25 observed that “the deployment of more border patrollers in 
2006 in Niassa Province resulted in decreasing smuggling rates and 
increases in collection of taxes on imported goods”. He believes strongly 
that priority should be given to border control to strengthen the human 
and technical capacities of the patrollers and to reduce the physical 
vulnerability of the border. This would ensure the political and economic 
sovereignty of the country. In the case of the Mandimba border, customs 
officials believe that the porosity of the physical border could be reduced 
by erecting fences along the border as much as 25 km in the direction of 
the northern part of Mandimba District. The key to this argument is that 
vehicles used to transport smuggled goods cannot travel beyond further 
than 25 km in this direction because there are no roads. In the next section, 
the chapter provides a context for border crossing in Mandimba.  
6.5 Immigration control: Mandimba border post 
The Mandimba official crossing point is less busy than Machipanda or 
Ressano Garcia. The number of travellers crossing the border daily ranges 
from 100 to 300. These figures vary depending on the season; from April 
to October, the movement of travellers increases (given the movement of 
tourists travelling to Cabo Delgado and Nampula Provinces) while in the 
rainy season, this drops.  
From the perspective of crime control, the immigration officers are 
mostly concerned with unauthorised immigrants and over-stayers 
(particularly young Malawians). The Chief of Immigration at the 
Mandimba border post26 states that “these young people come to 
Mandimba due to famine in Malawi. Most of them look for casual jobs on 
local farms, manufacturing of bricks and construction of houses”. He 
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suggests that immigration officers at Mandimba and Mangochi may need 
to coordinate the measures they take. The first measure is related to the 
issuance of circulation cards as identification documents to all border 
inhabitants in the interdicted area. An immigration inspector in Mandimba 
border post27 explains that a lack of coordination with colleagues in 
Mangochi on the issuance of circulation cards could open doors for 
criminals, allowing them to cross the border and stay wherever they like 
without any possibility of tracing them. He further explains that “in 2012, 
a guard at a grinding mill was murdered by a group of individuals who also 
robbed money in a shop nearby and fled to Malawi”. Based on this 
evidence, he believes that both Malawian and Mozambican citizens are 
involved in such crimes, and that the most important thing is to have their 
profile as border inhabitants. Moreover, the immigration department in 
Mandimba is also concerned by the fact that local communities cross the 
border at any point they find convenient, contributing to unreliable 
records of migration flows. As was made evident in the previous chapter, 
border crossing trends among local communities are shaped mostly by 
socio-economic and cultural factors that have existed over decades.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 6.2  
Mandimba-Mangochi border 
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Source: http://www.accommodationmozambique.co.za/malawi-mozambique-border-posts.php ; accessed on 
15 August 2014 
6.6 Life experiences in Mandimba border region 
This section focuses on two border neighbourhoods within the 
Mandimba District, Chicolone and Luelele, and describes life experiences 
of some local inhabitants of areas adjacent to Mandimba town. The 
section considers the main activities and factors of interaction among 
populations on both sides of the border.   
6.6.1 Chicolone community 
Chicolone is a neighbourhood bordering the Lissiete Administrative Post28 
– 17 km north of Mandimba village. Inhabitants of this neighbourhood 
are chiefly subsistence farmers. They grow beans, soybeans, rice, maize 
and sweet-potatoes, which they sell to Malawian citizens at international 
markets. They also share leadership with Malawian citizens from same 
border area. For example, the leader of the Chicolone neighbourhood29 
states that “regulu (local leader) Mpanga exerts authority both in Malawi 
and in Mozambique”. He explains that this situation has prevailed since 
the end of the war in Mozambique given the fact that during that period 
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some members of families from the community fled to Malawi while 
others remained on the Mozambican side.  
Border dwellers in the Chicolone neighbourhood are in constant 
interaction with their counterparts in Malawi for various reasons: marriage 
bonds, participation in burial ceremonies, celebrations of national 
holidays, and social events. For example, a resident in the Chicolone 
neighbourhood explains that “most of the time, young men from both 
sides use their bicycles to carry commodities for informal traders from 
Lichinga up to Mandimba village. Also, many young men from Malawi 
cross the border to Mandimba in search of casual work on local farms”. 
Another factor that leads to permanent cross-border interactions in 
Chicolone is related to Malawian citizens who have lands on the 
Mozambican side of the border.    
Regardless of the reasons that keep border dwellers of both sides in 
need of permanent interaction, crossing the border from one side to the 
other can be complicated, as some local residents explain. A respondent 
in the Chicolone neighbourhood30 stated that:  
From one side of the border to the other, border police demand for 
illegal fees for us to cross the border either going to hospital or to 
grinding mills. In case, we don’t pay, they seizure our goods either 
money or any other good concerned. 
In one FGD, a participant who was also a local resident expressed his 
frustration with border police by making a request to the researcher in the 
following terms: “Can you please talk to these border guards just to be 
kind with us? When we buy corrugated zincs from Malawi to roof our own 
houses we have to pay bribe; where else do we have to go”. What may be 
missing on the part of border authorities at this simplified border crossing 
is the meaning of a border as a socio-economic set of interactions, since 
they tend to implement state-centred border control principles – 
protection of territorial sovereignty. Regardless of this persistence of state-
centred border controls, the quotation above illustrates that Mozambique 
development policies, under implementation since the end of the war in 
1992, have neither improved basic socio-economic services to local 
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communities, nor enabled the establishment of cooperative arrangements 
with neigbouring states aimed at improving cross-border integration – a 
fundamental fact of life for local communities. In this context, local 
communities are frustrated by the inability of the bordering governments 
to improve their standard of living (Anderson, 2013; Rudolph, 2005).  
Based on these realities, some dwellers in the Chicolone community 
have suggested that border police should be more tolerant on sensitive 
matters such as the need to cross the border to buy basic consumer goods. 
Moreover, they understand that bribes paid to police on the border have 
been contributing to low numbers of traders at international markets and 
drive casual workers from Malawi to use bush paths in order to cross the 
border. For example, a respondent from Chicolone border 
neighbourhood31 stated that “most Malawian casual workers on their way 
back home use unofficial crossing points in order to avoid border police”.  
This reveals that the Mozambican government’s efforts in training and 
deploying more border forces in order to preserve national security 
constitute one of the major factors in the insecurity to local communities. 
As far as the literature is concerned, cross-border interaction is still marred 
by struggles between local communities and border official regarding 
restrictive measures, rent seeking and corruption (Whiteside, 1998). 
Apart from concerns over the behaviour of border police, border 
dwellers in the Chicolone neighbourhood lack grinding mills, hospitals, 
drinkable water and schools, which forces them to cross the border to 
Malawi. For example, a local leader32 points out that “we take decision to 
go to Malawi to grind maize due to high price we are charged in 
Mozambique and the distance we make on foot to reach those mills”. He 
explains that the nearest grinding mill is about 7 km from their community 
(in Luelele) and another is about 18 km (in Mandimba village), but 
grinding mills in Malawi are just across the border and prices are relatively 
low.  
Women from the Chicolone neighbourhood have to travel 18 km on 
foot or by bicycle to the nearest Mozambican hospital in Mandimba 
village. According to a resident from the Chicolone neighbourhood, 
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“some patients from this neighbourhood and others from other areas 
prefer to pay bribes demanded by some of the Mozambican border 
officers to cross the border to find the nearest hospital in Malawi”. 
Furthermore, he explains that, as a result of the distance, the majority of 
local schoolgirls drop out before they reach grade 6 and beyond because 
their parents believe that it is too dangerous for their daughters to travel 
15 km on foot to a secondary school on a day-to-day basis. Other claims 
raised by Chicolone border dwellers are concerned with job opportunities. 
For example, a local woman33 states that “here, we lack jobs that women 
can perform and get some money to assist our children. Most of the jobs 
are not appropriate for women as they demand more physical power that 
we lack”. Firstly, this suggests that the population from this particular 
border region faces security threats posed by the over-securitisation of the 
border by border police aimed at collecting bribes. Secondly, the statement 
above reveals that this particular community faces socio-economic 
problems that require specific policy interventions other than the general 
approach to development that the Mozambican government has been 
implementing since the early 1990s. As the study found, inhabitants of 
Chicolone pointed out that the district government of Mandimba had 
made several promises, but nothing had been done to improve access to 
hospitals, schools or grinding mills.  
6.6.2 Luelele community  
The Luelele locality is situated in the northern part of Lissiete 
Administrative Post – 25 km from Mandimba village. In the past, the 
region was part of the Nyasaland colonial concession. After independence 
one part was integrated into Malawi while the other remained in 
Mozambique, which left relatives divided on either side of the borders of 
neighbouring states. With regard to leadership, a local dweller in 
Chicolone34 states that “the area in which Katur local leader was ruling has 
been separated, which has resulted in two Katur communities (one in 
Malawi and another in Mozambique)”.  
Compared to other communities, Luelele border region is the most densely 
populated in the Mandimba District as a result of its fertile lands, which are 
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the leading reason for the high demand for land here by Malawian citizens. 
On the subject of land, the leader of the Luelele community35 states that “in 
some sections of the border, beacons dividing the two countries were 
destroyed by Malawian citizens, who expanded their cropping lands onto 
Mozambican side of the border”. He adds that the problem was addressed 
in 2010 in a coordinated process between the chief of the Luelele locality 
and the community leader of the Kalange community (Malawi) who had to 
explain to people under his leadership that they should respect state borders. 
The Chief of Luelele community36 states that “the central idea was to alert 
Malawians citizens to the need to respect national borders since they 
establish the boundaries of states’ sovereignty”. 
 Once the reaffirmation process had been completed, the Malawian 
citizens who had removed beacons to expand their cropping areas and 
extended their settlements along the border were absorbed into the 
Mozambican side. As a result, some of them left the country and returned 
to Malawi while others remained in the same areas although they are 
identified neither as Mozambicans nor as Malawians. According to the 
Administrator of Mandimba37, “this is a central topic which dominates our 
bilateral meetings with the District Government of Mangochi, but a definite 
solution to the problem must come from the central Government”.  
 While the district government waits for solutions from the central 
government, local inhabitants have been reinforcing their integration. For 
example, in the case of commercial activities, people living in the Luelele 
border region have constructed a warehouse that they use to store their 
surplus. A local inhabitant explains that this warehouse has become a 
meeting point for Malawian buyers and it has also meant that they no longer 
have to travel long distances into the interior in search of surplus supplies. 
Moreover, local inhabitants understand that it has significantly reduced the 
bribes they have to pay as the warehouse is situated close to the simplified 
crossing point, which does not tolerate any unprofessional conduct from 
border police officers. While the remainder of the border is plagued by 
conflicts between the Mozambique border police and local populations on 
either side of the border, the likelihood of conflict is growing, as SADC 
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integration propaganda suggests, given the absence of debate about border 
regions and their associated issues: local development, poverty alleviation 
and food insecurity. In the following section, the focus falls on land as a 
shared resource, specifically in the case of the Mandimba-Mangochi border 
region, that could shape border regions with new initiatives such as 
collaboration or co-management aimed at addressing problems of access to 
land and its sustainable utilisation.     
6.7 Rethinking the Mandimba-Mangochi border as a co-
managed border zone  
6.7.1 Context of co-management and few examples 
The concept of a co-managed border zone arises from a partnership-based 
approach to natural resource management, which applies in a situation 
where those resources straddle the political borders of different sovereign 
states (Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2004; Pomeroy and Goetze, 2003; 
Borrini-Feyerabend, Farvar, Nguinguiri et al. 2007; Munthali, 2007). In co-
management, two or more social actors work to negotiate a fair sharing of 
management functions in a given territory with natural resources 
straddling the states concerned, aimed at achieving sustainable use of 
natural resources, poverty alleviation, social justice and equity as well as 
democracy (Munthali, 2007; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2007). Since a lack 
of cross-boundary cooperation is deemed detrimental to the sustainable 
use of natural resources, co-management of borderlands is essentially 
dependent on an understanding of the opportunities presented by 
integrating borders and borderlands of adjacent sovereign states (Asiwaju, 
2011; Perkmann, 2003; Timothy, 1999). As Perkman (2003:158) points 
out, “…the rationale of cross-border cooperation will be based on the 
persistence of differences between the nation state territories concerned, 
as for instance with respect to complementary locational advantages”. 
 Based on various opportunities across border lands of nation states 
around the world, there are several examples of co-management 
partnerships that indicate how cross-border cooperation can be conceived 
and managed in the context of the Southern Africa region, particularly in 
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the Mandimba/Mangochi cross-border region in northern Mozambique. 
Examples of existing co-management partnerships range from (1) the 
International Peace Garden straddling the border between north Dakota 
(USA) and Manitoba (Canada), which was established in 1932 as a 
monument to worldwide peace (Timothy, 1999); (2) the Roosevelt 
Campobello International Park, established in 1964 along the USA-
Canada border, regarded as part of these nations’ cultural heritage 
(Timothy, 1999); (3) Waterloo-Glacier International Peace Park, 
established in 1932 on the USA-Canada border with the paramount goal 
of promoting peace while preserving the natural environment (Timothy, 
1999); (4) the Belize Barrier Reef system in the Caribbean Coastal region, 
stretching over 260 km from Mexico to Guatemala. It was established to 
fight threats to marine and coastal resources, unsustainable fishing, 
improper land use, all of which were threatening the tourist industry 
(Pomeroy and Goetze, 2003). As a result, two co-managed partnerships 
were established: i) the Laughing Bird Caye National Park and ii) the 
Gladden Spit Marine Reserve; and (5) the Bénoué National Park Complex, 
a wildlife co-management partnership in the Cameroon. The 
establishment of this park addressed the concerns of local communities, 
particularly hunters, whose hunting territory occupied 44% of the land in 
question (Mayaka, 2002).   
6.7.2 Co-management of natural resources in the Southern African 
region  
Historically, the Southern African region has experienced resource-driven 
border conflicts between neighbouring states, particularly in the case of the 
Uganda-DRC, Kenya-Uganda Tanzania-Malawi, Tanzania-Uganda and 
Uganda-Rwanda borders (Okumu, 2010:280). In addressing conflicts 
related to existing natural resources in these border regions, the AU 
Assembly has urged African states to accelerate regional integration as one 
method of addressing border-driven conflict, particularly in areas where 
resources straddle the borders of states’ territorial jurisdictions (African 
Union Conference, 2007). 
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In general, in response to both the African Union and global regimes 
(for the management of bioregions and issues related to climate change), 
sub-Saharan African has adopted several transboundary conservation 
initiatives aimed at promoting effective conservation of biodiversity, the 
maintenance of peace and security, poverty alleviation and economic 
growth (Munthali, 2007; Wolmer, 2003; Duffy, 2001; Katerere et al., 2001). 
In the case of the Southern Africa region, these initiatives range from 
Transboundary Natural Resource Management Areas (TBNRMAs38), 
Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs39), Peace Parks, Spatial 
Development Initiatives (SDI), and Development corridors (Wolmer, 
2003). These initiatives were implemented on the grounds that many 
resources in Southern Africa (river basins, marine resources and wildlife 
populations) are shared across international borders and that a 
cooperation mechanism for their management could bring sustainable 
development to the regions (Katerere et al., 2001; Munthali, 2007).   
In the process, the Southern African region has focused chiefly on 
TFCAs as a ‘model40’ that is projected to evolve from an individual country 
level to promote complementary approaches to sustainable land use and 
biodiversity conservation (Munthali, 2007). Under the TFAC model, the 
Southern African focus is on government protected areas and community 
conserved areas as sites for the establishment of Peace Parks. Peace Parks 
are defined as conservation areas or bioregions41 crossing the frontier of 
more than one state. The objective of establishing such parks is to address 
transnational environmental problems by focusing on co-management 
partnerships (Duffy, 2001). At present, Peace Parks in the Southern Africa 
region are at different stages; some have already been established while 
others remain as ongoing projects. Examples include the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park, the agreement for which was signed in 2000 by the 
governments of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and South Africa for the 
establishment of the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou TFCA; the Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park, the agreement for which was signed in 2000 by the 
governments of South Africa and Botswana, and which is oriented to 
tourism (Hanks, 2003); the Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique 
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TBNRMA, aimed at improving the sharing, exchange and management of 
resources among these countries (Katerere et al., 2001); the Maputaland 
Centre of Endemism – a transfrontier conservation area that has been 
developed to ensure the long term survival of a biodiversity system 
covering approximately 17 000 km2 in Southern Mozambique, northern 
South Africa and western Swaziland (Smith, Easton, Nhancale, et al, 2008); 
and the three nations Namib desert TFCA, which is projected to integrate 
the Ai/Ais/Huns National Park in Namibia, the Richtersveld National 
Park in South Africa and the Iona National Park in Angola (Hanks, 2003).  
Although the transboundary conservation initiatives are designed to 
alleviate poverty, promote integrated sustainable development and to 
ameliorate political and cultural tensions related to disputes over shared 
resources through peaceful cooperation between states (Wolmer, 2003), 
there is much scepticism regarding their focus. Firstly, these initiatives are 
funded by international financial agencies and environmental institutions 
such as the World Bank (WB), the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), 
the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) and other non-government 
organisations (Duffy, 2006; Wolmer, 2003, Katerere et al., 2001). Secondly, 
transboundary conservation areas have been established in the fulfilment 
of a common global model for environmental management, which has led 
to a social construction of the environment (Duffy, 2006). The core 
argument in favour of a global approach to environmental management is 
that environmental problems have global impacts and consequently they 
require global science to understand them, and global institutions and 
experts to manage the areas (Katerere, et al., 2001:8).  
However, the common model for the management of the environment 
is a top-down approach, which is oriented towards business purposes, 
particularly those of the particular funding agencies. This is often runs 
counter to the needs of with local communities. Where Peace Parks have 
been established, communities have been forced to leave their land and 
have been deprived of access to it (Munthali 2007). In the context of the 
Southern African region, most TFCAs have been established without 
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consultation with local communities, which has exacerbated tensions 
rather than addressing them. For example, in the establishment of the 
Great Limpopo TFCA, populations in Campfire (in Zimbabwe) were 
evicted from their homes to make way for wild animals while in the case 
of the Sengwe community, people were not consulted about the 
dimensions of the park (Duffy, 2006). Also, communities in Coutada 16 
in Mozambique would have to be evicted to allow the establishment of 
the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou TFCA (Katerere et al., 2001). 
In all these cases, local communities have difficulties in accessing land, 
water and other livelihoods in their areas. As a result of the social 
construction of the environment, most of their survival strategies have 
been criminalised as poaching, trafficking or theft of natural resources. All 
in all, the Southern African region has fallen into the trap of the global 
model of environmental management, which has prevented the region 
from responding to the needs of local communities regarding their use 
and share of transboundary natural resources. In an elaboration on this 
subject from the perspective of poverty alleviation and sustainable 
development, the following sections comprises a discussion of how the 
fertile land in Mozambique (which is the key convergent factor of 
communities in the border regions) could be used to address food 
insecurity.   
6.7.3 Challenges for co-management of the Mandimba-Mangochi 
border region  
Contrary to the case studies presented above, the Mandimba-Mangochi 
border region is shaped predominantly by land-driven cross-border 
interaction for the production of food crops. Based on the rationale of 
TFCAs (that is, poverty alleviation and sustainable development), fertile 
land in Mozambique presents an ongoing challenge to the establishment 
of a local development oriented approach to co-management partnership 
in the Southern African region, one which goes against financially driven 
partnerships such as Peace Parks. Based on the SADC rationale of 
economic integration, the integration of communities and economy would 
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transform state territories into social and political communities and 
institutions (Blatter, 2004). More specifically, for economic integration to 
occur, SADC considers “food security, land, and agriculture” as crucial 
areas that should be strengthened in order to sustain a security community.  
 In the context of the Mozambique-Malawi border regions, co-
management partnership needs to stand out as a unique experience owing 
to the fact that the land in Mozambique could be used to address food 
insecurity in Malawi, the impact of which would affect Mozambican soils 
by dint of the cultivation of unsuitable food crops. For example, a 
significant number of Malawian households has fled into Mozambique in 
response to the use of resources by the Malawian government, driven by 
national food security policies while at the same time ruling out any 
thinking on household livelihood security (Whiteside, 1998; Adger, 2006). 
In response to this, are number of different co-management analyses have 
been proposed to establish cross-border partnerships aimed at addressing 
problems of access and use of land. One common approach to cross-
border partnerships is the co-management analysis research framework, 
which is intended to examine (1) legal feasibility – the existing 
customary/traditional laws and regulations for use of land; (2) political 
feasibility – the current political will, stability and capacity to enforce 
decisions; (3) institutional feasibility – the chance to build pluralistic 
management institutions across borders and possible conflicts that might 
result; (4) economic feasibility – the satisfaction of economic needs and 
availability of financial resources; (5) cultural feasibility –the status of the 
current population and socio-cultural diversity and their dynamics 
(Pomeroy and Goetze, 2003; Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2007).  
Elaborating on the analytical structure given above, Mozambique and 
Malawi have different laws and regulations controlling access to and use 
of land. The Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique stipulates in 
article 109 that (1) Land is the State’s property and (2) every Mozambican 
citizen has the right to access and use of land for socio-economic 
purposes. On the other hand, Malawi has three categories of land 
ownership: public, private and customary land (Takane, 2008). The 
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majority of the poor cannot hold public land (owned by government) or 
private land (this is owned by large-scale farmers). Moreover, according to 
customary law, land is not for sale. It is managed in accordance with each 
ethnic group’s customary law, whose transaction modalities depend on 
patrilineal or matrilineal rules (Place and Otsuka, 2001; Takane, 2008). 
Therefore, lower purchasing power preventing the poor from owning 
private land coupled with the confining of land transactions to matrilineal 
and patrilineal rules have resulted in a high demand for land in Malawi. 
Ultimately, this high demand has resulted in a shortage of land, which has 
in turn led individuals to search for new sources of land rights, particularly 
from non-matrilineal kin members (Takane, 2008).   
 From the perspective of political feasibility, Mozambique and Malawi 
have had challenging political relations, which might play a significant role 
in decisions on cross-border partnerships in access to and use of land in 
Mozambique or in any other neighbouring state. At present, strong 
political decisions depend on the state of the debate on SADC integration. 
Importantly, cross-border partnerships for use of land are different from 
bioregion initiatives in the sense that the latter straddle state borders while 
the former constitute the driving force behind the movement of people 
across state borders. While such partnerships are as yet unknown in the 
Southern African region, each state continues to make its borders as 
secure as possible to protect its territorial sovereignty.  
 From the perspective of economic feasibility, Malawian land has 
always been over-cultivated and lacking the replacement of nutrients, 
which has resulted in poor fertility and erosion (Whiteside, 1998). For 
example, research has illustrated that without an economic market 
network between the Mozambican communities (Niassa, Zambézia, Tete, 
and Nampula) and Malawi, development in these communities would be 
very different (Whiteside, 1998). In contrast, Mozambican informal 
traders see Malawi as their key market and source of labour for work on 
their lands. Mozambican products are predominantly agricultural, such as 
maize, beans, salt, fertilisers and vegetables. These facts reveal that while 
cross-border co-management partnerships in Southern African remain 
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dependent on political decisions, local communities continue to rely on 
unsustainable alternatives for access and use of natural resources, which is 
the persisting reality exposed in this study. Based on the three case studies 
discussed above, the next section provides a summary of convergent 
factors (socio-economic and cultural) and their relationship with state 
practices of border control.     
 
6.8 Conclusion  
In contrast to other cases studies, the Mandimba-Mangochi border region 
is dependent predominantly on agriculture, given the ready availability of 
land and the favourable climatic conditions. Given these circumstances, 
cross-border interaction occurs mostly in informal trade exchanges of 
agricultural surplus and access to arable land by Malawian citizens on the 
Mozambican side of the border. Malawian citizens’ reliance on this land 
has led to conflicts over land in some communities in the Mandimba 
border region. 
Regardless of the communities’ daily need to cross the border 
(including access to arable land), the Mozambican and Malawian border 
authorities have prioritised control mechanisms that constrain local 
communities and prevent them from addressing their socio-economic 
and ethno-cultural concerns across the border. As Chapter 8 will show, 
the SADC concept of a security community is diminished by the drive for 
security in the border regions. 
 As far as co-management of border zones is concerned, fertile lands in 
Mandimba present a challenge to Mozambique and Malawi in advancing 
cooperative mechanisms that could address food insecurity. In 
establishing such forms of management, the Mandimba-Malawi border 
could become a force of change in an approach to the border region that 
reflects the context of post-colonial African states. More specifically, the 
Mozambique-Malawi approach to land issues could illustrate a form of 
integration in SADC that differs from profit-oriented TCAs, which are 
based on global standards of environmental management.   
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Notes 
 
 
 
 
1 From Tete to Cabo Delgado province, Mozambique shares 900 km of land 
border with Malawi, most of which is porous. As a result, border patrol units 
believe that criminals are taking advantage of this to perpetrate various crimes, 
especially smuggling of fuel into Malawi and various goods into Mozambique. 
There is information on the increase in trafficking and smuggling of stolen cars 
across the border dividing the two countries. In response to this, however, the 
border authorities of the two countries have established a mechanism for sharing 
information and undertaking sporadic joint patrol operations along the border, 
very often in the Dedza and Angónia districts of Tete province. 
2 In the Republic of Mozambique, land is not for sale. Article 109 of the 
Constitution prescribes that 1) land is the State’s property and 2) land shall not be 
sold, alienated, or transmitted by other means such as mortgage or seizure.   
3 Interviewed on 7 February 2013 in Lichinga City. 
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4 Mandimba District is located in the southern part of Niassa Province. It is 150 
km from Lichinga City and 5 km from the border with the Republic of Malawi. 
It is also bordered by the Ngauma District in the north, Mecanhelas and Cuamba 
Districts in the south, Malawi in the west and Majune and Metarica Districts in 
the east. The district is divided into two administrative posts: Mitande and 
Lissiete, which also have internal subdivisions. Mitande has one locality called 
Mississe while Lissiete is divided into two localities, Luelele and Meluluca. The 
existing statistical data from the general population census of 2007 shows that 
there are about 159 000 inhabitants, of which 79 000 are men and 81 000, women. 
The climate is moderate with dry winters. The average annual temperature is 20 
degrees Celsius with annual amplitude of less than 10 degrees in all regions of 
the district. The rainy period begins in March and lasts until November with 
precipitation ranging from 1000 to 2000 mm and a relative humidity varying 
between 55% and 75%. The orography of Mandimba district is shaped by two 
main landscape platforms: fluvial landforms and mountains with valleys. Fluvial 
landform areas are composed of sand and dunes along Lake Amaramba with an 
altitude ranging from 600 to 700 metres; in other sub-regions this altitude ranges 
from 800 to 1000 metres. On the other hand, mountains with valleys are 
characterised by altitude variation along the entire east-west part of the border 
with the Republic of Malawi. The main elevations of the district include Mount 
Ivenga (1099 m), Mount Lussange (1127 m), Mount Lissiete (1598 m) and Serra 
Chigulo (1278 m). In some areas, such as Messalo and Luchimua, the altitude 
rises beyond 1500 metres. Soil in Mandimba is red clay, susceptible to erosion. 
The main types of wooded areas include shrubby savannah, swampy forest and 
rocky forest. In these forests, the dominant tree species are Jambire, Chanfuta, 
Mbaua, Umbila and Sândalo Africano (Ministério da Administração Estatal, 
2005). 
5Interviewed on 15 February 2013 in Mandimba Village 
6 Administrator of Mandimba district, interviewed on 15 February 2013 in 
Mandimba Village 
7 Interviewed on 15 February 2013 in Mandimba Village 
8 The administrator also strongly believes that during the war, Malawian 
authorities allowed members of Renamo to enter Mozambican refugee camps in 
Malawi to distribute essentials and clothing as a way of gaining sympathy, which 
has supposedly played a significant role in voting trends going in favour of the 
opposition party, particularly in the 1994 elections. 
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9Interviewed on 15 February 2013 in Mandimba Village 
10 The Mandimba administrator explains that the district has been implementing a 
green zones strategy, which has resulted in large quantities of surplus. As a result, 
the district has registered huge demand from Malawian citizens, which has 
stimulated local populations to produce more. However, the administrator 
explains that the most important message for local populations is that they 
should not sell their surplus at prices that will not compensate them. Also, local 
populations are warned to avoid stock break for their own consumption. For 
example, in the first two months of the year, Mozambicans buy maize in 
Malawi, the same maize that they sold to Malawians earlier. 
11 Capulanas is a manufactured fabric used by women to wrap their body and head. 
12 Interviewed on 13 February, 2013. 
13 Kwacha is the name of the Malawian currency. 
14 Administrator of Mandimba District, interviewed on 15 February 2013 in 
Mandimba Village. 
15 Community member in Mandimba village, interviewed on 13 February 2013. 
16 Interviewed on 13 February 2013. 
17Interviewed on 7 February 2013 in Lichinga City. 
18 Interviewed on 10 February 2013 in Mandimba. 
19 Unclear demarcation of the border in Lupilichi border area has brought 
Mozambicans and Tanzanians into competition for the exploitation of minerals. 
20 The border police report of 2012 states that on 1 June border police apprehended 
a motorbike (at Mpapa simplified crossing point) that was suspected of being stolen 
in the Republic of Tanzania. It was in the possession of a Tanzanian citizen, Inete 
Hiela, who was trying to smuggle it into Mozambique through the jungle.  
21Interviewed on 8 February 2013. 
22 Interviewed on 10 February 2013 in Mandimba. 
23 Interviewed on 9 February 2013 in Mandimba. 
24 Interviewed on 10 February 2013 in Mandimba. 
25Interviewed on 7 February 2013 in Lichinga City. 
26 Interviewed 10 February 2013 at Mandimba official border post. 
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27 Interdicted zone is a space stretching up to 20 km from the official line of 
state borders. 
28 Lissiete Administrative post is headed by Régulo Mpanga. 
29 The leader of Chicolone community, interviewed on 13 February 2013. 
30A resident in Chicolone border community, interviewed on 13 February, 2013. 
31 Interviewed on 13 February, 2013. 
32The leader of Chicolone community, interviewed on 13 February 2013. 
33 A resident in Chicolone border community, interviewed on 13 February 2013. 
34 Interviewed on 11 February 2013. 
35 Interviewed on 11 February 2013. 
36Interviewed on 11 February 2013. 
37 Interviewed on 15 February 2013. 
38 TBNRMAs are contiguous areas of neighbouring states, but they are not 
necessarily protected areas (Katerere et al., 2001).  
39 TFCAs are defined as linked protected areas between neighbouring countries 
(Katerere et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2008). 
40 Other transboundary co-management partnerships in Southern Africa include 
the Beira corridor, which was established by the governments of Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe and intended to use transport infrastructures from Port Beira 
to Zimbabwe and thereby reduce transportation costs; the Maputo corridor, 
which was established in 1995 by the governments of Mozambique and South 
Africa, aimed at facilitating the access to global capital and infrastructures 
development, and which has culminated (for example) in the construction of a 
toll gate road connecting Maputo (Mozambique) and Witbank (South Africa). 
41 Bioregion is defined as a self-contained and equilibriated place structured and 
governed by its life forms, its topography and its biota rather than by human 
dictates and legislature (Wolmer, 2003).  
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7 
Internationalised border governance: 
Mozambique’s sea borders and airports  
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 2 reference was made to the common concept of security that 
took hold after the end of the Cold War, and the expansion of border 
controls outside the immediate frontiers of the EU and other ‘Western’ 
countries. In the process, human movement was reconceptualised as a 
threat to national sovereignty. The cases studies discussed in Chapters 4, 
5 and 6, have shown how life experience in cross-border regions, the 
relationship between cross-border communities and border control 
perspectives differ from such dominant thinking about state security and 
the governance of migration. Overall, findings show that the interaction 
of communities in the border regions is motivated by day-to-day socio-
economic needs, but is limited by a state’s securitised international 
borders. While the Mozambique border police at land crossings are 
involved in controlling the border only insofar as this might prevent the 
national territory from external threats, such as cross-border crime, at 
airports and seaports much less discretion is possible on the part of 
immigration officers and custom officials. This chapter thus returns from 
the localised dimensions of border governance at land borders in 
Mozambique, to the globalised dimensions of border governance through 
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the imposition of international security standards on border controls, 
which are more visible at airports and seaports than at most border 
crossings (with the possible exception of Ressano Garcia, which is today 
in many ways an internationalised border crossing).   
 In this chapter the analysis focuses particularly on the experiences of 
Mozambique in applying international security standards to border control 
at sea ports and airports. In particular, the focus of this chapter will be on 
how the Mozambique Immigration Department has implemented 
mandatory standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) for the issuance and checking of Machine Readable Travel 
Documents (MRDTs), particularly passports and visas. At the same time, 
an analysis is provided of the impact of reforms undertaken by customs 
authorities in relation to e-luggage checking, aimed at ensuring legitimate 
trade in accordance with recommendations of the World Customs 
Organisation (WCO). As the chapter will show, recommended security 
standards and practices have resulted in significant changes in recent years 
in terms of technology, including biometric passport checks and a single 
electronic window for rapid clearance of imported goods, both introduced 
in 2010. E-luggage checking and adjustments to security practices at sea 
ports and airports are discussed. Based on these findings, it is argued in 
this chapter that international institutions have gained direct authority 
over many areas that were traditionally under the command of national 
states.   
7.2 Externalisation of international security standards of 
border control: the role of international institutions    
Chapter 2 established that the growing security threat posed by terrorist 
groups and other organised criminal groups has pushed the Western world 
to undertake restrictive migration policies and to tighten border control 
measures in an attempt to regulate the movement of people across 
international frontiers (Weber and Grewcock, 2011; Dauvergne, 2008; 
Rees, 2008). Western concerns with border control have been sparked by 
the 9/11 attacks in the US, the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London 
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bombings in 2005, all of which have led to the adoption of new security 
regimes in the control human migration, the control of cargo shipment, 
security of seaports and their facilities as well as airports and related 
facilities. In the case of the US, maritime security experts believed that 
there was a need to establish common practices and standards at all 
seaports and an international maritime security regime in order to ensure 
effective maritime trade worldwide (Frittelli, 2008). In the case of EU, 
common border control technology and practices have been externalised 
– in other words, exported to external borders, generally in a way that aims 
to control transnational crime and undocumented human movement 
(Grabbe, 2000).   
 At the global level, these regimes have been introduced through several 
mechanisms, ranging from (1) the enactment of compulsory legislation 
(such as the United Nations Conventions against terrorism, against 
transnational organised crime and against human trafficking) and 
agreements aimed at controlling unauthorised migration from potential 
sending countries, and direct support as well as physical border patrol 
operations from third countries; (2) compliance with recommended 
standards for the issuance and control of biometric travel documents; (3) 
compliance with international security standards for e-luggage checking 
for air and sea navigations, which has resulted in the ascendency of 
biometric border control technology and its ‘enforcement’ on a global 
scale (Amoore, 2006; Salter, 2004; Boswell, 2003). 
 As far as legislation and agreements are concerned, in 2004 the EU 
adopted the Qualification Directive, which prescribes common criteria 
that are useful for reducing the existing socio-economic differences 
between member states in the identification of persons in need of 
international protection (Nessel, 2008).   
 In the matter of direct support and physical border control operations 
from third countries, the EU and the United Kingdom have been sending 
their officers to refugees’ countries of origin where they are stationed at 
airports and seaports, for example, explicitly in order to prevent the 
departure of potentially unwanted migrants (Nessel, 2008). This strategy 
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has been supported by both the US and EU security authorities on the 
grounds that relying on countries of origin to check the legality of people 
who plan to migrate, before they embark, is not sufficient. Externalising 
controls may be costly, but allows the EU and US to avoid the high costs 
of deportation operations later (Guild and Bigo, 2010). From the 
perspective of trade control, the EU has strengthened maritime border 
control and increased collaboration with points of origin of trade aimed at 
avoiding penetration of trade and travel networks by terrorists (Bellavita, 
2011; Wolff, 2008; Bryan and Flynn, 2002). These collaborative initiatives 
are complemented by patrol operations at the EU external borders 
designed to stop migrants before they enter these territories (Rees, 2008; 
Nessel, 2008). 
  In the EU, the patrol of external borders is undertaken through 
FRONTEX operations FRONTEX plays two fundamental roles. First, at 
the operational level, it has been adopted as a strategy aimed at protecting 
the EU’s internal security by preventing transnational organised crime 
from reaching European territory (Mounier, 2007:47). These operations 
involve the cooperation of border controls of third countries. For 
example, in 2004 the EU proposed the establishment of five detention 
centres: in Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia (Nessel, 
2008:661). Secondly, FRONTEX has been adopted as a model that would 
involve other countries in fighting threats that concerning not only EU 
geopolitical borders (Burgess, 2009). As Rees (2008:97) points out, “the 
incorporation of the Schengen Convention into the Union established a 
borderless internal area with a hard external frontier that was designed to 
provide a high level of common security”. 
 Furthermore, the EU has been expanding external border governance 
through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This is designed to 
prevent the development of security threats in the neighbourhood that 
could jeopardise the EU, while at the same time maintaining certain 
influences in these areas (Marchetti, 2006; Bosse, 2009). As Marchetti 
(2006:16) observes, “it will be argued that the ENP can be understood as 
a manifestation of the EU’s will to create a ring of states in its vicinity to 
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serve its purposes of protecting itself and exercising influence”. Indeed, 
the European Security Strategy of 2003 stipulates that “our task is to 
promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European 
Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy 
close and cooperative relations” (Smith, 2005:760). The EU and the US 
are not alone in having externalised their model of border governance 
through providing physical support to neighbouring states; security 
standards have become compulsory for the rest of the world through 
international security institutions such as the UN, the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the WCO. In the next section, the 
focus is on ICAO and its mission in the governance of air transportation.     
7.2.1 The International Civil Aviation Organisation and the 
technologies of border governance  
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is a United Nations 
agency established in 1944 under the Chicago Convention as a platform 
for planning, developing and providing recommended standards and 
practices for the safety of air transportation, including provisions for 
clearance of persons through border controls (ICAO, 2006). In 
compliance with its mandate, the ICAO has devoted expertise to 
developing standardised aviation safety and security measures (AVSEC)1, 
with which every contracting country is obliged to comply. Security 
standards and practices recommended by the ICAO are contained in 
several legal instruments such as Annexes 9 and 17 to the Chicago 
Convention, which are the most adaptive and frequently revised 
documents.  
 Annex 9 provides contracting states with advanced tools to ensure the 
reliable management of Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs). 
As a complementary legal framework to prevent acts of unlawful 
interference, Annex 9 is concerned specifically with the facilitation of 
landside formalities for clearance of aircraft and passengers, goods and 
mail with respect to the requirements of customs, immigration, public 
health and agriculture authorities. It provides a frame of reference for 
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planners and managers of international airport operations, describing the 
obligations of the aviation industry as well as the minimum facilities to be 
provided by governments.   
Annex 17 establishes international standards and recommended 
practices for civil aviation aimed at preventing acts of unlawful 
interference. It defines acts of unlawful interference as all those that are 
intended to jeopardise the safety of civil aviation, inter alia: unlawful seizure 
of aircraft in flight or on the ground; hostage taking on board aircraft or 
in aerodromes; introduction on board an aircraft, or at an airport, of 
weapon or hazardous devices or material intended for criminal purposes. 
Based on this, annex 17 prescribes that special attention shall be given to 
flights on their departure and arrival. For example, the Chief of Police 
Operations at the Mavalane Airport in Maputo2 explains that:   
On departure flights, special attention is paid to potentially risky 
passengers who may enter aircraft with prohibited goods; while on arrival 
flights, the focus is shifted to check travellers with irregular visas, who do 
not declare their goods at customs and those who may have endemic 
diseases are checked by the health authorities.  
 
This suggests that the control of the movement of people undergoes 
different levels of security checks. People are checked against state 
security; security of financial sources; security of goods in international 
trade circuits; security against diseases in both transit and receiving 
countries; security of travel documents and other categories of security 
that peoples on the move are subject to undergo. With regard to the 
security of travel documents, the ICAO has devoted a great deal of time 
and resources to developing advanced technology for the issuance and 
control of electronic documents – the MRTDs.    
7.2.1.1 Machine Readable Travel Documents in the context of 
passenger control  
Under the Chicago Convention, the ICAO’s main mandate was to develop 
a standard document – the MRTD – , which would be compatible with 
security features such as durability, data storage, storage capacity, data 
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content and format, optical character recognition capability, biometrics, 
contactless chip technology, and privacy with respect to national laws 
(ICAO, 2007). Initially, ICAO’s development of MRTDs was launched in 
response to weak passport controls, particularly with regard to the 
authenticity of electronic passports. This concern was linked to the rise of 
human migration on a global scale, in the context of both tourism and 
international trade as well as the fear of cross-border criminality associated 
with passport theft.  
 More recently, particularly in the context of the war on terror, “the 
deployment of electronic personal data to classify and govern the 
movement of people across borders has become a key priority” (Amoore, 
2006:341). The ICAO has responded to this challenge by incorporating 
biometrics in travel documents as the single best way to link these 
documents with their rightful holders (ICAO, 2007). In this case, the 
challenge facing the ICAOs was to create a passport that was replicable 
globally but also unique – representing the data of only one bearer (Salter, 
2004). Bio-technology experts proposed risk profiling techniques for 
travellers as a technical solution to governing people’s movement across 
borders (Amoore, 2006).  
In pursuance of this proposal, the ICAO has developed standardised 
requirements3 for document (format and contents) that could facilitate 
international travel as well as enable nations to determine the validity of 
travel documents more quickly. The ICAO’s work has resulted in an 
innovative MRTD – an official document for international travel 
technically referred to as ICAO Doc 9303, which is compatible with 
biometric identification and global interchange using both visual (eye 
readable) and machine readable means (ICAO, 2007). From the 
perspective of document security, the standardised format of the MRTD 
comprises a visual inspection zone containing mandatory and optional 
data elements in a prescribed layout and a machine readable zone (MRZ) 
containing mandatory data elements in a form and position that are 
absolutely mandatory (ICAO, 2006).  
As an innovative document, the MRTD has replaced handwritten 
travel documents (whose information could easily be altered or destroyed) 
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with a standardised data placement and other security features aimed at 
reducing data alteration or counterfeiting, as well as arithmetically derived 
security verifying check digits (ICAO, 2006). With this innovation, all 
ICAO contracting states have been urged to incorporate biometric data in 
their MRTDs and they are also advised to update security features 
regularly in new versions of their travel documents to prevent their misuse 
and to facilitate the detection of cases where such documents have been 
unlawfully altered, replicated or issued (Annex 9, 2005: 15).  
From a technical standpoint, the MRZ contains a digital signature, 
which is readable by a modified Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) – a 
trusted data encryption hierarchy system that helps to ensure privacy, 
security and integrity in the achievement of global interoperability4. Global 
interoperability is achievable when a passenger’s information is captured, 
processed and shared through an integrated circuit technology within all 
ICAO certified states. Authenticity of data encrypted on MRTDs is 
certified by the Public Key Directorate (PKD), an essential component of 
PKI for the checking and validation of digital signatures. The major 
advantages of PKI include the conceding of access to PKD to inspectors 
of e-passports throughout the world and the use of public signing keys to 
validate passports in confidence; preventing people from wrongful2ly 
crossing the border and from wrongfully boarding an airplane (ICAO, 
2006).   
All in all, the ICAO’s efforts in establishing recommended security 
standards and practices for the safety of air transportation has made it the 
creator, monitor and governor of a passport regime in which travel 
documents are used for the control of people’s movements across 
borders, and for the categorisation, tracking and restriction of travellers. 
The passport is the primary identification document by which border 
officials classify the international status of the bearer and decide whether 
he or she is desirable or undesirable to the country of destination (Salter, 
2004). Through the internationalisation of security standards, the ICAO 
has exercised full autonomy and independence in prescribing standards to 
contracting countries, the implementation of which has placed global 
governance in the hands of powerful states that back the creation of these 
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institutions. The following section discusses some of the arrangements 
made by the Mozambican Civil Aviation Institute in order to implement 
the recommended security standards and practices for the safety of air 
transportation.   
7.3 ICAO’s security standards and their impact on 
Mozambican border control reforms     
7.3.1 Security standards for air border control   
Under the Chicago Convention, “contracting states are obliged to develop 
and adopt international standards for customs, immigration, and other 
procedures to facilitate the border-crossing processes involved in 
international air transport” (ICAO, 2007:6). In this regard, the ICAO has 
provided technical assistance to contracting states in establishing and 
implementing their own national civil aviation security programmes, with 
the primary objective of ensuring “the safety of passengers, crew, ground 
personnel and the general public in all matters related to safeguarding 
against acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation” (Annex 17, 
2006:2). 
In response to these mandatory recommendations, a security manager5 
at the National Institute of Civil Aviation of Mozambique (IACM) 
explains that the institute has made some progress towards compliance 
with security and safety measures in aviation transportation. The institute 
has submitted a proposal blue print to the National Assembly on key 
security programmes aimed at improving security practices at all airports. 
From a technical perspective, the security manager explains that the key 
components of civil aviation security encompass training in safety 
measures, quality control (inspections and auditing), preventive actions 
and physical patrol around airport premises. Under the coordination of 
IACM, these programmes will be undertaken by a large team composed 
of the national defence force, the police, managers of airports and 
operators. This multilateral security sector is planned as a response to the 
ICAO’s provision, which reinforces that “each contracting state shall keep 
under constant review the level of threat to civil aviation within its 
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territory, and establish and implement policies and procedures to adjust 
relevant elements of its national civil aviation security programme 
accordingly” (Annex 17, 2006:3). 
Apart from the ICAO’s endeavours to establish the recommended 
security standards and practices to ensure the safety and security of air 
transportation, other organisations such as the World Customs 
Organisation (WCO6), the International Trade Organisation (ITO), the 
UN7 and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO8) have passed 
mandatory security measures with which contracting states are obliged to 
comply.  
For example, in order to be fully compliant with recommended 
practices for sea border security, Mozambique has made efforts ranging 
from the delimitation of sea borders with neighbouring states (Mauritius, 
Madagascar, Seychelles, South Africa, and Tanzania) to the ratification of 
international legal instruments for more reliable and secure borders 
(including ships and port facilities). At the legal level, Mozambique has 
become a contracting state to the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and to the International Code for the security of 
ships and of port facilities by the signing and ratification of resolutions 
25/2004 and 26/2004 of July 14. The Code for security of ships and of 
port facilities is intended to: facilitate access to and assessment of the 
exchange of information related to security threats by appropriate 
contracting governments; prevent unauthorised access to ships, port 
facilities and their restricted areas; prevent the introduction of weapons or 
explosives to ships or port facilities; and master of security plans and 
procedures (Resolution 26/2004). 
Furthermore, SOLAS recommends that “contracting governments 
shall set security levels and ensure the provision of security level 
information to port facilities within the territory, and to ships prior to 
entering or whilst in a port within their territory” (Resolution 
25/2004:262). Under this prescription, contracting states have a duty to 
update their security strategies according to international standards.  
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In the following subsection, the history of Mozambican sea borders is 
provided and security reforms that have been implemented at Port 
Maputo to date are discussed. 
7.3.2 Security reforms for sea border control  
The history of Mozambican sea borders is recent and is still under 
construction. Until recently, sea borders had no legal framework to guide 
their delimitation or demarcation. Such a legal instrument was passed in 
19829 as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). This convention addressed theoretical controversies that had 
until this point dominated the technical discourse of the delimitation of 
the sea and the exploitation of sea resources in a peaceful manner.  
At the one end of spectrum was a group of states in favour of freedom 
of the oceans, allowing any state in the world to navigate and explore 
resources in a free manner. At the other end of spectrum were advocators 
of sustainable use of the sea and its resources. This group advocated 
respect for the jurisdiction and sovereignty of coastal states as well as the 
protection and safeguarding of interests of landlocked states and their 
access to the sea. States embracing the latter philosophy recognised that, 
in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, UNCLOS was 
provided a legal framework for the seas and oceans that would facilitate 
international communication and promote the peaceful use of the seas and 
oceans, the equitable and efficient utilisation of their resources, the 
conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and 
preservation of the marine environment (UNCLOS, 1982). 
UNCLOS has provided guidelines for the delimitation of various 
jurisdictions, including that imposed on the territorial sea between states 
with opposite or adjacent coasts. Member states signing up to the 
convention understood that unclear delimitation of well-resourced border 
areas had pushed states into war and that compliance with these provisions 
would contribute to peace keeping, justice and progress for all peoples of 
the world (Couto, 1988). With the signing of the convention, the 
jurisdiction of the sea was divided into five key areas, namely: the territorial 
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sea10 – article 2; internal waters11 – article 8; the exclusive economic zone12 
– article 55; the continental shelf of a coastal state13 - article 76; high seas14 
– article 86. 
 
Table 7.1  
Sea divided into various legal zones 
Source: http://worldoceanreview.com/en/wor-1/law-of-the-sea/a-constitution-for-the-seas/ 
 
Although UNCLOS has established all procedures for delimitation and 
demarcation of the sea between states, many lack the resources and 
technology to ensure proper monitoring and surveillance of their sea 
borders. In most cases, they reinforce security at departure and arrival 
points. Port Maputo offers an example of security reforms undertaken to 
ensure legitimate trade and security the port premises.  
7.3.2.1 Port Maputo and security reforms 
Port Maputo is situated in the South East African interior as a strategic 
a gateway to international markets. Since the year 2000 it has become a 
busy port with annual volumes of cargo reaching 12 million tons in 2012 
(Leatherbarrow, 2012). Port Maputo handling services have been pressured 
by high demand from China, India and elsewhere for the shipping of 
minerals (coal, ferrochrome, nickel, iron) and other resources, which has 
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presented challenges to port security providers on the one hand, and to 
the customs authorities on the other. In response to this, Port Maputo 
authorities have reinforced security measures for the safety of employees, 
port facilities and ships in accordance with the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code under the ISO 2800015– 700 accreditation. 
In doing so, the Maputo Port security officer observes that “the aim is to 
sustain current standards whilst securing strategies to assure clients and 
their staff that neither personnel nor cargoes will be compromised within 
the boundaries of the port’’ (Leatherbarrow, 2012: 27).  
Port Maputo’s efforts to comply with international security standards 
for sea border protection has been implemented in response to the 
vulnerability of all modes of transportation presented by terrorist 
activities, something which has become a threat to global maritime 
commerce, particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (Frittelli, 
2008). Maritime border protection is given both national security and 
economic security importance by the fact that ships are the primary mode 
of the transportation of cargo globally and that developing international 
security standards for protection of port facilities and ships has become a 
global security imperative (Frittelli, 2008). 
In response to these security imperatives, particularly to provide 
physical protection to Port Maputo, local security authorities have hired 
two security companies, Executive Protection, which renders security at 
the entrance gates to the port buildings, and SPACE, which is responsible 
for the protection of the perimeter of the port through continuous and 
random checks on individuals and vehicles. Protection of the perimeter of 
Port Maputo is a requirement of international security standards aimed at 
preventing terrorists from entering port facilities through adjacent areas 
or in trucks in loading and unloading operations (Frittelli, 2008). To this 
end, SPACE has reinforced security by introducing identification security 
cards for workers and visitors inside the port site.   
As far as the control of passengers travelling by sea is concerned, the 
Chief of Immigration Control Post at Port Maputo16 explains that security 
measures focus solely on the control of sailors and passengers on board 
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cruise ships, given that the number of passenger travelling by sea has 
diminished. In compliance with international security procedures for sea 
transport, he explains that “sea travellers have a unique embarking and 
disembarking point (unless there is an emergent health problem among 
passengers) and a complete registration list of passengers on board is 
submitted in advance by the navigation agent to the Immigration and to 
Customs officers, from which they can proceed with check out”.  
In the control of cargo shipped at Port Maputo, the MRD has been 
adjusting its operations to match the global demand for trusted trade, 
which includes compliance with port-security operations ranging from a) 
selecting of risk ships before they enter the port area; b) cargo information 
handed to a port of destination in advance; c) electronic screening of 
containers to prevent the import/export of prohibited17 goods or 
hazardous substances (Frittelli, 2008).  
In doing so, in partnership with Kudumba18, the MRD established 
integrated technological equipment for border security at Port Maputo in 
2006. On the one hand, a non-intrusive scanning system has been 
introduced to ensure legitimacy and integrity of international trade and to 
speed up cargo flow at Kudumba. On the other hand, the system is 
designed to crack down on terrorist activity and the potential for criminal 
assault on the movement of imports, exports and transit freight 
(Leatherbarrow, 2012). Geoffrey McPherson observes that “cargo is being 
moved more quickly and efficiently than by many other ports in the region 
and the high security standards will augment these performance 
improvements” (Leatherbarrow 2012: 27). For example, a senior officer at 
Port Maputo19 explains that “once the ship has docked at the port, a joint 
team constituted by elements of the Maputo Port Development Company 
(MPDC), intelligence brigade, and customs officers examine the list of 
merchandise on the ship in order to control the introduction of any 
prohibited goods”. He adds that once the verification stage is complete, 
merchandise is submitted to non-intrusive inspection. Also, the deputy 
manager20 of the Maritime Terminal at Maputo explains that “cargo 
control at this terminal is subject to a risk profile check, which consists of 
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getting important information on goods abroad before they are shipped. 
This information is related to the country of origin and routes used by the 
ship”. Based on this information, customs officers are able to categorise 
the risk of the goods concerned. For instance, if a ship departs from 
Angola heading for Colombia, then Brazil, then Durban and finally to 
Maputo, there is high probability that it is involved in drug trafficking. 
Furthermore, risk profiling of goods may be used to ensure legitimate 
trade and also to prevent tax evasion, smuggling and threats of terrorism. 
The Deputy Manager21 of the Maritime Terminal at Maputo explains that 
some importers may declare second-hand clothing while they are in fact 
importing new clothes or even illicit goods such as drugs or weapons. He 
therefore believes that security practices require continuous updating 
because criminals may find new methods to protect their illicit goods from 
security checks. He explains that the Electronic Single Window (ESW)22, 
which has already been introduced, will assist the intelligence sector in 
activating risk profiling on the system and in analysing documents before 
the arrival of goods and in inspecting them physically once they have 
arrived. The Deputy Manager23 believes that ESW system represents the 
most advanced level of the adaptation of MRD to the new trade 
environment.  
7.3.3 Reforms in the Immigration Department 
While the MRD security reforms are focused on the control of cargo in 
the interests of legitimate trade, the Immigration Department has been 
concerned with reforms aimed at controlling entry, stay and departure 
to/from the Republic of Mozambique. From a legal standpoint, migration 
across the Mozambique borders is regulated by the Migration Act 5/93 of 
28 December, which prescribes legal regimes for dealing with foreigners 
(rights, duties and guarantees). The Act is complemented by other legal 
instruments such as Decree 55/2003 of 28 December, which established 
recommended standards required for the facilitation and security of 
passengers travelling on aeroplanes; Decree 13/2008, which has 
introduced biometric passports; Resolution 21/2001 on the abolition of 
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visas in passports among the community of Portuguese language countries 
(CPLP); and the Southern African Community for Development (SADC) 
Protocol on the facilitation of movement of people, approved by heads of 
states in the region on 13/07/2005. These legal instruments have been 
implemented progressively over time as the security situation has 
demanded. In its efforts to comply with the ICAO’s security standards, 
the Mozambican immigration department has become more interested in 
establishing a reliable system to profile travellers’ information. For 
example, the Chief of Immigration at Mavalane Airport states24 that “we 
need to respond efficiently to high immigration flows by implementing 
security standards on issuance, certification, and checks of official travel 
documents in all key entering/exit points”. He adds that since 2007, 
Maputo has become a new destination for many international airline 
companies such as Ethiopian, Kenyan and Qatar airways, which has made 
Mavalane airport very busy. Also, at the domestic level, the Mozambican 
airline (LAM) has established direct flights from Maputo to Pemba and 
Vilankulos airports, which has increased the demands made on staff and 
technology in the drive for improved control of migration flows in the 
country.  
However, Mozambican authorities believe that strict control of 
immigration flows at airports, seaports and official land crossing points is 
still unable to deliver reliable data on actual numbers of immigrants. They 
point to the physical vulnerability of land borders and corruption25 within 
the Immigration Department as the main reasons for this. For example, 
the Immigration Inspector26 at Mavalane Airport observes that “many 
foreign immigrants (particularly those from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Zaire and Rwanda pretending to be refugees and asylum seekers) 
have been able to get national official documents by paying bribes”. 
In order to counteract corruption, the immigration authorities believe 
that the ICAO MRDTs for certification of official travel documents 
should be connected to the Technical Secretariat for Electoral 
Administration (STAE), the National Directorate for Civil Identification, 
the Criminal Police, the National Department for Migration (NDM), the 
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National Institute for Land Transport, Ministry of the Interior, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and the 
Ministry of Justice. The integration of all these departments would reduce 
corrupt practices to since the system is replicable and centralised, offering 
few options for alteration without interface. 
Despite this desire for integration, the Mozambican government has 
not yet integrated its immigration control system into the ICAO’s PKD. 
As a result, the country has followed the practice of handing over 
responsibility for the productions of the state’s official information (such 
as personal identification) to various private companies, which has not as 
yet proved reliable. For example, a private British company (Brithol 
Michicoma) was until recently responsible for printing biometric 
passports, visas and bar codes as well as other official documents. A 
private Belgian company (SEMILEX) has now taken over from this 
company and is also printing IDs, drivers’ licenses and other electronically 
readable identification cards for various Ministries. Against this 
background, the Immigration Inspector at Mavalane Airport27 observes 
that “SEMILEX does not comply with ICAO recommendations for 
placement of biometric data, which distorts the logical structure of 
MRTDs”. He clarifies this by providing the example that when a passport 
number is entered on their system, the name of the holder is not 
recognised, creating a weakness in the control of official travel documents 
at check points.   
Given this evidence, the MID believes that the absence of a reliable 
system of controlling the flow of immigration has exposed the country to 
three categories of risk: risk nationality, risk passports and risk flights. Risk 
nationality is used as a label for foreign immigrants who are most likely to 
be involved in drug trafficking, forging of official travel documents, illegal 
extraction of mineral resources and other transnational offences. In this 
regard, the MID believes that Nigerians, Malians, Pakistanis, Somalis and 
Bengalis pose the greatest risk as immigrants. For instance, “Nigerians 
were the earliest foreigners who were found with forged passports and 
they are well known in the world as risk nationality passengers”28. As a 
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result, most passengers coming from the so called ‘risk countries’ are 
suspected of behaving criminal intentions, which damages their 
relationship with local people and limits their access to public services. 
Suffice it to say that the categorisation of travellers as ‘risk nationalities’ is 
a discourse emanating from the risk-based identification of persons 
crossing international frontiers, which has dominated concerns since the 
launch of biometric border control (Amoore, 2006).   
In the case of the category of risk flights, the term is applied to flights 
that carry passengers who are in irregular situations, particularly those who 
have visas that do not satisfy the travel requirements. Ethiopian airways 
are the most commonly placed in this category. In this regard, the MID 
believes the problem can be related to inadequate technical capacity at 
Mozambican embassies, particularly misinterpretations of the bill of 
foreigners regarding requirements for the issuing of visas29.  
The term ‘risk passports’ refers to passports with ‘low security features’, 
which increases their vulnerability to being forged. The introduction of 
biometric passports in 2010, and with it figures pointing to a significant 
decrease in forged passports, has become a contentious issue. At the one 
end of spectrum, some immigration officers believe that falsification has 
decreased because biometric passports feature more secure items that 
cannot be manually replaced, such as the electronic picture, which was the 
main feature that was falsified on handwritten passports. At the other end 
of spectrum, however, some officers believe that there has been a shift in 
modus operandi in falsification rather than an actual decrease. For 
example, the Chief of the Information Department at the NDM30 notes 
that the falsification of passports has become a networked business, 
involving employees from various sectors. The starting point is the 
falsification of the birth certificate in order to obtain an ID and thereafter 
a passport.  
As falsification of official travel documents and other related crimes 
such as human trafficking have increased, the MID has begun to 
implement various security operations including detailed checking of 
travel documents, regular internal checks of public places, tourist 
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attractions and locations that are suspected of harbouring foreign 
immigrants in irregular situations. These operations are also aimed at 
controlling international financial transactions since terrorist groups are 
always on the lookout for relatively easy ways to fund their activities. The 
Chief of Information in the Department of Immigration31 explains that 
“terrorists are able to explore weaknesses in internal legislation and 
thereby develop economic activities that can raise funds for unlawful 
purposes”. He adds that, according to the actual context of migration 
patterns in Mozambique, the bill of nationality is outdated on issues 
related to citizenship; some Portuguese citizens have been able to claim 
Mozambican citizenship as a result of loopholes in the legislation.  
The evidence above can be interpreted as a major factor in precluding 
effective implementation of international standards for immigration 
control. Mozambique is dominated by particular domestic problems that 
need to be addressed before any international recommendation can be 
implemented. For example, an immigration inspector at Mavalane Airport 
32 explains that “the country needs about 56 USD million to get registered 
into ICAO interoperability system, but there is lack of political 
willingness”. This statement can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, 
registration on the ICAO’s system requires shared technological standards 
to ensure compatibility, which consolidates governance through 
technology that is provided mostly by private actors in coordination with 
super power states. From the standpoint of realists, the ICAO’s standards 
have framed a global governance mechanism that has been created to 
serve the interests of super powers on the one hand, and the providers of 
technical standards on the other (Abbot, 2014; Abbott and Snidal, 1998).  
Secondly, the ICAO’s technological standards are not applicable to 
border problems related to porosity and surveillance facilities that are 
unable to conduct effective monitoring. At some point, western 
technology and standards of border control and migration management 
are meant to respond the movement of people across international 
borders under common principles of control (Abbot, 2014; Parker and 
Vaughan-Williams 2009; Amoore, 2006; Abbott and Snidal, 1998).  
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While the MID has not been successful in implementing MRDTs, the 
Revenue Department’s reform process has led to considerable success, 
particularly in increasing internal tax collection.  
7.3.4 Security reforms in the Mozambique Revenue Department    
The Mozambique Revenue Department (MRD) is divided into two main 
tax sectors: Internal and Customs taxes. Since 1996, these two sectors have 
been undergoing continued institutional and operational reforms assisted 
technically by a British company, Crown Agency. These reforms have 
been undertaken in order to establish modern and efficient services that 
meet international security standards while improving revenue collection 
and facilitating legitimate trade. At the operational level, the MRD wanted 
to prevent the import and export of prohibited goods in order to ensure 
the import and export of goods in accordance with international standards 
as well as to combat corruption within the Customs system (Mosse and 
Cortez, 2006).  
In 2006, the customs department was officially established as the MRD 
under the control of Mozambican managers in accordance with its 
institutional vision33 and mission. In order to achieve its goals, the MRD 
is concerned with increasing the collection of taxes in a sustainable manner 
and in modernising tax administration using advanced technologies. At 
the security level, it is concerned with compliance with the ICAO Annex 
17 security measures and the WCO provisions for legitimate trade. WCO’s 
key interest lies in the establishment of guidelines and tools to assist 
customs officials to master international security standards, rules and 
procedures in order to facilitate the flow of international trade while 
preventing illegal trade.  
In response to this, the MRD has established the Fleet Anti-Terrorism 
Security Team (FAST34) – a security force equipped with high level tactics 
and techniques for the prevention of the entry of harmful goods. The 
Assistant Chief35 of Customs at Mavalane Airport explains that the 
introduction of such security reforms at the airport is aimed at responding 
to large numbers of passengers, flights and new destinations. He adds that 
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“these changes have been more noticed since 1998 when traders have 
encountered relatively large opportunities and low prices in China and 
Dubai”. These flows have also been driven by internal business 
opportunities in general commerce, the tourism industry, the construction 
sector and mining. 
As these transformations have resulted in high volumes of exported 
and imported goods passing through the country’s borders, the MRD has 
introduced electronic luggage checks while at the same time enhancing 
security along the borders and ensuring legitimate trade. Large numbers 
of customs officers have been trained in E-luggage checking36 and in 
tactical response aimed at assisting standing teams at all cargo terminals. 
With regard to the apprehension of prohibited or illegal goods, the Deputy 
Chief of Customs at Mavalane International Airport in Maputo37 explains 
that in the past the situation was worse in that there was a drug-related 
arrest at the airport every day.  
Despite attempts to improve the effectiveness of luggage inspections, 
the Mavalane Airport is facing considerable security constraints, inter alia: 
the main entrance gates to the airport are under the control of a private 
company (G4S38), the personnel of which are regarded as poorly trained 
in the specific tactical responses required in cases of terrorist threat. 
Moreover, police believe that the private security company acts in direct 
opposition to the ICAO’s security practice guidelines, which prescribe that 
“each contracting state shall ensure that the persons implementing security 
control possess all competencies to perform the duties and are 
appropriately trained according to the requirements of the national civil 
aviation security programme and appropriate records are maintained up 
to date” (Annex 17, 2006:3). Although the ICAO prescribes that each 
country shall tailor security standards according to that specific country’s 
security priorities, it is practically impossible to establish different regimes 
of border control (for sea, air and land border), which leads to the general 
enforcement of a ‘global regime’ of border control, regardless of local 
particularities.  
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7.4 Securitisation and overlapping of regimes of border 
control   
Reforms implemented by the Mozambique Immigration and Customs 
Departments and aimed at better control of sea-borders and airports are 
oriented to responding to the globalisation of security threats posed by the 
movements of people and the shipment of cargo. Realistically, these 
practices have been put in place in order to allow the borders of third 
countries to be secured against a non-existent threat/enemy (Guild and 
Bigo, 2010; Nessel, 2008; Bigo, 2007).  
 From the perspective of securitisation theory, using the borders of 
third countries as buffer zones against constructed security threats has led 
to an overlap between international and local regimes of border controls, 
and of perceptions of cross-border threats. Chapter 2 has revealed that the 
need to enhance security of EU external borders has created the 
perception that asylum seekers and refugees pose major security threats 
and should be stopped from entering third countries (Léonard, 2010; 
Nessel, 2008). Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have illustrated that Mozambique and 
its neighbouring countries are characterised by socio-economic and ethno-
cultural dynamics that make both state-centric and international border 
governance incongruent in the day-to-day dynamics of cross-border 
regions.  
 In this chapter, it has been made evident that Mozambique’s adherence 
to the international technologies of border governance has turned the 
country into a recipient of regimes of border control that are geared to the 
frame or perception that the main threat is that posed by transnational 
criminal groups, and particularly terrorists. Electronic luggage checking, 
biometric passports, the single electronic window are examples of how 
Mozambique has introduced an international regime of border control, 
particular on sea-borders and in airports. 
 Sea-borders and airports are interconnected by a truncated system in 
which the implementation of common procedures for passport and 
luggage checks is relatively achievable. By contrast, cross-border regions 
in Mozambique and in Southern Africa as whole are characterised by 
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diversified natural landscapes (forests, mountains and rivers) and 
communities that are scattered over different locations as a result of access 
to livelihoods. This demands a model of border governance that is capable 
of balancing local realities with international interests. 
Regardless of these distinctions, evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests that Mozambique’s efforts in implementing an internationalised 
model of border governance have reinforced national security-driven 
border controls against external threats. For example, unauthorised 
immigrants are perceived as threats to the country’s economy and public 
security, which is the same discourse that led to restrictive borders in the 
West. This means that localised perspectives of cross-border controls, 
especially at land borders, may be neglected or displaced by these 
internationalised and more securitised models of border governance.  
7.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the impact of international security standards 
for migration management and border control on Mozambique. In the 
case of Mozambique, Immigration and Customs Departments have 
implemented reforms aimed at matching international security 
established by the ICAO and WCO. As is the case in many other third 
world countries, Mozambique has encountered financial problems in 
implementing those reforms (particularly in the case of the Immigration 
Department and Border Police). Despite financial constraints on major 
reforms, the Immigration Department has introduced biometric 
passports, but as a result of a failure to comply with recommended 
standards for the interoperability of data, Mozambique is not yet 
considered a secure transit country in accordance with the ICAOS’s 
recommendations.   
 Thus, the chapter finds that Mozambique border control strategies are 
influenced to a great extent by international security norms that have an 
active focus on seaports and airports. Since the end of the Cold War, 
developed countries, especially the US and EU, have been relying on 
international security standards for migration management and border 
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control, which has brought with it the involvement of international 
security institutions as providers of technologies for border governance 
into the domestic institutions of border governance in Mozambique. As 
international institutions have developed and updated recommended 
security standards aimed at establishing common procedures for better 
control of travellers and goods worldwide, the cost of maintaining 
international standards has risen, and attention and resources for 
alternative border control regimes have shrunk.  
  In the current scenario, international technologies of border 
governance, coupled with state-centric border controls in Mozambique, 
contribute to criminalising everyday and economic cross-border 
interactions, as three distinct case studies of cross-border areas have 
illustrated. The international model of border governance should not lead 
to the neglect of other kinds of cross-border dynamics and regimes. 
Mozambique’s government may even need to affirm the value and 
usefulness of ‘simplified’ regimes of control in cross-border areas, 
perhaps in the context of agreements within Southern Africa generally. 
Based on this concern, the following chapter examines how the socio-
economic and ethno-cultural dynamics in cross-border regions have been 
taken into account in ongoing regional integration in SADC. As has been 
suggested in previous chapters, the prototypical international security 
standards derived from Western-driven security concerns certainly 
cannot be applied as a model of border control in the Southern African 
region. The chapter now discusses how SADC could move beyond its 
present state-centric approach towards a border governance system that 
balances national security interests of SADC member states with the 
needs and priorities of local cross-border communities, such as those 
examined in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
Notes 
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1 AVSEC was developed by the ICAO in collaboration with the John Molson 
School of Business at Concordia University in 2004. Its aim is to provide 
aviation security middle and senior management personnel with new 
management skills and a greater understanding of the application of standards 
and recommended practices contained in Annex 17. The unique skills and 
understanding have become mandatory in dealing with emerging threats to 
civil aviation worldwide.  
2 Interviewed on 27 October 2012 in Maputo 
3 These requirements comprise the compatibility with travel document issuance 
and renewal; compatibility with machine assisted identity verification and 
inspection processes; redundancy of the biometric and its capture process; 
storage requirements and performance. Of those compatibility factors, the face 
came out on top with an 85% compatibility rating while finger and iris came 
identification was in the second position with a 60–65% compatibility rating. 
Face was determined to be the primary biometric mandatory feature for global 
interoperability. 
4 Global interoperability is an inspection system (either manual or automated) 
in different states throughout the world, capable of exchanging and processing  
data received from systems in other states, and utilising that data in inspection 
operations in the respective states.  
5 Technician for Facilitation and Security at the National Institute of Civil 
Aviation of Mozambique interviewed on 30 October 2012, in Maputo. 
6 The main contribution made by the WCO to counterterrorism at sea 
comprises the development of security measures while ensuring international 
trade supply. These measures are intended to provide a methodology for 
identifying in advance high-risk consignments carried on ships, providing a 
secure environment for maritime trade and facilitating legitimate cargoes 
being carried on those ships. This package of security measures has the 
potential to contribute to the early warning mechanisms and to protect port 
facilities, staff and ships against terrorist activities. 
7 The UN Security Council Resolution of 2003 places great emphasis on the 
growing danger of terrorist access to and use of nuclear, chemical, biological 
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and other potentially deadly materials and the consequent need to strengthen 
controls on these materials is emphasised. Customs administrations have a 
key role to play in the prevention, detection and investigation of such offences 
and, even though currently the powers of Customs in relation to these issues 
may vary from country to country, their potential future role should be 
recognised as part of national government’s response to terrorism. 
8 The purpose of the Organisation is to provide machinery for cooperation 
among governments in the field of governmental regulation and practices 
relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged with 
international trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the 
highest practicable standards in matters concerning safety at sea, efficiency of 
navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships. 
9 The Convention on the law of the sea and borders establishes methods for 
delimitating baselines and the territorial sea between states with opposite 
coasts as well as key concepts of sea borders. These key concepts include the 
continental sea; internal waters; straight baselines; territorial; sea; the 
contiguous zone; and the continental shelf.  
10 Territorial sea refers to a space beyond its land territory and internal waters 
and, in the case of an archipelagic state, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent 
belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. 
11 Internal waters are those on the inland side of the baseline of the territorial 
sea. The normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the 
low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially 
recognised by the coastal state (UNCLOS, 1982).  
12 The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial 
sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this part under which the 
rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state and the rights and freedoms of other 
states are governed by the relevant provisions of the Convention. 
13 The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and the subsoil 
of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the 
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental 
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, where the outer edge of the 
continental margin does not extend for that distance. The seabed outside 
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national jurisdiction constitutes the common heritage belonging to the 
peoples of the earth (Couto, 1988). 
14 High seas refer to all parts of the sea that are not included in the economic 
exclusive zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state, or in the 
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state. 
15 ISO 28000 is a supply chain security management system that protects a 
company’s goods from point of manufacturing to point of sale. It reduces 
opportunities for criminal elements to infiltrate the company’s supply chain. 
WCO argues that supply chain security management is vital for the 
establishment of early warning systems to protect borders against dangerous 
or harmful cargoes arriving, departing or moving through state territories. 
16 Interviewed on 18 October 2012 in Maputo City. 
17 These goods are defined in Annex to the Decree 34/2009 of July 6.. They 
entail all goods with counterfeit trademarks or false origin as such as: books, 
artistic works, CDs, and other counterfeit publications; hospital medicines 
and foodstuffs harmful to public health; narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances, except when imported for hospital use; distilled alcoholic 
beverages containing essences or chemicals recognised as harmful, such as 
wormwood, benzoic aldehyde, hyssop, and other items specified by special 
legislation. 
18 KUDUMBA is a Belgian company that is responsible for installing and 
providing technical assistance using non-intrusive scanners in Mozambique. 
19 Interviewed on 7 November 2013 at Port Maputo. 
20 Interviewed on 6 November 2012. 
21Interviewed on 6 November 2012. 
22 Electronic single window is a system that uses integrated tools adapted to 
any system used in the international system and constitutes a complete 
solution to trade facilitation, especially for the clearance of goods and their 
monitoring by customs. It consists of two computer systems that 
communicate with each other, the Customs Management System for 
Customs Processes for the exclusive use of customs and the Trade Net, which 
is a computer platform designed to enable interconnection and exchange of 
information with all users of customs procedures such as customs agents, 
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shipping companies, port operators, freight terminals, commercial banks and 
other entities involved in the process of customs clearance. With this 
integrated system, user information is introduced only once and all entities 
have access to it. Responses related to that information will be sent 
automatically and simultaneously. 
23Interviewed on 6h November 2012. 
24 Interviewed in October 2012. 
25 Although the frequent cases are related to the issuance of false passports or 
residence permits, from observations I made at Mavalane Airport on 17 
October 2013 between 10h00–14h00, I noticed that some passengers who had 
arrived on the same flight were sent back while others were left in a small 
lounge from which, after bogus bargaining and phone calls, they were allowed 
to enter the country. 
26 Interviewed in October 2012. 
27 Interviewed on 17 October 2013 in Maputo City.  
28 The immigration inspector at Mavalane International Airport interviewed in 
October 2012 in Maputo. 
29 Chapter 5, number 2 of bills relating to foreigners establish different  visa 
categories, namely: Student visa; Business visa; Work visa; Transit visa; Tourist 
Visa; Residence visa; Visitor visa. 
30Interviewed on 18 October 2012 in Maputo City. 
31Interviewed on 18 October 2012 in Maputo City. 
32 Interviewed in October 2012. 
33 The MRD’s institutional vision is to become a national and international 
reference in the provision of quality services, collecting revenue and in the 
promotion and protection of the economy and society. The mission is 
concerned with the collection of revenue to fund public activities, the 
promotion of effectiveness, efficiency and fairness in the application of tax 
policies, including customs, the ensuring of greater convenience to taxpayers in 
the fulfilment of their duties as well as the protection of the economy and 
society. 
34 Originally, FAST was the US Marine company that was established in 1987. 
Its aim was to perform security missions such as combating operations and 
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other military operations aimed at protecting military cargo ships (Thornton, 
2005).  
35 Assistant Chief of Customs at Mavalane International Airport, interviewed 
on 17 October 2012 in Maputo City. 
36E-luggage checking is done using scanners that allow customs officials to 
make rapid luggage checks without opening suitcases and other containers. 
Currently, these facilities are in operation at Maputo and Pemba airports as 
well as at Maputo, Beira and Nacala ports. 
37Interviewed on 17 October 2012 in Maputo City. 
38 GG4S is a multinational security services company founded originally in 
Copenhagen in 1901. It started operating worldwide in 2004 when four 
security companies (from Great Britain and Copenhagen) merged. G4S 
currently has its headquarters in Crawley, United Kingdom.  
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8 
Rethinking cross-border regions in 
Mozambique in the context of SADC 
integration   
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the impact of the international model of 
border governance on domestic policies of border control in 
Mozambique. Prior to that, in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, three cross-border case 
studies were examined for lessons on how migration governance and 
border controls in Mozambique might be understood and even improved. 
The main discussions in these chapters will be presented here in the form 
of an integrated discussion on the various border regimes that have been 
analysed, and the differences in perceptions of the border held by local 
people and officials. Differences between the three areas, airport and port 
regimes, and central and local officials will also be discussed.  
 In Chapter 4 it was pointed out that, given the international nature of 
flows across the Ressano Garcia-Lebombo border, Mozambique and 
South Africa can address the conflicts between the local communities and 
border authorities only by establishing mechanisms for cooperation that 
will balance both the needs of local populations and the state’s security 
concerns. Chapter 5 revealed that the Machipanda-Mutare cross-border 
region has long standing chains of informal trade exchanges that could 
lead the neigbouring states to establish a transition zone aimed at 
strengthening trade exchange and promoting the development of 
communities on both sides of the border. In Chapter 6 it emerged that, 
given land-driven interaction between communities in the Mandimba-
Mangochi cross-border region, Mozambique and Malawi could make a 
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remarkable contribution to management of cross-border resources by 
establishing the co-management of land in order to address the food 
insecurity faced by local communities. Such co-management initiatives 
would be substantially different from Peace Parks, which are established 
under the guise of the global regime for environmental management and 
which have presented obstacles to local communities’ access to livelihoods 
and their development of husbandry.   
 Given these differing contexts, this chapter examines the regional 
institutions and processes of SADC integration in relation to migration 
governance and concepts of security. The second half of the chapter 
reflects on the extent to which Mozambican border officials and 
government institutions are able to integrate cross-border socio-economic 
and ethno-cultural dynamics into their working practices, especially in the 
context of wider debates on border governance and regional integration 
in SADC. Are more conventional security priorities – such as those 
identified in Chapter 7 – still overriding considerations of inter-country 
mobility for migrants? Essentially, this chapter reflects on how the kinds 
of cross-border dynamics already identified in the case studies relate to 
cross-border dynamics as understood from the perspective of SADC 
regional integration and security. It does so by examining the interface 
between wider regional integration frameworks and national contexts of 
border crossings. The analysis in this chapter will integrate the discussion 
of SADC’s concept of security throughout, reflecting on how regional, 
national and local realities of border crossings in Mozambique differ and 
overlap.    
8.2 Interrogating SADC’s rationale for a security community  
Historically, SADC was crafted from its predecessor – the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which was established 
in 1980 (in Lusaka, Zambia) as a political and economic structure aimed at 
opposing apartheid and colonial dominance in the Southern African region 
(Schoeman, 2002; Evans, 1986). As a political organisation, SADCC was 
established as a defensive mechanism against the ideological and military 
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domination of apartheid. As an economic organisation, it was created to 
reduce economic dependence on and vulnerability to South Africa and 
thereby to promote development in the region (Schoeman, 2002). 
 However, SADCC member states failed to establish a synergy in 
economic development that was able to reduce dependence on South 
Africa, which led to the establishment of SADC in 1992 (Schoeman, 2002; 
Nathan, 2012). In contrast to SADCC, SADC was created as an 
economically oriented organisation aimed at achieving economic 
liberalisation, regional integration and a security community (Schoeman, 
2002). Its scope of cooperation encompasses a broad array of areas ranging 
from food security, land and agriculture; infrastructure and services; 
industry, trade, investment and finance; human resources development, 
science and technology; natural resources and the environment; social 
welfare, information and culture; politics, diplomacy, international relations, 
peace and security (Malan and Cilliers, 1997; Hammerstad, 2005).  
Notwithstanding this broad range of areas of cooperation among 
SADC member states, the concept of a security community remains open 
to question. Neither is it clear how security cooperation will be undertaken 
nor how SADC will provide human security for people in the wider 
Southern African region (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006). To some extent, 
experience of protracted conflicts in the region and mistrust among states 
has resulted in the concept of a security community taking on a military 
bias, implying that human security is a strictly secondary consideration 
(Nathan, 2012; Du Pisani, 2010).  
Thus, the Protocol on Politics, Defence, Security Cooperation1 
(PPDSC) of 2001 and the Mutual Defence Pact2 (MDP) of 2003 create the 
concept of a security community based on the possibility of violence 
within and between states as a fundamental factor threatening peoples’ 
security (Nathan, 2012). The preambles of both the PPDSC and the MDP 
highlight the commitment of SADC heads of state to the principles of 
strict respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, 
good neighbourliness, interdependence, non-aggression and non-
interference in internal affairs of other states. Moreover, article 2 (a) of the 
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PPDSC provides that the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security 
(OPDS), created in 1996, is concerned to protect “people and safeguard 
the development of the region against instability from the breakdown of 
law and order […]”. The implication of this quotation is that the security 
of people in the SADC community is understood to be threatened by the 
breakdown of law and order and by internal conflicts or conflicts between 
states, and not by a failure of ‘human security’ or excessively stringent 
border controls, for instance. In the context of inter-state conflicts, the 
preamble of the PPDSC emphasises the need for respect for states’ 
borders.   
SADC’S reference to a military-oriented security community derives 
from experiences of war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the 
civil war in Angola, which ended in 2002, the electoral violence in Lesotho 
in 1988, in Malawi in 1999, in Zimbabwe since 2000, and also the 
constitutional crisis in Zambia in 2001 (Laakso, 2005). As a result, the 
OPDS has been focusing its activities on key sensitive areas such as 
military/defence, crime prevention and foreign policy, security and 
intelligence, and political affairs (Cilliers, 1996).   
At the defence level, OPDS values include the protection of people 
from inter-state and intrastate conflicts as well as aggression; development 
of a collective security capacity for peace making and peacekeeping, which 
implies promoting the interoperability of military equipment and joint 
multinational exercises for enhancing peace and security in the region 
(Ngoma, 2003).  
At the level of crime prevention and foreign policy, the Organ is 
concerned with institutional cooperation in law enforcement 
(immigration, customs, and border police), the promotion of common 
political value systems and institutions to prevent cross-border crime 
(which brought about the launch of the Southern African Regional Police 
Chiefs Cooperation Organisation – SARPCCO). In the security and 
intelligence domains, the OPDS is concerned with the establishment of 
early warnings, cooperation on transnational crime, terrorism, food 
security, protection of maritime resources, and harmonisation of 
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intelligence systems; promotion of cooperation and common political 
value systems (Cilliers, 1996).  
In the political domain, the Organ seeks to build nation-states in the 
region in tandem with the process of building an accountable community; 
consultations intended to improve a democratic culture (this includes 
democratic elections), good political cooperation, and mediation of 
conflicts and disputes. Given the prevailing militarily-oriented concept of 
security, the embodiment of a human-oriented concept remains absent in 
the SADC region. In the context of post-colonial African borders, a clear 
distinction needs to be established between integration as an 
economically-oriented reality and cooperation as a more security-driven 
challenge in the region. 
8.3 Economic integration and security cooperation 
Since the inception of the African Union (AU) in 2002, the concept of 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs3) as crucial regional mechanisms 
for conflict prevention, management, and resolution has gained 
momentum (Lunegelo and Mbilinyi, 2009). 
 While the AU has been making efforts to establish RECs, regional 
member states have seen security and economic integration as complex 
and juxtaposed realities. As a result, the mainstream idea is that integration 
starts with economic and cultural cooperation and proceeds to political 
and security cooperation on the grounds that a security community can 
only be created if there is confidence, shared values and material interests 
in common between concerned states (Laakso, 2005). As far as the 
literature is concerned, security cooperation among developing countries 
needs to be defined in the particular regional context (Du Pisani, 2010; 
23). In the context of SADC, security experts understand that there is a 
lack of capacity to monitor the implementation of joint agreements, which 
reinforces the idea that regional security cooperation can only be attained 
after recognising the principles of state sovereignty, strong confidence and 
shared values among intra-regional member states (Laakso, 2005).  
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 In SADC, the OPDS was established as a platform from which to 
harmonise individual state values towards the attainment of a security 
community in the region (Hammerstad, 2003). However, several concerns 
have been raised regarding its functioning mechanisms in the region. 
Firstly, SADC lacks a parliament and the Organ operates at summit level 
(through cooperative arrangements to address all issues related to peace, 
stability and democracy), which leaves the feasibility of its function open 
to question (Cilliers, 1996). Moreover, the SADC parliament forum lacks 
authority to formulate binding policies as it operates at observation and 
monitoring levels with biannual meetings; this results in negative 
sentiments among members about the contribution of the OPDS to peace 
in the long term (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001). 
Secondly, scholars believe that it is difficult to hold political leaders 
accountable since they seem to be pursuing interests other than those 
concerning the attainment of a security community. Put differently, many 
regional projects in Africa have failed in their implementation stages 
because the elites in charge have not gained any private benefit, which 
leads to their losing interest (Söderbaum and Taylor, 2008). Most meetings 
held by SADC heads of governments are referred to as clubs of dictators 
plagued by the politics of greed, which has resulted in intense pressure to 
allow a greater degree of transparency, freedom and democracy in their 
countries in a move towards preventive diplomacy and conflict 
management in the region (Cilliers, 1996; Ngoma, 2003).  
Thirdly, at operational level, SADC states have been reluctant to 
allocate the Organ to a single country due to the sensitivity of the issues it 
deals with and political implications of military, intelligence, and early 
warning affairs, the consequences of which encompass a lack of shared 
perceptions of threats to security and tenuous political links between 
countries (Ngoma, 2003). There was a general perception that South 
Africa would play a dominant role in the development of collective 
security capacity through partnerships for the training of standby forces 
for peacekeeping missions, and this is seen by the majority of member 
states as a transfer of sovereignty outside the sub-region (Ngoma, 2003).  
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Based on the assumptions mentioned above, researchers believe that 
SADC states are not yet ready to embark on security integration projects 
because of persistent mutual mistrust (Hammerstad, 2003). As far as the 
PPDSC is concerned, however, SADC member states have committed 
themselves to building a security community based on sovereignty-
oriented cooperation to prevent border crime, interstate conflicts, and 
external aggression (Malan, 1998). As the main concern regarding the 
borders between states is crime prevention, SADC efforts have resulted 
in the establishment of SARPCCO – a regional police organisation 
designed to fight cross-border crime.  
8.4 Efforts towards regional security cooperation      
The Treaty of SADC establishes (in article 21) different areas of 
cooperation among member states. One of these arear is cooperation in 
politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace, and security in order to 
promote and defend peace and security. Since the inception of SADC, 
member states have raised concerns about rampant cross-border crime 
and its trends in the region (Gastrow and Mosse, 2002; Gastrow, 2001). 
In response to cross-border crime, SADC members have committed 
themselves to establishing SARPCCO (in 1995 in Harare). SARPCCO’s 
objectives are to promote, strengthen and perpetuate cooperation and 
foster joint strategies for the management of all forms of cross-border 
crimes with regional implications; to prepare and disseminate relevant 
information on criminal activities in the region; to undertake regular 
reviews of joint crime management strategies in view of changing national 
and regional needs and priorities; to make relevant recommendations to 
governments of member countries in relation to matters affecting 
effective policing in the Southern African region.  
 The need to reinforce cooperation in dealing with cross-border crime 
has been reinforced by the African Union Executive Council. As Spaan 
and van Moppes (2006:3-4) point out, “…several African governments 
and the African Union have acknowledged the importance of migration 
for their countries, and have recognised that migration and development 
 Rethinking cross-border regions in Mozambique in the context of SADC integration 
191 
 
are interlinked processes”. Based on this, Executive Council of the AU 
recognises that there is a need for a well-managed migration, one that 
should create development opportunities for people of adjacent countries 
within regional communities (African Union Conference, 2007). In line 
with this, the Executive Council of the AU has acknowledged that 
“combating irregular migration and establishing a comprehensive 
migration management system can contribute to enhancing national and 
international security and stability” (van and Moppes, 2006:6). These 
assumptions can be interpreted from two different angles. Firstly, regional 
states need to establish integration initiatives aimed at bringing 
development to their people, which reinforces the need for greater 
consideration of intra-regional migration (as discussed in Chapter 4). 
Secondly, enhancing national and international stability through border 
control reinforces the idea that people on the move represent the major 
threat to insecurity, which has resulted in different regimes of border 
control, particularly in western countries (Bosworth and Guild, 2008). For 
example, the EU has been reinforcing border control through 
FRONTEX, which involves extensive cooperation with European 
countries external borders4 (Neal, 2009; Léonard, 2010).  
In the case of SADC, the need for police cooperation was raised when 
there was a belief that the Southern African region remained a relative low 
risk point for organised criminal groups who had been able to establish 
better cooperation links than the police themselves (Van der Spuy, 2009). 
Since then, the bottom line has become to increase police cooperation in 
order to respond to organised crime that has gone regional (Gastrow, 
2001). In cooperation with INTERPOL5, SARPCCO’s main priorities are 
motor vehicle thefts, drug trafficking, economic and commercial crimes; 
trafficking, terrorism, unauthorised migration, and stolen and lost travel 
documents as fundamental challenges to good governance, democratic 
policing, and peace keeping (Van der Spuy, 2008). 
In pursuance of its mission, SARPCCO has begun to undertake several 
joint operations (particularly surveillance) aimed at stopping cross-border 
crime, particularly motor vehicle theft and smuggling (Mills, 1995). For 
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example, in 1997, police officers from South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique and Zambia undertook a ‘Voyager 4’ operation, which 
resulted in the recovery of 1576 stolen motor vehicles and the arrest of 
147 suspects (Gastrow, 2001).Regional police have continued to 
undertake further joint operations targeting stolen motor vehicles, such as 
Atlantic6 and Midas7 (1998), Sesani8 (1999), and Makhule (2002). In 
tandem with these operations, SARPCCO introduced a Motor Vehicle 
Clearance Certificate in 2000 in an effort to stop cross-border motor 
vehicle theft (Van der Spuy, 2009; Gastrow, 2001).  
In the matter of the trafficking of firearms, SADC adopted the 
Protocol on the control of firearms, ammunition and other related 
materials in 2001, from which SARPCCO drafted a Plan of Actions aimed 
at combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the 
region. This plan resulted in the training of regional police officers in 
destruction of illegal weapons and field operations such as Operation 
Rachel (Van der Spuy, 2009). The region has also been concerned with 
raising awareness of drug crime trends and demand-supply chains as well 
as implementing training programmes in how to deal with drug 
interdictions (Van der Spuy, 2009). In addition, SARPCCO has raised 
concerns about the policing of financial and economic crimes, particularly 
intensified responses to terror activities around the world. In doing so, the 
organisation has established financial intelligence units in the region, 
partially as a response to United Nations Resolution 1373 (Van der Spuy, 
2009). As far as good governance and democratic policing are concerned, 
regional police have implemented several reforms in an effort to make 
policing more humane and effective. In order to achieve this aim, 
SARPCCO has adopted a code of conduct, which provides standard 
values and principles of conduct for police officers in the region. Inter alia, 
the code emphasises respect for human rights (this includes the 
prohibition and prevention of torture), respect for the rule of law and the 
use of minimum force. Apart from these codified values and principles for 
police officers in the region, SARPCCO has delivered standardised 
training programmes on violence against women and children aimed at 
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ensuring effective responses to such cases of violence (Van der Spuy, 
2009).    
SADC states have different interpretations of the roots causes of 
unauthorised migration, which has made it difficult to harmonise 
strategies for cross-border cooperation. Different interpretations of 
human migration have prevented a common approach to border 
management in the region (Van der Spuy, 2009). For example, South 
Africa has been redeploying the military to increase surveillance and patrol 
operations along the border with Mozambique with the purpose of 
preventing the poaching of rhinos in the Kruger National Park, smuggling, 
stock theft and unauthorised migration along the border.     
As far as peace-keeping cooperation is concerned, SADC member 
states envisage the continuous development of the capacity of peace-
keeping missions in the regional training centre in Zimbabwe. As 
SARPCCO has been established in tandem with INTERPOL’s 
cooperation needs, training in peace-keeping missions is seen as an 
opportunity to exchange security expertise and police intelligence. For 
instance, in preparation for the FIFA soccer World cup in 2010, South 
Africa gained valuable experience in the policing of big events and soccer 
hooligans, as well as training from the FBI on tackling terrorism and 
money laundering (Van der Spuy, 2009).  
 Regardless of these advantages, SADC members remain concerned 
about joint peace-keeping operations on the grounds that training 
programmes are run by NGOs; this is perceived as a threat to ‘regional’ 
sovereignty (Ngoma, 2003; Van Nieuwkerk, 2001). To some extent, the 
SADC cooperation process is evolving from the need to fulfil 
international requirements for economic and security cooperation. 
However, the three case studies presented in this thesis (Chapters 5, 6, and 
7) reflect different local contexts and dynamics in the border regions that 
could lead to a (re)framing of the concept of a security community in the 
process of regional integration. In the following section, experiences of 
the Mozambique border police in the border regions and the challenges 
they are faced with are discussed.   
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8.5 Border control regimes in SADC   
As is the case in many RECs in worldwide, integration initiatives focus on 
economic transactions while restricting the movement of persons 
(Léonard, 2010; Adamson, 2006; Andreas, 2003a). In the context of 
SADC, the protocol on the free movement of peoples was benchmarked 
on the European model, which motivated its rejection owing to 
incongruences with prevailing sovereignty-driven border control 
(Vigneswaran, 2013; Crush, 1999). As Crush and Dodson (2007:449) point 
out, “the response to the protocol was swift and immediately, South Africa 
vociferously declared its opposition and found allies in Botswana and 
Namibia”. South Africa and its allies wanted to hold the right to determine 
who should cross their borders before taking such a major step. Moreover, 
South Africa was solely concerned with free trade, which is why it 
encouraged others to stop the implementation of the protocol 
(Trimikliniotis et al., 2008).  
One of the main reasons for the rejection of the protocol on the ”free 
movement of peoples” is that regional integration needs to follow its own 
patterns much as the European Union is an exception to be implemented 
in the SADC region (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; Crush and Dodson, 
2007). For example, the National Commander of the MBP9 understands 
that the “African concept of border is incomplete and unique. It is 
incomplete given the emerging focus on natural resources, which leads to 
new geopolitical tensions between countries”. He explains that in the 
SADC region, South Africa claims the right to possession of the 
Mozambican region of Ponta D’ Ouro while Swaziland claims possession 
of the totality of Maputo Province. This illustrates how the African 
context of border remains unstable regardless of official state borders 
recognised under the sacrosanct10 principle adopted in Cairo (Egypt) in 
1964.  
As a unique concept, African borders are deeply grounded on the ideas 
of sovereignty, territory and population as the building blocks of the 
political power of the state (which cannot be discussed in more integrated 
manner between countries). Furthermore, the National Commander of 
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the MBP explains that “from the meetings we have with border authorities 
of neighbouring countries, there are different interests over the border, 
whose impact is a lack of compliance with existing bilateral agreements”. 
As a result, each SADC member state has been developing its own 
policing strategies and adopting its own patrol methods, regardless of the 
impact on diplomatic relations and local communities. The Tanzanian 
border, for instance, is patrolled by militias; Mozambique has police 
border patrollers; while Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Malawi use police and 
military units to patrol the border. South Africa has been relying on the 
national defence force to patrol its borders with neighbouring states, 
particularly with the increase in poaching in the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park (in Mpumalanga Province – border with Mozambique).  
However, the National Commander of the MBP explains that in most 
cases, South Africa undertakes these operations unilaterally, which has 
resulted in a break in regional agreements, particularly the SARPCOO 
code of conduct that establishes standards for democratic policing and 
respect for human rights. The literature reveals that the militarisation of 
borders is referred to as practices of securitisation, which consist of 
turning actions that were used to fight traditional security threats (from 
third counties) to use in preventing the movements of asylum seekers, 
refugees and other desperate persons (Léonard, 2010). Despite the 
negative social impact of regime-based border control on human life, 
border authorities in neighbouring states are reluctant to openly consider 
security concerns from the perspective of cross-border communities on 
the grounds that integrated regionalism will not necessarily benefit all 
participants, and could instead open the way to asymmetrical relations and 
create imbalances within society across geographical spaces (Söderbaum 
and Taylor, 2008: 23).  
In the context of this evidence, SADC will continue to give priority to 
sovereignty-driven border control, with a particular focus on what and 
how to train border police to meet national-security strategies (Gavrilis, 
2008; Crush and Dodson, 2007). A point of reflection regarding regional 
integration in SADC is that border regions have not yet become spaces of 
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contact and interaction in a move towards rapid and accelerated socio-
economic development; rather, communities in the border regions lack 
socio-economic services fundamental to their survival. In the following 
section, an analysis is provided of some of development programmes that 
have been implemented by the Republic of Mozambique since 2000, 
aimed at improving various priority sectors. The key argument in this 
section is that Mozambique’s development strategies lack specifications 
on development in border regions, although regional economic 
development is a prevailing mantra.  
8.6 Rethinking border governance from within: local 
communities and border officials   
In 2007 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, African heads of state recognised the 
need to address resources-driven border conflicts and adopt integration 
initiatives to bring development to people in contiguous borders. Their 
key argument was that “by transcending the border as barrier and 
promoting it as bridge linking one state to another, Africa can boost the 
ongoing effort to integrate the continent socio-economically, to 
strengthen its unity, and promote peace, security and stability through the 
structural prevention of conflicts” (African Union Declaration, 2007:1). 
This statement suggests that African borders can be understood as barriers 
as a result of practices of border control that are sovereignty-driven, which 
in turn hampers socio-economic and cultural interaction between peoples 
in cross-border regions. It is worth highlighting that the concerns felt by 
African heads of state about regional integration underpin the assumption 
that “the greater the difference between the economies on either side of a 
border, the greater the scope for activities such as illegal trafficking” 
(O’Dowd, 2002:25). 
 Despite compelling arguments for regional integration, specific 
development strategies reflecting socio-economic differences between 
border regions are still lacking. For example, the Ressano Garcia, 
Machipanda and Mandimba case studies reveal similar and distinctive 
factors of interaction (see Table 1.1) that can be interpreted from two 
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perspectives. Ethnic, socio-linguistic and economic factors are 
determinants of interaction in the context of day-to-day border crossing, 
but states’ responses to these convergent factors differ depending on their 
approach to the border in question. Two examples are presented below:    
 Example one – a resident in Chizipa border community11 (in 
Machipanda border region) states that “when border police came in this 
region, they have occupied our land and we cannot crop, hunt, or getting 
fire wood in areas where we have been using for years. We now face a 
total restriction imposed by the Mozambican border police.”12 This 
example reflects a situation where state decisions are implemented without 
taking into account local contexts. The MBP Provision guide establishes 
inter alia that no construction shall be undertaken within the restricted 
border zone; no fishing or hunting activities shall be undertaken; and if 
they are authorised, non-residents shall enter and exit this zone through 
official ports of entry with their official travel documents. The difficulty 
lies in the fact that interdicted border zones were established in 
communities that had long been settled in those areas, with strong patterns 
of informal trade and human movement back and forth across the 
borders. 
Example two – after the reaffirmation of the Mozambique-Malawi 
border in 2010, most Malawian citizens in the Mponda/Katur cross-
border region decided to obtain Mozambican nationality, thereby 
acquiring or retaining the right to access arable land. This example reveals 
that the identity of people is not solely linked to the political ‘mantra’ of 
national unity but that people tend to identify themselves with what 
satisfies their daily needs. This illustrates how the meaning of the border 
can be influenced by border governance arrangements on both sides, and 
how movement reflects the strictness or laxness of border governance on 
either side. A sense of belonging is not based solely on national identity, 
but on the pragmatic, material considerations of those living in cross-
border areas. The question of identity is not discussed in detail in this 
thesis, but it is important and is returned to in the concluding chapter.  
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Example three – In the Ressano Garcia cross-border region, local 
communities and some border officials suggest that there is a need for 
collaborative initiatives that would promote the participation of local 
communities in cross-border areas in finding their own solutions to their 
concerns. A local leader in the Ressano Garcia community13 expresses the 
view that “we should act as advisory councils in which we can raise our 
opinions and influence decisions about local development”. The kind of 
collaborative initiatives that might be introduced is not specified, but what 
this example shows is that Mozambique and other SADC countries could 
still explore the meanings and different understandings of border held by 
people whose daily lives involve crossing, or seeking to cross, the border. 
Perhaps by paying more attention to these perceptions, such locally 
informed views on border governance could influence the establishment 
of more realistic human development programmes that could 
accommodate the complexities of cross-border movement.  
Example four – According to the Head of the Immigration Office at 
Mavalane Airport14, “local communities can be empowered through 
training programmes that can help them identify and manage local 
development problems such as sustainable usage of water basins [for 
preventing conflict over access to natural resources][…] conception and 
management of small development projects in local communities”.15 What 
this implies is that conflict-prevention can be facilitated by a more 
accommodating and more participatory approach by the state towards 
local cross-border communities. In keeping with this comment, it is 
recognised in the literature that improved coordination with local 
communities can create synergies that boost the capacity of the state to 
deal with security threats in their embryonic stage (Kaldor, Martin and 
Selchow, 2007). As section 8.7 will show, Mozambique’s development 
strategies need to be (re)shaped to match the actual complexities and 
specific status quo of urban and rural contexts of cross-border 
development.   
What this suggests is that the concept of development still needs to be 
adapted to accommodate both perspectives based on regional integration, 
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and practices of development and security at the local level in cross-border 
areas. This is both a complex and challenging task, however, and based on 
the Mozambican experience of border control, a more complex approach 
than simple state-centred security may be required to go beyond questions 
of national identity, natural resources and national sovereignty. However, 
concerns of officials often lie with state security and ‘informal’ means of 
evading border controls. Thus the Head of the Immigration Office at 
Mavalane Airport in Maputo16 observes:  
Mozambique was not a successful example in managing refugee policy. 
The Convention and Protocol related to refugee status prescribes that the 
status of refugee shall not be applicable if the circumstances in connection 
with which have ceased to exist, but most of refugees in Mozambique did 
not leave the country at the end of the war. 
Based on this, he believes that most refugees who acquired Mozambican 
citizenship in the past did so through unofficial mechanisms. Moreover, 
he is convinced that communities in cross-border areas can be easily 
manipulated for electoral purposes by neighbouring countries through 
uncontrolled cross-border movement and voter registration. As a result of 
such suspicions, in most cases border police and immigration officers tend 
to see border regions as spaces for potential conflicts rather than spaces 
of complementarity where cooperation might yield development 
dividends and improved security. Such prevalent suspicion, mistrust of 
others and national exclusivity makes reform and a more human-centred 
approach very difficult (Nathan, 2012; Newman, 2010; 2006a; 2006b). In 
the context of the SADC, the legacy of mistrust and the discovery of 
mineral resources can lead to territorial claims and disputes, particularly if 
those resources stretch over the transboundary regions adjacent to 
Mozambique’s land borders (Nathan, 2012; Okumu, 2010). Based on 
these circumstances, the MBP believes strongly that African countries 
have not reached a point where they can claim power without making 
reference to real physical borders. According to the Head of the 
Immigration Office at Ressano Garcia border post17,   
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…a neighbouring country can be interpreted as an enemy depending on 
political orientation and interests at stake. The best way is to work on good 
neighbourhood between countries, (this implies also respect to bilateral 
agreements between countries for better economic cooperation). Every 
country should behave as a friend and not as a regime in the region. 
 This statement implies that the Mozambican authorities understand 
regional integration from its economic angle, while security remains a 
challenge for each member state regardless of the geographical proximity. 
Importantly, there is little faith in the commitment of African states to 
regional integration inasmuch as most of them gain membership simply 
because of their geographical proximity to each other (Laakso, 2005).  
Basing his argument on these assumptions, the Head of the Immigration 
Office at Mavalane Airport in Maputo18 suggests that SADC should 
establish regional institutions such as a regional parliament, a regional 
court and a regional Central Bank, like the European bank. The European 
Union experiences illustrates that central institutions such as a bank, a 
parliament and a court are prerequisites in the development and 
implementation of central policies of integration (Niemann and Ioannou, 
2015; Lindberg, 1963). In the context of human development, these 
institutions should to enable people to meet sustainable development, 
promote cost-benefit sharing, gain access to funding, policy exchange and 
the sharing of best practices (Kaldor et al., 2007; Gualini, 2003; Perkman, 
2003).  
In the context of SADC, regional institutions could be responsible for 
harmonising different systems of legislation; establishing an official 
language (which includes training border officials and establishing 
common working procedures); and coordinating regional economic 
development (creating opportunities for citizens of the member countries 
to apply for financial investment in equal circumstances). However, the 
Head of the Immigration Office at Mavalane Airport19 points out that 
“without regional institutions to regulate economic development, regional 
integration will not achieve its purposes, which will lead member states to 
rely on national-oriented development”. In the question of management 
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of migration and border control, SDAC states have different bilateral 
agreements concerning the free movement of persons across the region, a 
circumstance that has perpetuated anti-immigration feelings in some 
countries in the region. For example, in mid-July 2014, the South African 
government unilaterally withdrew the issuance of emergency certificates 
to Mozambican citizens (including mine workers) without notifying the 
Mozambican authorities, alleging non-compliance with international 
security standards prescribed by the ICAO20 (Jornal Verdade, 2014). 
Moreover, a spokesman for the South African Department of Home 
Affairs observed that “South Africa will make efforts to comply with 
international regulations, and as a sovereign state, the country is in the 
right to protect its borders against unauthorised immigration, 
transnational crime as well as any kind of hostility across borders” (Jornal 
Verdade, 2014:1). Two weeks later (6 August 2014), South African 
authorities established unilateral proof of a minimum subsistence amount 
of R3000 for each traveller crossing the border. The reaction to this 
decision was immediate as dozens of travellers on the Mozambican side 
blocked the border gate (see image 8.1) with various objects (bricks, tree 
trunks, sticks, stones and branches). This forced the South African 
authorities to retract this decision (Maluleque, 2014).  
This evidence suggests that, regardless of the existing protocols on the 
free movement of people, there is a trend to resort to a state-centred 
approach to border control, which makes irrelevant the power of those 
legal instruments that reinforce opposition to the protocol modelled on 
that of the European Union (Crush and Dodson, 2007). The original 
designation of this protocol changed from the ‘free movement’ to the 
Protocol on the facilitation of movement of people, finalised in 2000. 
Regardless of this step, SADC member states have not yet embarked on 
ensuring the free movement of people in the region. The following section 
provides a discussion of the consolidation of a regime-based border 
control system, one which is based on cooperation while keeping a state-
centred approach to border control and migration management. 
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Image 8.1  
Barricades at the Ressano Garcia border gate  
 
 
 
Source:https://www.facebook.com/JornalVerdade/photos/a.117830171572017.13544.113487338672967/78
3206931701001/?type=1&theater; accessed on 6th August 2014 
8.7 Mozambique development strategies: a challenge to (re) 
conceptualising development in cross-border regions      
After the end of war in Mozambique, the country’s first harmonised 
strategic plan for development was the Poverty Reduction Action Plan 
(PARPA), in 2000. PARPA is the government’s medium-term strategy and 
is aligned with the National Planning System, the Agenda 202521, and the 
Millennium Development Goals. Since its inception, PARPA has been 
updated three times: (PARPA I, 2000-2004; PARPAII, 2006-2009; and 
PARPA III, 2011-2014). The goal of PARPA is poverty reduction, and 
this is implemented with a view to achieving inclusive economic growth 
(IMF Country Report, 2011).  
 In pursuance of the goal of achieving inclusive growth, Mozambique 
has defined three interrelated objectives that are intended to 1) increase 
output and productivity in the agriculture and fisheries sectors; 2) promote 
employment; and 3) foster human and social development (IMF Country 
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Report, 2011). These objectives are interdependent in different ways. 
Since more than 70% of Mozambican families are dependent on 
subsistence agriculture, improved agricultural and fisheries production 
would ensure food and nutrition security, which is fundamental to a 
healthy population (African Development Bank Group, 2011; Multi-
Annual strategy Plan, 2013). A healthy and educated population (human 
development) would contribute to productivity (IMF Country Report, 
2011).  
 Notwithstanding the country’s progress in certain areas (IMF Country 
Report, 2011), Mozambican development strategies are at odds with the 
AUBP (African Union Border Programme) perspective of development 
in the context of regional integration. The AUBP calls a rapid and 
accelerated integration of border regions a crucial mechanism in providing 
development to peoples in adjacent borders regions (African Union 
Conference, 2007). Mozambique lacks clear specifications for its 
development strategies in the context of border regions. For example, the 
Evaluation Office for the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) highlights the point that “a major challenge for Mozambique is 
how to ensure that the benefits of a growing economy are used equitably 
to alleviate widespread human poverty, especially in the rural sector…” 
(2004:7).  
This quotation suggests that Mozambique also faces a challenge in 
determining how populations in the border regions will benefit from the 
country’s economic growth. As far as SADC integration is concerned, the 
challenge is to get all member states to engage in multi-level development 
strategies. Here, development is contextualised from the human 
perspective of conditions that are created for human security and human 
dignity (such as access to medical treatment, access to mills, schools, and 
markets). In the context of Mozambican border regions, the issue of 
human security is not about protecting people from extreme vulnerability 
(Newman, 2010); it is about human security that is achieved as a result of 
normal development strategies. Des Gasper points to the need to separate 
the concept of security from the context of human individuals as the best 
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level at which to situate the notion of human security (Gasper, 2010; 
2005).  What is at stake here is the protection of individuals and 
communities from various kinds of threats, and not only from military 
threats or “security” threats in the usual sense (Gasper, 2010; Gasper, 
2005). Arguably, this distinction between a narrow focus on the security 
of states to the human referent of a broader notions of security represents 
a substantial advance, shifting the focus of policy interventions from the 
state to the individual’s self-defined and collectively-defined security 
arrangements (Vietti and Scribner, 2013; Gasper, 2005; King, 2001). This 
may be particularly relevant for those individuals and communities living 
in the kinds of cross-border areas discussed in this study.  
A focus on human dimensions of security could help to challenge the 
dominant view, emerging from interviews with officials, that 
concentrating on military threats is the best means of responding to threats 
to human life. From a development perspective,  human security can at 
least influence the dominant model of governance by reconceiving 
development as concerned with the provision of protection to individuals 
from a wider range of threats, including chronic diseases, traffic accidents, 
crime, polluted environments, inadequate food security, domestic violence 
and poverty, as well as more conventional physical security concerns 
(Oberleitner, 2002; Vietti and Scribner, 2013; Paris, 2001; Newman, 2001; 
Haftendorn, 1991). Such a (re)definition of security would require officials 
at border crossings, for example, to judge whether particular 
circumstances posed threats to national security or threats to the quality 
of life of inhabitants of the local areas, and to make decisions about cross-
border controls accordingly. Based on this more complex understanding 
of border control, security, migration and development can be understood 
as interactive dimensions of the policy processes and local decision-
making, aimed ideally at framing more innovative ways of achieving 
“harmonious and peaceful coexistence”, as well as within SADC among 
neighbouring states (Truong, 2011: 24).  
Table 8.1 below presents an analysis of state security concerns and 
community security challenges on a day-to-day basis in the particular 
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cross-border regions (Ressano Garcia, Machipanda, and Mandimba). The 
comparison is based on four referent security questions: (1) Security for 
whom? (2) What values are under threat? (3) What threatens those values? 
(4) How to respond to those security threats? (Bajpai, 2000).  
Table 8.1  
Analysis of human security and state security based on three border 
communities in Mozambique  
Security referent 
questions 
Communities (Ressano Garcia 
Mandimba; Machipanda) 
State 
(Mozambique) 
(i) Security for whom? Individuals in the border regions The state  
(ii) What values are under 
threat? 
Well-being; human dignity; safety  Territorial 
integrity; political 
independence; 
natural resources  
(iii) What threatens those 
values? 
Food insecurity; access to land 
(militarised spaces), water, 
hospitals; bribes at the border  
Unauthorised 
migration; 
transnational crime 
(trafficking, 
smuggling) 
(iv) How to achieve 
security? 
Community Consultation Forums 
for boosting state-community 
collaboration;  
Strengthening of cooperation 
between states for boosting local 
community interaction; 
Locally oriented socio-economic 
development initiatives  
Training and 
deployment of 
more patrol units; 
raids, arrests, 
deportations; joint 
patrol operations; 
ongoing 
development 
policies  
 
Source: Author’s own table based on field data and Bajpai (2000).  
 
The table suggests that individuals and communities in the three border 
regions are exposed to similar threats, such as the prevention of access to 
basic needs and the need for secure cross-border movement for the 
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purposes of their livelihoods. Limitations on cross-border movement 
threaten their well-being and human dignity. On the other hand, officials 
and policies of the Mozambican state give overwhelming priority to 
territorial integrity and physical security as more fundamental values that 
are seen to be threatened by transnational crime, smuggling and other 
forms of cross-border interaction. While local communities, as illustrated 
in the examples in the last section of this chapter, propose the 
establishment of consultative forums to find joint solutions to local 
problems, state official tend to give greater priority to the training of 
border patrollers so that these are able to respond more efficiently to 
threats, especially transnational crime and ‘terrorism’. From a human 
development perspective, Mozambican border governance has not yet 
proved its appropriateness in responding to the socio-economic context 
of those who inhabit cross-border regions. Similarly, at regional level, it 
could be suggested that as part of the process of SADC integration, all 
member states may need to (re)frame the concept of security in order to 
meet the development needs of individuals and local communities, 
without assuming that this would diminish the security of the state.        
8.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has addressed the question: “to what extent are human 
development aspects in cross-border regions taken into consideration in 
the ongoing process of regional integration in SADC?” In particular, this 
chapter explored how the socio-economic and ethno-cultural aspects at 
play in cross-border regions are taken into consideration – or not. In 
relation to Mozambique, the chapter finds that SADC integration has 
focused mainly on economic aspects of integration, which has limited 
possibilities for incorporating cross-border communities’ interactions into 
the SADC regional integration framework. By focusing largely on 
economic integration and by defining security as national security, SADC 
member states have focused on eliminating trade barriers while ensuring 
that legitimate trade is monitored in accordance with WCO security 
practices.  
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 On the question of border control, each SADC member state has been 
relying on its own internal security strategies, which has led to different 
regimes of border control in the region. Mutual distrust between countries 
and the political legacies of war in the region are the driving forces behind 
the reluctance to move away from the present state-centric approach to 
border control towards a more integrated system that would pay closer 
attention to the needs of communities in cross-border regions and across 
the SADC region.  
 As a result, the concept of a security community, as framed by SADC, 
centres on intra-state and inter-state conflicts, and this can detract from a 
broader understanding of security as socio-economic and as “human 
security”. This broader conception of security may be particularly vital for 
areas adjacent to border crossings, where communities are directly 
affected by the nature of border governance regimes and their 
implementation on both sides of the border. From the perspective of 
human development and human security, the SADC concept of a security 
community lacks reference to the usefulness of inter-connecting cross-
border areas as part of regional integrated development. In Mozambique, 
for instance, development strategies that have been put in place since the 
early 1990s say little about the transformation of border regions into 
integrated zones in accordance with AUBP. Although SADC member 
states will continue to face global influences that push them in particular 
directions in relation to security in the region, they may also need to 
consider a wider variety of types of cross-border control, and, more 
specifically, models of border governance that are more appropriate to the 
day-to-day dynamics of migration within and across the SADC region.    
Notes
1 The protocol on Politics, Defence, Security and Cooperation can be accessed 
through the following link: 
http://www.sadc.int/files/3613/5292/8367/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_
and_Security20001.pdf  
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2 The Mutual Defence Pact was created to stop member countries from 
promoting hostile activities from each other’s territories and calling for 
support from each other in such eventualities (Ngoma, 2003). SADC MDP 
can be accessed through the following link: 
http://www.sadc.int/files/2913/5333/8281/SADC_Mutual_Defence_Pact
2003.pdf 
3 The existing economic regions in Africa encompass the East African 
Community (EAC), which was originally founded in 1967 and then brought  
into force again in 2000; the SADC region, the treaty for which was signed in 
1992; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which 
was originally founded in 1975 and revised in 1993; the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), formed in December 1994 and 
replaced by the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa region 
(PTA);  the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which 
was fully approved and adopted in 1995; the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS) that became active in 1988; and the Arab 
Maghreb Union (UMA), which came into force in 1989. 
4 The European countries forming the external borders are the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland.  
5 INTERPOL is the International Police Organisation, founded in 1923. Its 
mission is to prevent and fight crime through enhanced cooperation and 
innovation in police and security matters.  
6 The Atlantic operation was conjointly undertaken by Botswana, Namibia 
and South Africa with the primary aim of combating motor vehicle theft. 
The operation resulted in the seizure of 114 stolen motor vehicles, 11 
firearms, 71 rounds of ammunition, 27 910 kilograms of dagga and the arrest 
of 23 suspects. 
7 The Midas operation was conjointly undertaken by Lesotho, Mauritius, 
Swaziland and South Africa and was aimed at motor vehicle theft, drug-
trafficking, firearms-smuggling and other attendant crimes. The operation 
resulted in the seizure of 76 stolen motor vehicles, 14 firearms, 20 000 
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rounds of ammunition, 11 694 kilograms of dagga and the arrest of 22 people 
in connection with these crimes. 
8 With technical support from South Africa, the Sesani operation was 
undertaken by Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its 
purpose was to address motor vehicle theft and associated cross-border 
crimes. It resulted in the seizure of 180 stolen motor vehicles, 47 firearms, 
15,1 grams of hard drugs (heroin and cocaine), 413 kilograms of light drugs 
(dagga and Khat), and the arrest of 64 suspects. 
9 Interviewed in February 2014 in Maputo. 
10 The sacrosanct principle was adopted in Cairo (Egypt) in 1964, at a time 
when many African countries were achieving independence. Under this 
principle, the African Union established its border programme and urged all 
member states to finalise the reaffirmation and delimitation process by 2012 
(African Union, 2007). The African Union Border Programme is a framework 
that is concerned with the delimitation and demarcation of all African state 
borders as a vital milestone in preventing conflict and promoting peace, security 
and stability as fundamental elements in the facilitation of integration and 
sustainable development in Africa. The African Union Body acknowledges that 
the borders that were established by the colonisers in their scramble for natural 
resources have now become sources of conflict in post-independence Africa. 
In order to prevent endless conflicts, the key challenge facing the AUBP is to 
transform borders from barriers into bridges of solidarity and mutual trust 
(African Union Conference, 2007). 
11 The Chizipa Community is a jurisdiction of Machipanda Administrative Post 
in Manica District in Central Mozambique.  
12 Interviewed in March 2014 in Manica District. 
13 Interviewed in October 2012. 
14 Interviewed in April 2014 in Maputo City. 
15 Interviewed in March 2014 in Maputo. 
16 Interviewed in October 2014 in Maputo. 
17Interviewed in March 2014. 
18 Interviewed in March 2014. 
19, Interviewed in March 2014. 
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20 ICAO stands for the International Civil Aviation Organisation created by the 
Chicago Convention of 1944. 
21 The Mozambique Agenda 2025 is a government intervention plan for 
development that focuses on key areas: 1) peace and stability; 2) democracy and 
participation; and 3) competitiveness and technological transformation. 
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9.1 Introduction  
This thesis has examined border governance in Mozambique in the 
context of new trends in the dynamics of migration flows in cross-border 
regions since the end of the war in 1992. It sought to provide answers to 
the main research question of how state border authorities and 
communities in the cross-border regions understand the concepts of 
‘borders’ and ‘security’. How can these understandings be reconciled or 
balanced within Mozambican and regional border governance 
arrangements and principles? This main question was broken down into 
four sub-questions aimed at achieving the abovementioned objectives: (1) 
How has the end of the Cold War and of apartheid influenced border 
governance at national and international levels, and the realities of cross-
border movements in the Southern African region, and more specifically 
in post-war Mozambique? (2) On the basis of three local case studies, how 
do communities in the border regions experience day-to-day border 
controls; what kinds of border controls can be identified, and in what ways 
do they accommodate – or not - such localised understandings of cross-
border interactions? (3) What impact have the international norms and 
migration governance standards had on the Mozambican borders 
(seaports and airports). (4) To what extent are human development 
aspects in cross-border regions taken into consideration in the ongoing 
process of regional integration in SADC? 
 Based on these sub-questions, this concluding chapter will begin with 
a synthesis of the three empirical findings and the intersection of local 
realities in cross-border regions with international models of border 
controls as well as the regional interests in SADC. This is followed by a 
reflection on the theoretical contribution of the findings and suggestions 
 
9 
Summary and research agenda for the 
future 
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of topics for further research. Finally, the chapter concludes with the 
implications of the empirical findings for policy makers.  
9.2 Empirical findings  
The main findings of this study were presented and discussed in three 
chapters: Chapter 4 dealt with Ressano Garcia, and internationalised, 
securitised, border controls; Chapter 5 concerned the Machipanda region, 
defined as blurred boundaries of a border economy; and Chapter 6 
discussed the Mandimba region and involved rethinking land-related 
cross-border governance issues. Findings were presented in order to 
address  the second sub-question of the thesis, which is “on the basis of 
three local case studies, how do communities in the border regions 
experience day-to-day border controls; what kinds of border controls can 
be identified, and in what ways do they accommodate – or not - such 
localised understandings of cross-border interactions?” 
 In response to this sub-question, Chapter 4 dealt with the Ressano 
Garcia border, which since the early 1990s has become the busiest 
crossing point on the Mozambique-South Africa border. The end of the 
war in Mozambique, coupled with the collapse of apartheid in South 
Africa, has transformed Ressano Garcia into an international (rather than 
transnational) land crossing point with thousands of travellers and vehicles 
making the crossing daily. In response to high flows of migration through 
Ressano Garcia, South African border authorities have tightened their 
control of the border by erecting electrified fences, deploying more patrol 
units and using the defence force to fight irregular forms of migration, 
trafficking and smuggling. Likewise, the Mozambican border authorities 
have introduced reforms such as the replacement of the long pass stamp 
(which was issued to the local populace, allowing them to cross the border 
into South Africa without a passport) with a passport regime and the 
deployment of more patrol units along the border. While both the South 
African and Mozambican border authorities have made efforts to fight 
irregular forms of migration and cross-border crime, the daily life of 
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communities in the Ressano Garcia border region has been adversely 
affected. It has become difficult for the local populace to cross the border 
to Komatipoort to buy consumer goods without a passport. Long-
standing tensions between border authorities and local communities 
remain unresolved, and this has perpetuated irregular forms of migration 
and smuggling.  
 Findings from the case study discussed in Chapter 5 indicated that since 
the period of war in Mozambique, day-to-day interaction between 
communities in the Machipanda-Mutare cross-border region have been 
marked by strong ties of informal trade exchanges, particularly from 
Mutare to Machipanda but including further afield such as Chimoio and 
Beira Cities. As a result of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe that has 
persisted since the mid-1990s, the Machipanda-Mutare cross-border 
region has continued to register intense informal economic exchanges, but 
with a reversal in migration patterns, from Zimbabwe to Mozambique. 
Regardless of the political and economic dynamics in Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe that have altered migration patterns, border authorities in the 
neigbouring countries have prioritised border control measures aimed at 
restricting the volume of goods exchanged in trade (by increasing tax 
duties) and limiting irregular forms of migration (by deploying more patrol 
units along the border). These measures have not addressed the socio-
economic demands related to the daily crossing of the border, an issue 
that continues to divide border authorities and local communities. 
Moreover, given the long-standing informal trade exchanges coupled with 
ethno-cultural proximity (one of the key characteristics of post-colonial 
African states), the Machipanda-Mutare cross-border region could be 
transformed into a transition zone through institutions that could further 
coordinate and strengthen those trade exchanges.   
 In Chapter 6, the Mandimba-Mangochi cross-border region was 
discussed. This case differs substantially from the previous two case 
studies. Day-to-day life in the Mandimba-Mangochi cross-border region 
is affected by access to arable land (by Malawian citizens on the 
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Mozambican side of the border) and informal exchange of trade in 
agricultural surplus (by Mozambican citizens on the Malawian side of the 
border). Regardless of these key interaction factors, border authorities in 
the two countries have been putting more effort into the control of cross-
border crime. This control strategy has not responded to food insecurity, 
which is the main factor leading to intense interaction between 
communities in Mandimba and Mangochi. This chapter suggested that co-
management of land across the Mandimba-Mangochi cross-border region 
would lead to the establishment of a border governance model more 
suitable in addressing typical post-colonial African border problems in 
accordance with recommendations prescribed in the African Union 
Border Programme. This could counteract the global regime of 
environmental management, which has led to the establishment of 
Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) in the Southern African 
region.     
 Based on the findings from these three empirical cases studies, the 
thesis concludes that, regardless of the distinctiveness of one cross-border 
region from another, Mozambique and other neigbouring states have 
prioritised a state-centric model of border control. This approach has 
resulted in different regimes of border control in the region, which has led 
to a failure to discuss ongoing integration in SADC from a human 
development standpoint in the context of socio-economic and ethno-
cultural dynamics in cross-border regions. Not only Mozambique but also 
other countries in the Southern African region have failed to incorporate 
cross-border issues into their border control strategies, and they have been 
unable to adapt international models of border governance to these cross-
border regions.   
9.3 Theoretical implications and future research  
First and foremost, existing scholarly reflections on migration in 
Mozambique (Gastrow and Mosse, 2011; Raimundo, 2009; Gastrow and 
Mosse, 2002; Gastrow, 2001) have been limited to understanding the 
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impact of restrictive border controls on people on the move. By contrast, 
this thesis has expanded on the reflection on the impact of border controls 
on the people living in the cross-border regions. As evidence from the 
three cases studies has shown, Mozambique’s cross-border border regions 
are shaped by different socio-economic and ethno-cultural dynamics, 
demanding an analytical framework that goes beyond the Westphalian 
regime of state sovereignty and diverges from international models of 
border governance. Findings from the three case studies suggest the need 
for an understanding of local complexities informing cross-border 
interactions and of factors with the potential to bring mutual benefits to 
people living in adjacent borders regions without threatening state interest 
in national security. Further studies may be useful in reflecting on how 
border governance might be rethought, both in the context of SADC 
integration and in a confrontation of the realities of internationalised 
models of border control.  
 What the case studies have illustrated is how each cross-border region, 
though different from another, reflects that on their own, state-centred 
border controls and internationalised, threat-oriented models of border 
governance will be inadequate. Both these will clash with the local realities 
of cross-border areas. Based on this key finding, this thesis has identified 
at least three research topics that combine theory and practice, and that 
could help to ensure that the concept of cross-border regions as critical 
meeting-points for post-colonial African states, specifically in the 
Southern African region, could provide alternatives to more state-centred 
border governance. These concerns firstly, questions of identity in cross-
border areas; secondly, the social integration of non-nationals; and thirdly, 
the way in which human security concepts might help in the reformulation 
of principles of border governance.   
9.3.1 Hybrid identities in cross-border regions   
It is difficult to pinpoint the role of identity behind the often messy 
realities of complex and multiple cross-border interactions. Given the 
socio-economic differences between neigbouring countries in the 
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Southern African region on the one hand, and ethno-cultural proximities 
between communities in cross-border regions on the other, this raises 
interesting questions for the researcher. Why do some border officials 
believe that communities in cross-border regions can be manipulated 
during elections in neigbouring states? Why are stronger controls in cross-
border regions unlikely to work effectively? Based on such contradictions, 
what role can hybrid identities play in moving beyond either-or thinking 
about the nature and interests of communities living in cross-border 
regions? Could a hybrid form of legal identity help border authorities and 
politicians in neigbouring countries to better understand the daily realities 
of people living in border regions? In the context of co-managed and 
transitional zones, can politicised sites of separated sovereignty, based on 
fixed, mutually exclusive identities and territorial lines on the map, become 
more flexible for local communities?    
9.3.2 Social integration of foreigners  
Although the war ended in 1992, Mozambique immigration authorities 
have yet to develop a coherent model for the integration of immigrants 
into the country. Rather, the country has been mainly concerned with 
controlling admission, transit and deportation of immigrants. In contrast, 
communities in cross-border regions understand that foreign immigrants 
can make a great contribution to local development through the 
establishment of job opportunities and skills transfer. Based on this 
background, the researcher suggests that further studies may be needed to 
examine how integration policies in Mozambique compare with local 
opinions held by Mozambican citizens on the role foreign immigrants 
play, and how immigrants might be better integrated into the economic, 
social and political life of Mozambique. This study could provide a real 
picture of social interaction between foreigners and national citizens, one 
which might suggest that foreigners are neither a burden for the state, nor 
for local communities, but that relationships will vary depending on local 
conditions. Hybrid identity and social integration are complementary 
topics that can help to expand the understanding of border controls and 
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the challenges posed by migration management in the Southern African 
region.    
9.3.3 Human security, development and border governance 
Human security is a complex discipline that embraces aspects of security 
related to the provision of protection to individuals from a variety range 
of threats such as chronic diseases, traffic accidents, crime, pollution and 
inadequate health care, food security, external aggression, domestic 
violence, poverty and other aspects threating human survival (Vietti and 
Scribner, 2013; Gasper, 2010; Gasper, 2005; Oberleitner, 2002; Paris, 
2001; Newman, 2001). On the subject of human development, evidence 
from the field suggests that Mozambican development strategies are 
broadly designed and implemented without any clear reference to human 
security in cross-border regions. Based on this gap, the thesis suggests that 
further research on human development and how it relates to human 
security and border governance would be useful, especially in meeting 
some of the needs expressed by the cross-border communities studied 
here. If taken further, the results of such research might help politicians 
to reconceptualise cross-border areas as development ‘nodes’ instead of 
as problem areas. This could contribute positively to human security in 
Mozambique and might also help to ensure that development 
programmes reflect the concerns of local communities to a greater extent. 
9.3. 4 Implications of this study for policy makers  
The problem that prompted this research in the first place was a 
contradiction between two paradigms of border governance. On the one 
hand, officials were informed by the state’s national security-driven view 
of border controls, influenced by international and regional priorities of 
‘combating crime’. On the other hand, such perceptions came into 
confrontation with the daily socio-economic and ethno-cultural realities 
of local dynamics in cross-border regions. These tensions became more 
apparent after the end of war in Mozambique in 1992. In fact, these two 
contrasting logics of border management have intensified with the 
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internationalisation and externalisation of border security by the West. In 
this way, the study set out to show how fighting transnational crime can 
pose hardships for local communities in the border regions, since their 
day-to-day life depends on constant cross-border interactions. The study 
indeed confirmed this view, and this led to the setting of three interrelated 
objectives. Firstly, the existing academic literature on the concept of 
security was reviewed and related to responses to migration policies and 
border controls by Mozambique following the end of war and the collapse 
of apartheid in South Africa. Secondly, life experiences of communities 
living in and moving through the three selected border regions in 
Mozambique were compared and contrasted. Thirdly, the impact of both 
international and regional border governance regimes on Mozambican 
policies and communities was assessed.   
 This suggests that the general literature on security can help us to 
understand how, since the end of the Cold War, countries like 
Mozambique have been faced with major changes in how security threats 
from cross-border movements have been perceived. Individuals on the 
move are now considered a threat to national sovereignty in the wider 
global context of restrictive migration policies in Western societies and 
beyond. This study has shown how internationalised models of border 
governance are reinterpreted at regional and national levels. This implies 
that those responsible for overseeing and reforming contemporary border 
governance arrangements may not achieve enhanced human security for 
the population simply by restricting the movement of so-called 
transnational criminal groups. Measures are needed that are more 
appropriate in addressing the socio-economic and ethno-cultural interests 
and needs of communities living in cross-borders areas of Mozambique, 
and in the Southern Africa region in general, and these may need to be 
elaborated upon in future if the overall (human) security situation is to 
improve.  
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